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Article 
Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in 
American Indian Religious Freedoms 
KRISTEN A. CARPENTER 
Employment Division v. Smith was a watershed moment in First 
Amendment law, with the Supreme Court holding that neutral statutes of 
general applicability could not burden the free exercise of religion.  
Congress’s subsequent attempts, including the passage of Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, to 
revive legal protections for religious practice through the legislative and 
administrative process have received tremendous attention from legal 
scholars.  Lost in this conversation, however, have been the American Indians 
at the center of the Smith case.  Indeed, for them, the decision criminalizing 
the possession of their peyote sacrament was only the last in a series of 
Supreme Court cases denying American Indian Free Exercise Clause claims. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Indian cases share a common and previously 
overlooked feature: in all of them, the Court assessed the Indian claims as too 
broad or too idiosyncratic to merit Free Exercise Clause protection and 
instead denied them through a succession of bright line formulations.  
Identifying the unrequited search for a “limiting principle” as a basis for 
analysis, this Article reassesses the religion cases and underlying theoretical 
questions of institutionalism and equality, in their Indian context.  It then 
identifies two contemporary policy shifts—namely Congress’s decision to 
entrust accommodation of Indian religious freedoms to federal agencies and 
its decision to do so at the tribal, versus individual, level—that have, in some 
respects, facilitated an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian 
religious liberties in the post-Smith era.  Taking a descriptive and contextual 
approach, the Article illuminates opportunities for additional law reform in 
the American Indian context and also larger questions of institutionalism, 
equality, and pluralism in religious freedoms law. 
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Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in 
American Indian Religious Freedoms 
KRISTEN A. CARPENTER

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The [Supreme] Court in Lyng denied the Free Exercise 
claim in part because it could not see a stopping place.  We 
uphold the RFRA claim in this case in part because otherwise 
we cannot see a starting place.  If Appellants do not have a 
valid RFRA claim in this case, we are unable to see how any 
Native American plaintiff can ever have a successful RFRA 
claim based on beliefs and practices tied to land that they 
hold sacred.
1
 
 
Employment Division v. Smith
2
 was a transformative moment in First 
Amendment law, with the Supreme Court holding that states may impose 
burdens on the exercise of religion through neutral states of general 
applicability.
3
  Departing from previous case law holding that states had to 
demonstrate a compelling interest to sustain such infringements on 
religion, Smith inspired a groundswell of interfaith coalition building,
4
 
passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
5
 (“RFRA”), the 
                                                                                                                          
 Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Associate Professor of Law, and Director of the 
American Indian Law Program, University of Colorado Law School.  Thanks to the AALS Section on 
Law & Anthropology, NYU, Pepperdine, and Colorado Law Schools for workshop opportunities, and 
to Richard Allen, Amy Bowers, Alan Brownstein, Fred Cheever, Rick Collins, Perry Dane, Allison 
Dussias, Leslie Griffin, Chris Eisgruber, Marie Failinger, Matthew Fletcher, Greg Johnson, Sonia 
Katyal, Kati Kovacs, Sarah Krakoff, Steve Moore, Helen Norton, Angela Riley, Wenona Singel, Alex 
Skibine, Rebecca Tsosie, Deward Walker, Jace Weaver, Phil Weiser, Charles Wilkinson, Thatcher 
Wine, and Ahmed White, for comments and support.   
1 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535 
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3 Id. at 888–89. 
4 See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 210 n.9 (1994) (listing dozens of secular and religious supporters of RFRA 
including Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Muslim, and Humanist organizations). 
5 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb4 (2006)) 
(restoring the substantial burden–compelling interest test to government activities that burden the 
exercise of religion, including through neutral statutes of general applicability). 
 390 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:387 
 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
6
 (“RLUIPA”), and 
an entire body of legal scholarship.
7
  Lost in this conversation, however, 
have been the American Indians who actually lost the right to practice their 
religion in Smith.
8
  Some commentators have gone so far as to 
affirmatively deny an American Indian context for Smith.
9
  Yet, for 
American Indians, the decision criminalizing the possession of sacramental 
peyote was devastating both on its own
10
 and as the culminating case in a 
series of Supreme Court decisions denying American Indian Free Exercise 
Clause claims.
11
  Moreover, in addition to RFRA’s general restoration of 
                                                                                                                          
6 Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc) (extending free 
exercise protections to property owners and prisoners and adjusting certain definitions under RFRA).  
7 There is a great deal of scholarship surrounding the Smith case and the legislative responses to 
it.  A number of these articles and books are cited throughout this Article.  For criticism of Smith and 
support for RFRA, see, e.g., Doug Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994).  For defense of Smith and criticism of RFRA, see, e.g., Marci A. 
Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the 
Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2011).   While this Article engages seriously with the 
Indian religion cases and others relevant to its analysis, it does not delve more broadly into the history 
or theory of the First Amendment, which is treated in an exceptionally rich literature by numerous 
experts in the field of constitutional law, and law and religion.  For a few of the many sources see, e.g., 
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, 
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 415–523 (3d ed. 
2011); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).  Scholars have considered 
questions that are relevant to, but beyond the scope of, this Article, including the meaning of “religion” 
vis-à-vis a theory of the First Amendment.  See Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A 
General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996).  For a treatment of 
religious minorities beyond American Indians, see Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the 
First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222 (2003). 
8 Consider, for example, the three symposia devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the Smith 
decision.  Of the twenty-five symposium articles, many of which were authored by leading scholars in 
law and religion, only two pieces focused on Indian religious freedoms and these two were authored by 
practitioners or students.  See Symposium, Criminal Law & the First Amendment, 44 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1 (2011); Symposium, The Twenty Year Anniversary of Employment Division v. Smith: 
Reassessing the Free Exercise Clause and the Intersection Between Religion and the Law, 55 S.D. L. 
REV. 385, 385 (2010) (dedicating the symposium to Smith not because “the decision actually changed 
free exercise doctrine that much, but rather because the responses to it changed history”); Symposium, 
Twenty Years After Employment Division v. Smith: Assessing the Twentieth Century’s Landmark Case 
on the Free Exercise of Religion and How It Changed History, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2011) 
(viewing the symposium as “an occasion to request new thinking to help chart doctrinal paths through 
the First Amendment’s own real thicket of ambiguity and conflict in the Religion Clauses”).   
9 In a recent article, the former Oregon Attorney General affirmatively denied any Indian context 
for Smith.  See David B. Frohnmayer, Employment Division v. Smith: “The Sky That Didn’t Fall,” 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1657–58 (2011) (“This was not an Indian law case . . . . Galen Black was not a 
Native American.  No discernible tribal treaty or general tribal interests were remotely involved.  In 
fact, as an anthropological matter, the Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest did not utilize peyote at all, 
because the substance is not indigenous to the climate or culture of the region.”). 
10 See WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR: THE 10 WORST INDIAN 
LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 317 (2010) (“The injustice of Smith slapped many Native Americans in the 
face.”).   
11 See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699–700 (1986) (holding federal government did not 
violate Free Exercise Clause by conditioning welfare benefits upon practice, use of social security 
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the substantial burden–compelling interest, there has been a virtual 
explosion of federal legislative and regulatory law directed specifically at 
accommodating American Indian religious freedoms.  These legal 
developments have been largely unexplored by the law and religion 
scholars who aim to assess religious freedoms in the post-Smith era.
12
       
The Indian religion cases may be explained by a number of factors, 
including the Court’s narrowing of Free Exercise Clause protections 
generally after the high water marks of Sherbert and Yoder
13
 and the 
Court’s expansion of government property rights in the same era.14  These 
points have been addressed in other scholarship, including my own work in 
the past.
15
  But there is another point, so far under-theorized in the 
literature, that sheds light on the pre-Smith cases and post-Smith reforms: 
the unrequited search for a “limiting principle” in American Indian 
religious freedoms jurisprudence.  In every Indian religion case, the 
Supreme Court assessed the Indian claims as too broad or too idiosyncratic 
to merit Free Exercise Clause protection and, instead, denied them through 
a succession of bright line formulations.  For example, in Lyng v. 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Association,
16
 the Court rejected Free Exercise 
Clause objections to government plans to build a road through an Indian 
sacred site, in part because the suit implicated “rather spacious tracts of 
                                                                                                                          
number, prohibited by Abenaki Indian’s religion); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439, 452–53 (1988) (holding federal government did not violate Free Exercise Clause by 
approving Forest Service plan that would destroy Indian sacred site); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872, 888–89 (1990) (holding that state government did not violate Free Exercise Clause through statute 
denying unemployment benefits to individuals discharged from work for possession of peyote). 
12 One exception is the very insightful article by my Colorado Law colleague Professor Richard 
Collins who evaluates accommodation of sacred sites claims through a comparative study of the United 
States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia and concludes that indigenous peoples have fared better in 
political strategies than judicial review.  See Richard B. Collins, Sacred Sites and Religious Freedom 
on Government Land, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 241, 269 (2003) (discussing costs of religious 
accommodation on American Indians and others in society).   
13 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120 (1990) (criticizing Smith on a number of grounds including its “troubling” use 
of precedent); Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. L. REV. 145, 154 (2004) 
(arguing that Smith marks a “crucial divide in free exercise law” and “sharply restricts the scope of the 
Free Exercise Clause”).  
14 Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for 
Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1062–67 (2005) (arguing that courts have failed to 
recognize Indian property rights at sacred sites and evaluating a real property law approach to sacred 
sites cases); Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENV. L.J. 313, 324–40 
(2008) (arguing that First Amendment cases have failed to recognize the constitutive relationship 
between tribal nations and sacred sites, and proposing that federal administrative policy should 
recognize the non-fungible nature of sacred sites in tribal identity and culture); Kristen A. Carpenter et 
al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1113–24 (2009) (criticizing judicial decisions on 
sacred sites under the First Amendment and RFRA and arguing for a cultural property approach 
grounded in indigenous stewardship and cooperative governance). 
15 See Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1087.  
16 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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public property.”17  While the Indians attempted to “stress the limits” of 
their claim, the Court could see “[n]othing in the principle for which they 
contend” that would prevent them from seeking “to exclude all human 
activity but their own from sacred areas of the public lands.”18  Instead, the 
Court held, the Indians would only have an actionable case if they could 
show that the government had “coerced” them into violating their religion, 
through the denial of a benefit or imposition of a sanction. 
Similar concerns plagued Bowen v. Roy,
19
 in which the Court said the 
plaintiff could not prevail on his objection to the use of a Social Security 
number on the grounds that it would “harm [the] spirit” of his daughter.  
The Court held that this claim, attributed to Abenaki Indian beliefs, was no 
more actionable than a “sincere religious objection to the size or color of 
the Government’s filing cabinets.”20  And in Smith, Native American 
Church (“NAC”) members failed on a challenge to a state statute 
prohibiting the possession of peyote, their religious sacrament, in part 
because of fears that widespread claims for religious drug use would 
follow.
21
  Here, the Court held that states need not grant religious 
exemptions to neutral statutes of general applicability like this one.   
It appears, then, that the Court’s inability to discern a limit on the 
Indian religious practices in Bowen, Lyng, or Smith was a common factor 
leading to its outright denial of the claims in each.  Of course, American 
Indians are not the only ones who face the slippery slope problem in free 
exercise cases.  As Ira Lupu evocatively put it, “Behind every free exercise 
claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, 
and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands 
from religious deviants of every stripe.”22  The confounding question is 
whether and how to draw the line between the legitimate claim and the 
deviant one.
23
  In many religion cases, judges are able to rely on their 
                                                                                                                          
17 Id. at 452–53.  
18 Id.  
19 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
20 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452–53. 
21 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89 (1990); see also Brief for Petitioner, Emp’t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (No. 88-1213), 1989 WL 1126846 at *6, *21 (stating that peyote is 
“dangerous” and that “accommodating religious drug use would necessarily mean that highly 
dangerous drugs . . . could lawfully be in private hands, for use at private discretion.  Each exemption 
 . . . would compromise the regulatory goal of eliminating the presence, use and availability of 
dangerous drugs in our society”). 
22 Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 947 (1989) (emphasis added).  
23 Compare Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sam Deloria: San Francisco Peaks Could Be the First Test 
of the Obama Administration’s Support of the UN DRIP, TURTLE TALK (Jan. 5, 2011, 12:45 PM), 
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2011/01/05/sam-deloria-san-francisco-peaks-could-be-the-first-test-of-
the-obama-administrations-support-of-the-un-drip/ (“[Is] anyone . . . taking a stab at formulating a way 
for the executive branch . . . to give principled accommodation to Indian religious concerns without 
running afoul of the Establishment Clause?  [I] think we need to write the formula ourselves instead of 
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personal experience and common sense.  Courts typically know that a 
Christian individual’s claim not to work on the Sabbath is a legitimate 
religious observance, will take just one day per week, and will not cause 
the working economy to grind to a halt.
24
  But when it comes to the 
particulars of minority religions, it may be more difficult for the courts to 
evaluate the legitimacy and scope of particular practices, leading them to 
question both their own judicial competence and equality among plaintiffs, 
and to prefer bright line rules over nuanced analysis.
25
 
American Indian religions perfectly illustrate this challenge.
26
  From 
the perspective of many American Indians, the judicial concerns about the 
scope of their religions appear specious because the religions themselves 
specifically dictate and limit the practices.
 27
  These traditions are ancient in 
origin, tracing back to creation stories that place human beings on the earth 
and set forth values that will enable the people to thrive in their 
                                                                                                                          
waiting for them to do it, and I think we need to understand their bewilderment and their need to 
understand the scope of any accommodation we ask for.”). 
24 Sherbert v. Verner,  374 U.S. 398 (1963) (South Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause 
when it denied unemployment benefits to an individual who refused to accept Saturday work in 
violation of her Seventh Day Adventist beliefs); Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Flor., 107 S. 
Ct. 1046, 1048 (holding that Florida violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment 
benefits to an individual who, after conversion to Seventh Day Adventist church, was fired because she 
could not work on her Sabbath).   Judicial notice of the practice does not, however, guarantee that the 
plaintiff will prevail.  See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601–09 (1966) (noting that “[e]ach of the 
appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires the closing of their places of 
business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each 
Saturday,” and then rejecting First Amendment challenges to a state statute penalizing work on 
Sundays). 
25 See Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion 
as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629, 2631 (2009) (“The practical result 
of this attitude is that crucifixes may be displayed in the public schools because secularized Christianity 
represents a structural element of the western constitutional identity, while the wearing of Islamic 
symbols is either banned or restricted because it represents values and practices that are cast as illiberal 
and undemocratic.”). 
26 Walter Echo-Hawk has argued that, in light of judicial protection for other minority religious 
practices, including the ritual slaughter of Santeria, the Indian religion cases should not be viewed 
narrowly as “products of an insensitive court system that experienced inordinate difficult understanding 
and protecting a set of religions vastly different from those more familiar to American judges” but 
rather as “a form of discrimination and intolerance … propelled by forces of conquest and the mind-set 
of colonialism.”  ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 274–75.  Somewhat in contrast, Professor Richard 
Collins has argued that indigenous sacred sites claims: 
[R]eflect the extraordinary difficulty of committing the final say on issues of 
religious accommodations to judges.  Lacking a workable metric to determine the 
importance and authenticity of religious claims, judges rest their decisions almost 
entirely on the adequacy of secular justifications for denying religious claims, and 
most contested claims lose. 
Collins, supra note 12, at 269. 
27 See Justin B. Richland, Hopi Sovereignty as Epistemological Limit, 24 WICAZO SA REV. 89, 
92–105 (2009) (describing limits on Hopi ceremonial knowledge and property among individuals, 
families, and clans within Hopi society). 
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surroundings.
28
  Whether the religion calls for peyote, eagle feathers, burial 
rites, or access to sacred sites, the religions set forth the season, location, 
sacraments, prayers, and other aspects of ritual practice.
29
  Tribal religious 
leaders, academic experts, and even, in some cases, published legislative 
constitutions and codes, can attest to these practices.
30
 Contrary to the 
Court’s fears in Lyng, for example, the Yurok, Karuk, and Tolowa Indians 
were not trying to reclaim the entire public lands or to exclude anyone 
from entry, but rather to protect the sacred “High Country” and “Medicine 
Rocks.”31  And contrary to the fears in Smith, the NAC carefully dictates 
the ritual ingestion of peyote and forbids extra-religious use as a 
sacrilege.
32
  If taken seriously and understood, the tribal religions could 
provide at least some of the answers that the courts seem to seek.   
Yet, the Court sees two problems with this approach to the question of 
where to draw the line: the problem of institutional competence and of 
equality.  Institutionally, an assessment of limits based on religious tenets 
would engage the courts in theological inquiry beyond their competence.
33
  
Prior to Lyng, state and federal courts alike often used a “centrality” test to 
limit Free Exercise Clause relief to burdens on religious practices that were 
central to the religion.
34
  Justice O’Connor rejected this test on grounds that 
it would require courts to “weigh the value of every religious belief and 
practice” allegedly threatened by a government program and to hold that 
“some sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to 
certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious 
objectors who brought the lawsuit.”35  Such an approach would “cast the 
Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.”36  Justice 
                                                                                                                          
28 See VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 133–46 (3d ed. 2003) (“The 
Navajo legends begin with an account of the emergence of the Navajos or First People from the 
underworlds . . . .”).  
29 See Amy Bowers & Kristen A. Carpenter, Challenging the Narrative of Conquest: The Story of 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 489, 491–97 
(Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011) (describing Yurok tribal rituals and cultural covenants). 
30 See, e.g., General Provisions, Navajo Nation Code Tit. 1 (1995), § 205 (B)–(D) (identifying by 
name six sacred mountains and describing Navajo obligations to them); see also Carpenter, A Property 
Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1112–19 (providing examples of tribal law 
and custom on religious treatment of sacred sites in Zuni, White Mountain Apache, and Navajo tribes); 
see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional 
Law, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 168–78 (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012) (reviewing tribal constitutional provisions on religious 
freedom); Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Toward an Indigenous System of Cultural Property 
Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 106–08 (2005) (providing examples of religious law and custom 
embodied in legislative codes of Yankton Sioux, Pawnee, Eastern Cherokee, and Absentee Shawnee).  
31 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988). 
32 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 890 (majority opinion). 
34 Lyng at 457 (rejecting “centrality” analysis). 
35 Id. 
36 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458. 
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O’Connor’s reasoning resounds with a rich body of theoretical work in law 
and religion, noting that courts are generally encouraged to take a “hands-
off” approach to substantive questions of religion, both because judges 
may not be experts in religious matters and to preserve the separation 
between church and state.
37
  It is for these reasons that courts generally 
assume the sincerity of religious practice and do not delve into theological 
merits, this includes everything from church property to clergy hiring 
cases.   
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that concerns about 
judicial competence in the religion arena may be overstated, much to the 
detriment of religious practitioners.
38
  In this view, judges must often make 
decisions about complex areas outside of their legal training—from 
scientific to financial matters—and the religious nature of First 
Amendment cases should not obscure the judicial capacity to make 
reasoned decisions based on the trial evidence or appellate record.  In the 
American Indian context, state and federal judges often made perfectly 
thoughtful decisions in the cases
39
 leading up to Lyng and Smith, making it 
difficult to see the Supreme Court’s unilateral denials of religious freedom 
as preferable to the earlier nuanced analyses.  Moreover, as described in 
greater detail below, the federal government has for over two hundred 
years inserted itself into American Indian religion—originally through 
policies designed to eradicate tribal culture and more recently to reverse 
those policies.
40
  Given federal regulation of religious peyote, eagle 
feathers, and sacred sites, it is rather late in the day to disclaim a judicial 
role in American Indian religious freedoms cases. 
On the equality point, scholars have argued both that courts should not 
privilege religion itself over other fundamental liberty claims and that they 
should not indicate any preference among religious sects or individuals.
41
  
One can see strands of both equality arguments in the Indian religion cases.  
As Justice O’Connor said in Lyng and as Justice Scalia said in Smith, the 
American Indian plaintiffs in those cases were entitled to the same access 
to public lands and controlled substances as every other citizen.
42
  The Free 
Exercise Clause does not provide a basis for extending special rights, 
                                                                                                                          
37 This scholarship is discussed in more detail in Part IV.   
38 See generally Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are We 
Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009).    
39 People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964) (evaluating peyote religion claims of NAC 
members); Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (evaluating funeral practices of Athabascan 
Indians).  
40 Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century 
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
773, 774–75 (1997).  For additional discussion, see infra Part II.   
41 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment, 2006 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 571 (describing some of the scholarly debate on this issue). 
42 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.  
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which could violate the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.  
Instead of privileging religion, the Constitution only prevents the 
government from coercion or discrimination based on religious belief.  
Under this view, Smith may have been decided correctly.
43
  Other scholars 
argue, however, that even if Smith correctly treated religion as non-
exceptional, it was still wrongly decided because it discriminated against 
American Indians vis-à-vis other groups that enjoy access to their 
sacraments.
44
   
While laudable, even these nuanced views of equality often fail to 
capture the interests at stake in the American Indian context, in part 
because they remain grounded in the First Amendment’s individual rights 
paradigm.  To be sure, religious legal theory has begun to conceptualize 
group rights through a number of models, including, among others, the 
aggregated interests of members, minority rights, and church autonomy, all 
of which suggest important points of intersection for the American Indian 
context.
45
  But these accounts of institutional and group rights do not 
recognize the unique status of history of Indian tribes.
46
  While Indian 
tribes share some similarities with racial minorities and religious 
institutions, they are more properly described as pre-constitutional 
sovereigns with reserved rights over their citizens and territories.
47
  Tribes 
are not bound by the Bill of Rights and may—as some tribes do—maintain 
theocratic forms of government.
48
  Indian tribes generally retain rights of 
self-government and an ongoing, unique political relationship with the 
                                                                                                                          
43 See, e.g., Leslie Griffin¸ Smith and Women’s Equality, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1831, 1835 
(hailing Smith as necessary for women’s rights and equality as against the oppressive practices of 
religious groups). 
44 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 95–96 (2007). 
45 See discussion infra Part IV. 
46 See Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 802 (2007) 
(arguing that “American Indian Tribes do not neatly fit into existing legal paradigms”); Sarah Krakoff, 
Inextricably Political: Race, Membership and Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2169402 (observing that “courts uphold 
laws and policies that further the separate, and constitutionally based, political status of American 
Indian tribes”). 
47 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 519 (1832) (categorizing the Cherokee Nation as an 
independent territory, subject to the treaties with the United States, within which the laws of the state of 
Georgia can have no force); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831) (stating that the 
Cherokee Nation can more accurately be described as “domestic dependent nation” than a foreign state 
or state of the union).  For a discussion of contemporary federal Indian policy implementing these 
holdings, see infra Part IV.  
48 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–82 (1896); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 
(D.N.M. 1954); see generally Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the Indian 
Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1596 (2004) (discussing how the Constitution does not regulate the conduct 
of Indian tribal governments). 
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United States.
49
  Congress, in turn, has plenary authority in Indian affairs 
and an obligation to protect tribal resources under the federal Indian trust 
responsibility.
50
  
This special relationship between Indian tribes and the United States 
has historically been a double-edged sword in the religion arena.  In many 
American Indian communities, the traditional Indian religion is at the root 
of the tribal culture, social structure, subsistence practices, and even, in 
theocratic tribes, government.
51
  Understanding that tribal survival was 
linked to these religious practices, the federal government actively 
suppressed American Indian religions as a means of eradicating tribes and 
assimilating their members into the Christian citizenry in the eighteenth 
and
 
nineteenth centuries.
52
  Today, as tribes recover from this legacy, 
Indian leaders have described the ability to practice their religion as critical 
to tribal “self-determination,”53 and on the flip side, have decried threats to 
their religious practices as “genocide.”54  As the Indian legal and religious 
scholar Vine Deloria Jr. wrote, “There is no salvation in tribal religions 
apart from the continuance of the tribe itself.”55  In this regard, Indian 
religious claims against the federal government are not only about 
defending individual beliefs against government intrusion, but also about 
preserving tribal societies from extermination.   
If the meaning of equality must be re-assessed in the Indian religion 
context, so too must the question of institutional role.  Smith is famous for 
shifting religious accommodation from the judiciary to the legislature.
56
  
                                                                                                                          
49 See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 519; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17–18.  For a discussion of 
contemporary federal Indian policy implementing these holdings, see infra Part IV.  
50 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) 398, 
438–40 [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
51 DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION, supra note 28, at 211 (“The obvious 
benefit of a tribal religion is its coextensiveness with other functions of the community.  Instead of a 
struggle between church and state, these become complementary aspects of community life.”). 
52 See Dussias, supra note 40, at 773, 774–75.       
53 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[The] 
traditional religious uses of [Devils Tower] are . . . vital to the health of our nation and to our self-
determination as a Tribe.  Those who use the butte to pray become stronger.  They gain sacred 
knowledge from the spirits that helps us to preserve our Lakota culture and way of life.  They become 
leaders.  Without their knowledge and leadership, we cannot continue to determine our destiny.”). 
54 After the district court decided against the tribes in Navajo Nation, the Navajo Nation’s 
President, Joe Shirley, was quoted as saying: “It is another sad day . . . [when] in the 21st Century, 
genocide and religious persecution continue to be perpetrated on Navajo people [and] other Native 
Americans . . . who regard the [San Francisco] Peaks as sacred.”  Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents 
Now Targeting City Council, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Jan. 13, 2006, available at 
http://azdailysun.com/snowmaking-opponents-now-targeting-city-council/article_3cff71dc-acbf-59f9-
8461-63548e54cfb5.html (emphasis added). 
55 See DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION, supra note 28, at 194. 
56 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal 
of Roles, 2001 BYU L. REV. 611, 613–15 (2001) (discussing Congressional attempts to protect minority 
religious interests in the wake of Smith).  Compare Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and 
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As Justice Scalia wrote: “[A] society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of 
that value in its legislation as well.”57  Smith and its defenders argued that 
the legislature is better suited than the courts to balance sensitive questions 
of religion and politics.
58
  Yet critics argued that Lyng, Smith, and other 
decisions abdicated the judiciary’s traditional role as a protector of 
minority rights, leaving religious minorities vulnerable to a political 
process in which they are, at worst, poorly represented, and at best, forced 
to use valuable community resources to vindicate rights that others take for 
granted.
59
  This critique is surely apt in the American Indian context, where 
tribes have had to go it alone, lobbying for peyote, eagle feathers, and 
sacred sites protection.
60
 Indeed, when the large inter-faith coalition 
famously pushed for the passage of RFRA to restore the traditional Free 
Exercise Clause test following Smith, it expressly declined to push the 
agenda of the NAC on grounds that peyote use was too controversial for a 
broad-based legislative effort.
61
   
                                                                                                                          
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 195 (1997) (arguing that 
Congress should be permitted to adopt a more robust, protective interpretation of free exercise rights 
than those articulated by the Court), and Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An 
Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 690–92 (1992) (defending the 
legislative accommodation model), with Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The 
Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 600–03 (1991) 
(arguing that adjudication is preferable to legislation to address free exercise issues), and Ira C. Lupu, 
The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 776–79 (1992) (criticizing permissive 
accommodations under the legislative-accommodation model).   
57 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
58 See Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause, supra note 56, at 600–02 (discussing the 
benefits of judicial adjudication of free exercise claims).  
59 See Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the 
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger 
When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1725 n.74 (2011) (discussing the 
difficulties that religious minorities face in protecting their rights through the political process).  
60 The Obama Administration’s Indian policy has been critiqued on precisely these grounds.  See 
Andrew Cohen, If Obama Is Serious About American Indians, He’ll Offer More than Just Eagle 
Feathers, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/if-obama-is-serious-about-american-indians-hell-
offer-more-than-eagle-feathers/249311 (criticizing President Obama’s focus on clarifying the rules of 
eagle feathers, while failing to address other major issues in American Indian policy).  
61 See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment Division v. Smith, 
30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 1016 (1998).  As Epps writes:  
[T]he NAC was kept at a distance from the ecumenical coalition that formed to push 
for passage of RFRA—a fact that NARF staff recall with resentment.  Walter Echo-
Hawk recalled that NAC was: “asked to pretty much please go away, get your own 
separate legislation.  We’re going to get ours, and once our rights are fixed, we’ll be 
there to support you on yours.  And they asked the Church to basically get their own 
coalition [and] get their own law, and not try to get their own amendment in this 
legislation.  [NAC was] considered controversial and the whole drug politics and 
that sort of thing-and we felt snubbed and let down.”  The Church did not receive its 
legislative protection until nearly a year later, with the enactment of a statute 
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Yet the shift from judicial to legislative-regulatory accommodation 
also has particular ramifications in the American Indian context that 
scholars have not fully considered.  Since the 1970s, Congress has 
repudiated its historical suppression of Indian religions and mobilized its 
plenary power and trust duties in support of tribal self-determination and 
religious freedoms.
62
  Enactments and amendments to the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Bald Eagle 
and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and Native American Graves Protection 
and Repatriation Act now make it federal policy to preserve and 
accommodate the traditional religions of American Indians.
63
  These 
statutes delegate to agencies, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Forest 
Service, Park Service, Army Corps of Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the obligation to manage resources—such as sacred sites, eagle 
feathers, human remains, and peyote plants—which are critical to 
American Indian religion.
64
   
This legislative-regulatory framework in Indian religious matters has, 
in many respects, achieved what First Amendment litigation could not.  
Today, Congress and the agencies treat tribes as governments for whom 
religious cultural traditions are constitutive elements and work with them 
to negotiate accommodations.
65
 The Clinton, Bush, and Obama 
administrations have ordered agencies to develop procedures and policies 
for accommodating tribal needs, and have issued special directives on 
                                                                                                                          
protecting religious use of peyote by members of Indian tribes.  
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
62 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006); American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006).  
63 The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 provides, “it shall be the 
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom 
to believe, express, and exercise the[ir] traditional religions.”  
42 U.S.C. § 1996.  The National Historic Preservation Act declares that “the historical and cultural 
foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life and development.” 
16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2006).  The Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle Protection Act “permit[s] the taking, 
possession, and transportation of specimens . . . for the religious purposes of Indian tribes.” 16 U.S.C. § 
668a (2006).  The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act provides that inventory for 
human remains and associated funeral objects “shall be . . . completed in consultation with tribal 
government and Native Hawaiian organization officials and traditional religious leaders.” 25 U.S.C. § 
3003(h)(1)(A) (2006). 
64 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668b (“The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to enter into 
cooperative agreements with State fish and wildlife agencies or other appropriate State authorities to 
facilitate enforcement of [The Bald and Gold Eagles Protection Act].”). 
65 See Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 329–35, 364–38 (considering 
agency expertise in sacred sites matters); Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country in State of 
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 109, 111 (1999) (acknowledging the 
Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs’ expertise in American Indian affairs and 
President Clinton’s Executive Order calling for increased collaboration between agencies and Indian 
tribal governments). 
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Indian sacred sites and eagle feathers.
66
  The administrative process offers 
several mechanisms—consultation, notice and comment, hearings, 
accommodation plans, and co-management—by which tribes and the 
agencies engage in that process.
 
 Indeed, over the years, agencies and tribes 
have developed mutual relationships of trust and shared information with 
respect to lands and natural resources,
67
 and have used those common 
interests to negotiate several notable religious accommodations over sacred 
sites, peyote, eagle feathers, and burial grounds.
68
  Because of the political 
and secular nature of the relationship with tribes, Indian religious 
legislation is subject to rational basis review and thus often withstands 
challenges brought under the Equal Protection or Establishment Clauses.
69
  
For all of these reasons, I identify the current legislative-regulatory 
framework as an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian 
religious freedoms. 
Still challenges remain.  In the final analysis, Indian religious freedom 
is subject to Congressional authority and agency discretion, and sometimes 
the agencies decide to subordinate Indian religious needs to other 
stakeholder interests.
70
  Moreover, the courts have struggled to determine 
how to interpret RFRA’s substantial burden–compelling interest test in 
these cases.
71
  Thus, while acknowledging the transformation of American 
Indian religious freedoms law, this Article highlights both successes and 
failures under the post-Smith legislative-regulatory framework.  In 
particular, this Article acknowledges and identifies a number of 
opportunities for additional improvements to federal policy and judicial 
review in American Indian religious freedoms cases.  These are important 
issues at a time when the United States has just recently adopted the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, with its many 
                                                                                                                          
66 See infra note 298 and accompanying text.  
67 See Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country, supra note 65, at 111 & n.244. 
68 See infra Part IV.B.    
69 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553, 555 (1974) (applying rational basis review, 
not strict scrutiny, to federal legislation benefiting American Indians because it is a political rather than 
a race-based classification); United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding eagle permit program against challenge by a non-Indian on the grounds that Congress has 
“a compelling interest” in  “protection of the culture of federally-recognized Indian tribes”); Peyote 
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that NAC 
membership is a political classification).  
70 See Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 324. 
71 Compare Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(rejecting tribal RFRA challenge to Forest Service decision to use treated wastewater on sacred site 
under standard enunciated in Lyng), with Comanche Nation v. United States, No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 
WL 4426621, at *20 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008) (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the 
federal government from constructing a “training support center” on lands sacred to the Comanche 
people, on the strength of the tribe’s RFRA and NHPA claims, and noting disagreement between Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits on test for substantial burden under RFRA in sacred site cases). 
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provisions for indigenous religious, spiritual, and cultural freedoms,
72
 and 
President Obama has called for legal reform to bring the United States into 
compliance.
73
  In this regard, American Indians press the United States not 
only to deal with tribal issues,
74
 but also to assess what it means to 
guarantee religious freedom in our intercultural society of overlapping 
identities and diverse world views.
75
 
The Article aims to elaborate a new perspective on the cases, statutes, 
and regulations as a bridge to deeper understanding at the intersection of 
American Indian law and religious freedoms law.  In this regard, the 
objectives of this Article are largely descriptive and contextual, rather than 
normative or strategic.
76
  More specifically, I argue that with a better 
appreciation of the equality and institutional arguments, the truly 
transformative potential of the recent Indian religion statutes and 
regulations becomes clear.  In the Bowen-Lyng-Smith era, American Indian 
religious freedoms were litigated primarily within an individual rights 
framework wherein the problem of “limiting principles” was an 
insurmountable hurdle.  In the post-Smith statutes, an entirely new model 
has emerged.  After centuries of religious oppression, the United States has 
finally promised religious liberty to Indian tribes and their citizens.  With 
tribal governments and federal agencies at the table, the questions of scope 
and legitimacy that previously torpedoed Indian religious freedoms claims 
outright are now vetted and discussed by authorized parties as they work 
                                                                                                                          
72 See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) (providing Articles 11 and 12, which assert the right to practice 
indigenous cultures, religions, and ceremonies; Article 25, which asserts the right to strengthen spiritual 
relationships with traditional territories; Article 31, which asserts the right to indigenous cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge, and cultural expressions; and Article 34, which asserts the right to 
indigenous spiritual, cultural, and other institutions). 
73 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the White House Tribal Nations 
Conference (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/12/16/remarks-president-white-house-tribal-nations-conference. 
74 Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 
YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953) (“Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to 
poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of 
other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.”).   
75 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2d ed. Oxford U. 
Press 2004) (stating that “in a world of increasingly overlapping and integrated political spheres,” we 
should consider the interests of “peoples,” a term that  “should be understood to refer to all those 
spheres of community, marked by elements of identity and collective consciousness, within which 
people’s lives unfold—independently of considerations of historical or postulated sovereignty”). 
76 In past work, I have advanced the normative argument that federal courts provide insufficient 
recognition of tribal property rights at sacred sites and suggested strategic approaches in several 
different models of advocacy grounded in property theory.  For further discussion, see the articles cited 
supra note 14.  Other scholars have suggested litigation and legislative approaches grounded in 
constitutional theory.  See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Toward a Balanced Approach for the 
Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269 (2012) (calling for 
intermediate scrutiny in Indian sacred sites cases).    
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toward meaningful religious accommodations.  The post-Smith era thus 
reveals an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian religious 
freedoms. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides background on 
American Indian religious practices and the law.  Part III identifies the 
problem of “limiting principles” in Indian religious free exercise 
jurisprudence, arguing that the courts’ inability to find a satisfactory 
limiting principle led them to establish bright lines denying American 
Indian religious freedoms in sacred sites, peyote, and other cases.  Part IV 
suggests that recent developments in the legislative and administrative 
process empower agencies and tribes to advance religious freedom; 
although more is needed, these “empowering practices” offer a partial 
solution to the problem.  This Article concludes in Part V with reflections 
on the broader lessons that the American Indian experience offers for 
questions of religious freedom and pluralism in the United States.   
II.  AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIONS AND THE LAW 
American Indians have rich spiritual traditions in which they 
conceptualize their place in the world, experience a connection with the 
supernatural, and develop values to order their communities.
77
  In many 
native cultures, religion is interwoven with relationships, rituals, stories, 
and places.
78
  Navajos, for example, have many practices identified as 
elements of the Navajo “religion” such as a spiritual ethic, cosmology, 
deities, creation story, ceremonial chantways, daily rituals, and sacred 
sites.
79
  But in the Navajo language, it may be more meaningful to describe 
these practices as an entire way of living in harmony with one’s 
surroundings, relatives, and circumstances.
80
  James Zion explains that one 
of the fundamental principles of Navajo life is the phrase “sa’ah naaghai 
bik’eh hozho, which states that ‘the conditions for health and well-being 
                                                                                                                          
77 See DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION, supra note 28, at 67 (“[T]he gulf 
between religious reality and other aspects of community experience is not . . . wide.”); Inés 
Hernández-Ávila, Mediations of the Spirit: Native American Religious Traditions and the Ethics of 
Representation, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 11, 13–14 (Lee Irwin ed., 
2000) (discussing sweat lodge traditions in various Native American cultures). 
78 WILMA MANKILLER, EVERY DAY IS A GOOD DAY, REFLECTIONS BY CONTEMPORARY 
INDIGENOUS WOMEN 11–16 (2004). 
79 See LELAND C. WYMAN, THE RED ANTWAY OF THE NAVAHO 20–25 (1965) (detailing the 
ceremonies and traditions of the Navajo associated with the myth of the Red Antway); WILLIAM A. 
YOUNG, QUEST FOR HARMONY: NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUAL TRADITIONS 246 (2006) (delineating 
the beliefs of traditional Navajo spirituality and declaring that “[t]he Navajo world is a unity; no 
separate sphere of life denoted by a word equivalent to religion exists”). 
80 See Barre Toelken, The Demands of Harmony, in I BECOME A PART OF IT: SACRED 
DIMENSIONS IN NATIVE AMERICAN LIFE 68–69 (D.M. Dooling & Paul Jordan-Smith eds., 1989) 
(asserting that different parts of nature according to the Navajo “naturally . . . go in the same category 
because they are ritually connected”).   
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are harmony within and connection to the physical/spiritual world.’”81  
Reflecting similar sentiments, one commentator writes, “Because of 
the unified nature of Native American traditional culture, it can be difficult 
to assign cultural dynamics to fragmented Western categories.”82  Yet, the 
oft-repeated mantra that Indians “have no word for religion”83 is surely an 
over-generalization.  The Cherokee Nation, for example, gives the word 
dinelvdodi as a direct translation of the English word religion.
84
  Cherokee 
linguist Dr. Durbin Feeling writes, “The word ‘dinelvlodi’ (dinelvdodi) is 
the object of one’s belief.  For religion, it could be anyone or anything.  
For the Christian, Christ Jesus is the basis for his belief or faith.”85  Among 
Cherokee individuals and communities, people follow a variety of religions 
from traditional tribal practices, like the Stomp Dance, to Christianity and 
other faiths.
86
 
As these examples begin to suggest, American Indian religious 
experiences are quite diverse and they are evolving.  These religions have 
also been poorly understood by outsiders.
87
  Former Cherokee Principal 
Chief Wilma Mankiller once said that “stereotypes . . . particularly with 
regard to spirituality” persist “because of the dearth of accurate 
information about Native people.”88  The hundreds of tribal religions and 
cultures are often lumped into generalities about Indian relationships with 
the natural world, including the common impression that for Indians, 
                                                                                                                          
81 James W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 18 TOURO L. REV. 563, 603 (2002) 
(quoting Elizabeth L. Lewton &  Victoria Bydone, Identity and Healing in Three Navajo Religious 
Traditions: Sa’ah Naaghai Bik’eh Hozho, 14 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 476, 478 (2000)).  
82 JOSEPH EPES BROWN, TEACHING SPIRITS: UNDERSTANDING NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS 
TRADITIONS xxi (2001).   
83 See, e.g., THE PLURALISM PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., RESEARCH REPORT: NATIVE 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL FREEDOM: AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY (2005), available at 
http://pluralism.org/reports/view/176 (noting that “people from different Native nations hasten to point 
out that their respective languages include no word for religion” and instead maintain that the many 
aspects of life and culture “are ideally integrated into a spiritually-informed whole,” making analogy to 
Western principles of religious freedom difficult).  
84 English-Cherokee Word List Lookup, CHEROKEE NATION, 
http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/Wordlist.aspx (search “English” for “religion”; then follow 
“Search” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). 
85 Email from Dr. Durbin Feeling to Author (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:20 AM) (on file with author). 
86 See, e.g., Cherokee Stomp Dance, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNati
on/Culture/General/24400/Information.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2012) (“There are nearly 300,000 
Cherokee tribal citizens today.  Although many choose to worship through other religious methods and 
denominations, including Indian Baptist and Methodist among others, many traditional Cherokee 
continue to worship at stomp dances and are members of one of the several stomp dance grounds 
located within the Cherokee Nation.”). 
87 See Charles E. Little, A Policy Agenda for Sacred Lands, in SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN 
AMERICA 133, 133–35 (Jake Page ed., 2001) (explaining the difficulties presented to public land 
policymakers in determining the location and importance of tribal religious sites as a result of the strict 
confidential treatment afforded to traditional spiritual information and practices). 
88 MANKILLER, supra note 78, at 13. 
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“everything is sacred.”89  On the other hand, when scholars examine the 
specifics of any traditional tribal religion, they must take care to develop 
adequate cultural familiarity
90
 and respect particular privacy norms.
91
  
 “Traditional tribal religions”92 are those associated with the 
indigenous spiritual experience of each tribe, whether Navajo, Yurok, or 
Cherokee.
93
  These religions often begin with a creation story that traces 
the group’s origin as a distinct people to a place of emergence or 
migration.
94
  The creation story often situates the tribe in a particular place 
in the natural landscape and sets forth a way of life—including values and 
practices—that allows the people to thrive there.95  In many such stories, 
                                                                                                                          
89 See Frank Pommersheim, Representing Native People and Indian Tribes: A Response to 
Professor Allegretti, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1998) (stating that “the concept of the secular 
is largely unknown” in all Native American religions with which the author is familiar and asserting 
that such religions hold that “[a]ll of life and all action in life—indeed every breath—is sacred”). 
90 See Mary C. Churchill, Purity and Pollution: Unearthing an Oppositional Paradigm in the 
Study of Cherokee Religious Traditions, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 
205, 212–13 (Lee Irwin ed., 2000) (noting that early non-Indian observers commonly misinterpreted 
tribal rituals of the Cherokees and Chickasaws).  
91 See Christopher Ronwaniènte Jocks, Spirituality for Sale: Sacred Knowledge in the Consumer 
Age, in NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUALITY: A CRITICAL READER 61, 61–65 (Lee Irwin ed., 2000) 
(reflecting on “the bases upon which an American Indian community might decide what is or is not to 
be shared with outsiders” in the context of Iroquois Longhouse ceremonies and stories and pointing out 
that such revelations “can violate Native rules of privilege, designed to protect aspects of specialized 
knowledge and practice from dangerous exposure or misuse”); see also Debora L. Threedy, Claiming 
the Shields: Law, Anthropology, and the Role of Storytelling in a NAGPRA Repatriation Case Study, 29 
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 91, 118 (2009) (discussing that Navajo norms allowing disclosure 
about religious significance of sacred shields, as contrasted with Paiute/Ute norms preventing such 
disclosure, may have been determinative in repatriation matter).  With these dynamics in mind, my own 
practice is to avoid writing about religious topics that I know to be confidential in tribal communities, 
to rely on interdisciplinary sources as a means of contextualizing and understanding specific tribal 
practices, and to emphasize indigenous sources. 
92 Compare VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 123 (1999) 
(describing Indians who “maintain a traditional religious life”), with George E. Tinker, Around the 
Sacred Fire: Native Religious Activism in the Red Power Era: A Narrative Map of the Indian 
Ecumenical Conference, 20 WICAZO SA REV. 203, 205–06 (2005) (reviewing JAMES TREAT, AROUND 
THE SACRED FIRE: RELIGIOUS ACTIVISM IN THE RED POWER ERA (2003)) (discussing the “much-
contested” nature of the term “traditional” in Indian religious and other matters), and CLARA SUE 
KIDWELL ET AL., A NATIVE AMERICAN THEOLOGY x (2001) (arguing for a Native American theology 
that is “inclusive of all Natives (traditional, Christian neo-traditional, syncretic)”). 
93 See BROWN, TEACHING SPIRITS, supra note 82, at 107–08 (describing various Native American 
tribal rituals as embodying “traditional values” and contrasting such practices against Western 
“mainstream culture”). 
94 Laura Adams Weaver, Native American Creation Stories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND 
RELIGION IN NORTH AMERICAN 83, 83 (2006) (asserting that origin stories typically begin with an 
“earthdiver” or “emergence” story); see also JACE WEAVER, NOTES FROM A MINER’S CANARY: ESSAYS 
ON THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA 218 (2010) (“Every native people has some form of an origin 
story.”). 
95 See DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA, supra note 92, at 208 
(illustrating how specific sites are sacred in Native American religious traditions because they are 
locations where “the sacred appeared in the lives of human beings,” thereby tying the sanctity of the 
place to tribal experience). 
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the people and natural world are mutually dependent, with humans having 
obligations or covenants that they must perform in order to live in harmony 
with the plants, animals, waters, mountains, and other features of the 
natural world.
96
  The traditional religion often pervades identity, kinship, 
governance, subsistence, and social order and often serves as a way to 
define and maintain the tribal existence, even in contemporary times.
97
  As 
Hopi clan leaders declared in 1951, “Our land, our religion, and our life are 
one.”98 
American Indians across a number of tribes participate in the peyote 
religion which has roots in ancient traditions.
99
  Indigenous use of peyote 
dates back to at least 1600 C.E., by the Huichol and Tarahumara Indians of 
Northern Mexico, and possibly back to the Aztecs in 8000 B.C.E.
100
  In 
North America, Kiowa-Apaches, Kiowas, and Comanches used religious 
peyote in the 1860s,
101
 and the NAC was officially chartered in 1918 in 
Oklahoma to “foster and promote the religious beliefs of the several tribes 
of Indians . . . with the practice of the Peyote Sacrament.”102  Practitioners 
attest to the healing power of the plant, the fellowship among peyotists, 
and the moral code of the NAC.
103
  Today, the peyote religion is practiced 
in both urban and reservation settings, by inter-tribal and tribal groups. 
Most legal disputes, of course, consider an individual practice or 
religious practitioner out of the larger tribal religious context.
104
  Such 
practices include ceremonies to keep the world in balance,
105
 heal those 
inflicted with illness,
106
 and communicate with the creator.
107
  Depending 
                                                                                                                          
96 See id. at 211 (explaining that Native ceremonies “involve a process of continuous revelation 
and provide the people with the necessary information to enable them to maintain a balance in their 
relationships with the earth and other forms of life”). 
97 See, e.g., Joel W. Martin, Rebalancing the World in the Contradictions of History: Creek/Musk
ogee, in NATIVE RELIGIONS AND CULTURES OF NORTH AMERICA: ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SACRED 85, 
86 (Lawrence E. Sullivan ed., 2000) (stating that the Creek religion “is dynamic, truly historical, and 
continually innovative”). 
98 JOHN D. LOFTIN, RELIGION AND HOPI LIFE 116 (2d ed. 2003). 
99 See generally ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 
(Huston Smith & Reuben Snake eds., 1996); OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 
(1987).  
100 YOUNG, supra note 79, at 309. 
101 THOMAS CONSTANTINE MAROUKIS, THE PEYOTE ROAD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
NATIVE AMERICAN CHURCH 23–24 (2010). 
102 YOUNG, supra note 79, at 309. 
103 MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 59–60. 
104 See, e.g., United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942–43 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding charges 
against an Arapaho man who shot an eagle, in violation of federal law, to provide it as an offering for 
the Arapaho Sun Dance).  
105 YOUNG, supra note 79, at 345–46. 
106 Lee Irwin, Themes in Native American Spirituality, 20 AM. INDIAN Q. 309, 321 (1996) 
(explaining how Odawa ceremonies “function to establish communal health that connects the Odawa to 
a larger spiritual community”); Douglas L. Winiarksi, Native American Popular Religion in New 
England’s Old Colony, 1670–1770, 15 RELIGION & AM. CULTURE: J. INTERPRETATION 147, 163–64 
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on the tribe, there may be special rituals for major life events of individuals 
and the community (birth, adoption, coming-of-age, marriage, hunting, 
trading, diplomacy, going to war, and death); seasonal practices; daily 
prayers; food preparation; modes of dress and appearance; and other 
observations.
108
  In many religions, there are leaders, such as priests, 
doctors, medicine women and men, chiefs, caciques and others, who have 
responsibility for leading religious practices and training others.
109
  Today, 
traditional tribal religions may be maintained informally or institutionally, 
with varying degrees of participation by tribal citizens.   
To a very significant extent, traditional religious practices are 
undertaken for the collective benefit of the tribe, as much as for any 
individual purposes.  In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 
v. Peterson,
110
 for example, the district court explained Yurok, Karuk, and 
Tolowa traditions: “Medicine women in the tribes travel to the high 
country to pray, to obtain spiritual power, and to gather medicines.  They 
then return to the tribe to administer to the sick the healing power gained in 
the high country through ceremonies such as the Brush and Kick 
Dances.”111  As the court observed: “The religious power these individuals 
acquire in the high country lends meaning to these tribal ceremonies, 
thereby enhancing the spiritual welfare of the entire tribal community.”112  
Many traditional tribal religious practices work toward this sense of 
collective renewal.
113
  Former Cherokee Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller 
explained:  
Each year one Cherokee ceremony in a series was conducted 
in each settlement for the explicit purpose of rekindling 
relationships, requesting forgiveness for inappropriate 
conduct during the previous year, and cleansing the minds of 
Cherokee people of any negative thoughts towards each other 
                                                                                                                          
(2005) (discussing how the Wampanoag communicated with the spirit world through religious 
ceremonies in order to heal the sick). 
107 Frell M. Owl, Who and What Is an American Indian?, 9 ETHNOHISTORY 265, 281 (1962). 
108 See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms Under Tribal 
Constitutional Law, 14 KAN. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 561, 577 (2005) (noting that the hunting ceremonies for 
the Plains’ Indians were conducted to ensure food and to maintain relationships with the natural world); 
Irwin supra, note 106, at 321 (explaining the role of “[g]iveaways, naming ceremonies, feasts, ghost 
suppers for the dead, elder councils, [and] spiritual get-togethers,” in the Odawa community); Owl, 
supra note 107, at 281 (noting that ceremonies vary from tribe to tribe, and the Sun Dance is a common 
seasonal ceremony originated by the Plain Indians). 
109 See Owl supra, note 107, at 273 (discussing role of priests, medicine men, singers of tribal 
songs, drummers, and dancers in American Indian ceremonies); see also CONST. OF THE IROQUOIS 
NATIONS §§ 100–01, 103, available at http://www.indigenouspeople.net/iroqcon.htm (assigning duties 
related to the festivals of Thanksgiving to the Lords and appointed managers within the brotherhood). 
110 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983). 
111 Id. at 592 (internal citations omitted).  
112 Id. at 591–92. 
113 Id. at 591 n.4. 
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. . . . The primary goal of prayer is to promote a sense of 
oneness and unity.
114
 
These religious values are often inscribed in the tribe’s customs and 
laws.  The Iroquois Constitution, dating back to the fifteenth-century, for 
example, provides an extensive description of the purposes of certain 
ceremonies and ascribes to members of the community duties to support 
those ceremonies.
115
  A contemporary Navajo Nation Resolution provides: 
This religion, Beauty Way of Life, holds this land sacred and 
that we, the Navajo People, must always care for it.  Through 
this sacred covenant, this sacred ancestral homeland is the 
home and hogan of all Navajo people.  Further, if the Navajo 
left their homelands, all prayers and religion would be 
ineffective and lost forever.
116
   
At an even more particular level, the legislative code of the Navajo Nation 
identifies, by name, the six sacred mountains of the Navajo Nation and sets 
forth a standard of care owed to them by the Navajo people.
117
  The 
significance of these mountains is traceable to the Navajo creation story 
and values formative in Navajo culture. 
Notwithstanding the ancient origins of many tribal religions, Indians 
were often perceived as godless savages to the early Europeans who 
encountered them.  Indeed, religion was a flashpoint in the conquest and 
colonization of North America.  From the fourteenth century, monarchs 
invoked Christian theology and papal law in justification of their New 
World policies, using indigenous “heathenry” as a justification for military 
incursions and land seizures, for example.
118
  At the same time, some 
Catholic thinkers argued that Indians were human beings entitled to a 
measure of natural law protection from the Spanish, if only the right to be 
conquered and converted for their own benefit.
119
  In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, French and Spanish colonization efforts worked 
                                                                                                                          
114 MANKILLER, supra note 78, at 16–17. 
115 CONST. OF THE IROQUOIS NATIONS §§ 64, 100–03, available at 
http://www.indigenouspeople.net/iroqcon.htm.  I discuss this Constitution extensively in Carpenter, 
Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, supra note 30, at 169–
70. 
116 Navajo Nation Council Res. CD-107-94 (Dec. 13, 1994).  
117 General Provisions, Navajo Nation Code Tit. 1 (1995), § 205 (B)–(D) (identifying six sacred 
mountains and Navajo obligations to them). 
118 See id. at 59–71 (“Unfortunately for the American Indian, the West’s first steps toward this 
noble vision of a Law of Nations contained a mandate for Christian Europe’s subjugation of all peoples 
whose radical divergence from European-derived norms of right conduct signified their need for 
conquest and remediation.”). 
119 See S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16–19 (2d ed. 2004) 
(noting that lead figures in this discussion included Bartolomé de las Casas and Francisco Vitoria, who 
confirmed the humanity of the Indians of the Western Hemisphere). 
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closely with churches to establish missions across tribal communities, 
while some of the English colonies and colonists isolated Indians in 
“praying towns” so they could be instructed away from whites.120  
Once the United States gained independence, federal lawmakers 
quickly grasped that the eradication of Indian cultures was a key step in 
“break[ing] up the tribal mass” and paving the way for political and 
geographic domination by states and the federal government.
121
  At the 
same time, policymakers believed that encouraging Indians to “put aside 
all savage ways” would help them achieve “salvation” through 
Christianity.
122
  These measures targeted individual Indians and whole 
tribes alike.  Beginning in 1869, President Grant’s “Peace Policy” provided 
contracts to Christian missions, assigning them to reservations and granting 
federal funding for the purpose of bringing civilization to the Indians.
123
  
Federally funded boarding schools with a mission to “Kill the Indian in 
him and Save the Man”124 targeted the children of traditional Indian 
communities for removal from their families and educated them in English, 
Christianity, and manual labor skills.
125
  In 1883, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs distributed a set of “Rules for Indian Courts” that defined as 
“Indian [O]ffenses” religious activities, including participation in the Sun 
Dance, scalp dance, war dance, and the practice of polygamy.
126
    
Efforts to eradicate Indian religious practices became increasingly 
coercive at the turn of the century.  In 1890, the U.S. Army shot and killed 
300 Lakota people engaged in a revivalist religion called the Ghost 
                                                                                                                          
120 See, e.g., COLIN CALLOWAY, NEW WORLDS FOR ALL: INDIANS, EUROPEANS, AND THE 
MAKING OF EARLY AMERICA 75–77 (1997) (discussing fourteen praying towns established by John 
Eliot in Massachusetts in the 1660s–1670s); DONALD A. GRINDE & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, EXEMPLAR 
OF LIBERTY: NATIVE AMERICA AND THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY 73–91 (1991) (explaining Roger 
Williams’s seventeenth century perceptions and activities regarding Narragansett and other Indian 
tribal religions). 
121 CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 19 (2005), 
(quoting President Theodore Roosevelt as imposing assimilation and allotment policies “as a mighty 
pulverizing machine to break up the tribal mass”); see Dussias, supra note 40, at 773–805 (describing 
assimilation programs that worked directly on religion).   
122 Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones (Oct. 16, 1902), reprinted in 2 
WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 724, 727 (1973) [hereinafter Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones]. 
123 Dussias, supra note 40, at 776–87. 
124 DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE 
BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 52 (1995). 
125 See id. at 21–24 (stating that the three aims of Indian education were to provide children with 
the rudiments of an academic education, teach individualization over tribal community interests, and 
promote Christianization); see generally TIM GIAGO, CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: THE DARK LEGACY OF 
INDIAN MISSION BOARDING SCHOOLS (2006) (providing a first-hand account of a student’s experience 
at an Indian boarding school); AWAY FROM HOME: AMERICAN INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOL 
EXPERIENCES, 1879–2000 (Margaret L. Archuleta et al. eds., 2000) (providing an historical and 
pictorial overview of Indian boarding schools in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).  
126 Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones, supra note 122, at 344, 348–49. 
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Dance.
127
  In 1902, the federal Indian Commissioner issued an order to 
reservation-based Indian agents providing: “Indian dances and so-called 
Indian feasts should be prohibited.  In many cases, these dances and feasts 
are simply subterfuges to cover degrading acts and to disguise immoral 
purposes.  You are directed to use your best efforts in the suppression of 
these evils.”128  In 1904, the federal government criminalized Indian 
religious dances, making, for example, the practice of the Sun Dance 
punishable by ten days in prison or ten days denial of food rations.
129
  
Around the same time, Indian Affairs declared peyote to be a narcotic and 
waged an assault on the peyote religion; in 1908 and 1909, for example, an 
Indian Affairs “investigator” reported that he had destroyed 176,400 
peyote buttons, an act of incredible offense, sacrilege, and waste to the 
practitioners for whom it was a holy sacrament.
130
  Into the 1920s, the 
federal government was still issuing directives for agents to suppress 
religious ceremonies in the Southwestern Pueblos.
131
  
In response to the federal persecution of Indian religions, some 
traditional American Indian religious practitioners went underground, 
while some ceased practicing altogether, and still others resisted.
132
  While 
the federal government expressly pursued the extermination of Indian 
tribes, as such, officials reported that they had no intention of “interfering 
with the Indian’s personal liberty”; instead, they saw their actions, as a 
means of removing a “badge of servitude to savage ways and traditions 
which are effectual barriers to the uplifting of the race.”133  To the extent 
that the First Amendment applied at all to American Indian religions, it 
was to uphold the use of treaty payments to fund Christian mission schools 
                                                                                                                          
127 See generally JAMES MOONEY, THE GHOST-DANCE RELIGION AND WOUNDED KNEE (1973).  
Mooney visited Wounded Knee in December 1890.  From interviews with survivors, Mooney 
described that as a medicine man blew on his whistle and the Indians convened in their sacred Ghost 
Shirts, the army opened fire: “The guns poured in 2-pound explosive shells at the rate of nearly fifty per 
minute, mowing down everything alive . . . . In a few minutes 200 Indian men, women, and children, 
with 60 soldiers, were lying dead and wounded on the ground . . . . [T]he pursuit was simply a 
massacre, where fleeing women, with infants in their arms, were shot down after resistance had ceased 
and when almost every warrior was stretched dead or dying on the ground . . . . Authorities differ as to 
the number of Indians present and killed at Wounded Knee [from 340-370 people].”  Id. at 869–70. 
128 Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones, supra note 122, at 725. 
129 Dussias, supra note 40, at 800. 
130 MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 40. 
131 See Dussias, supra note 40, at 803–05 (describing directives requiring, among others, 
“attendance at church and Sunday school by all Indian students,” and that “no dances be held in March, 
April, June, July, or August”). 
132 See, e.g., CHARLOTTE COTE, SPIRITS OF OUR WHALING ANCESTORS: REVITALIZING MAKAH 
AND NUU-CHAH-NULTH TRADITIONS 56 (2010) (explaining that, from the 1880s to 1920s, 
“[p]otlatching went underground and coastal peoples began holding their ceremonies in secret locations 
or found innovative ways to conceal them”). 
133 Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs W.A. Jones, supra note 122, at 727. 
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on reservations against Establishment Clause challenges.
134
    
While some support for Indian cultural traditions surfaced in the 
1930s, federal policy began to change in earnest in the 1960s and 1970s.
135
  
Inspired both by tribal activism and federal policy changes, tribes 
nationwide started to revitalize their political, economic, and cultural 
institutions.  In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon announced a federal 
policy in favor of tribal “self-determination,” inspiring dozens of new 
statutes and programs to support tribal autonomy over education, 
economics, government, and culture.
136
  The practice of tribal religions was 
an important component, particularly in light of historic persecution of 
Indian religions described above.  In 1978, Congress passed the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act (“AIRFA”), reversing federal policy.  
Reflecting the broader aims of the self-determination era, AIRFA 
provided: 
[I]t shall be the federal policy of the United States to protect 
and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of 
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional 
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native 
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use 
and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship 
through ceremonials and traditional rites.
137
 
Despite AIRFA and the religious revitalization of the self-
determination era, certain legal and political obstacles still make it difficult 
to practice American Indian religions.  Through the dark years of Indian 
removal, assimilation, and allotment, tribes lost ownership of many of their 
sacred sites, which were now slated for development by private or 
government owners.
138
  In 1962, Congress added the golden eagle to the 
Bald Eagle Protection Act of 1940, which prohibits the killing of eagles 
and the possession of eagle parts, and has been interpreted to trump even 
Indian treaty rights to take eagles on their reservations.
139
  In 1965, the 
                                                                                                                          
134 See Reuben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81–82 (1908) (explaining that a prohibition 
against using federal monies for sectarian schools did not apply to use of treaty annuities to fund St. 
Francis Mission School on the Rosebud Sioux reservation). 
135 See WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS, supra note 121, 
at 58–60, 177–89, 263 (detailing federal reports that shed light on the plight of Indians and 
recommendations on how to improve their living conditions).  
136 See id. at 189–98 (explaining President Nixon’s policies toward Indian affairs and the 
programs started by the Office of Economic Opportunity). 
137 American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006). 
138 See Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1061 
(“American Indians have been unsuccessful in challenging government actions that harm tribal sacred 
sites located on federal public lands.”).  
139 See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,  743–46 (1986) (describing ways in which Congress 
tried to control Indian on-reservation hunting of eagles in the early 1960s). 
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federal government, following a number of states, criminalized the 
possession of peyote, the plant that serves as the main sacrament of the 
NAC.
140
  Both the eagle and peyote legislation provided certain 
exemptions for American Indian religious use.
141
  Nevertheless, these and 
other developments produced a number of lawsuits in which the courts 
tried to evaluate Indian religion claims against other competing interests. 
III.  LIMITING (JUDICIAL) PRINCIPLES 
The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”142  In their application of this language, the federal courts have 
long struggled to determine the scope of free exercise rights as against 
other critical rights and interests.  Cases that trigger such concerns include 
those in which free exercise claims would infringe on other citizens’ rights 
to equal protection, property, or privacy; pose a threat to public safety, 
order, or peace; or impede the state’s ability to carry out the business of 
government.
143
   
In light of these competing concerns, it is clearly not the case that all 
government activities infringing on religion violate the First Amendment.  
As a means of sorting the wheat from the chaff, the Supreme Court has 
long held that only those activities imposing a “substantial burden” on 
religious activity trigger the protections of the Free Exercise Clause, and 
even in those cases, the government may demonstrate a “compelling 
interest” to sustain the activity.144  The cases giving rise to this test—
Sherbert v. Verner
145
 and Wisconsin v. Yoder
146—also gave rise to various 
attempts to discern limiting principles in the American Indian religion 
context.
147
  In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that South Carolina 
                                                                                                                          
140 In 1965, Congress listed peyote as a Schedule I hallucinogen on the list of controlled 
substances under the Controlled Substances Act.  21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2006).  State laws prohibiting 
and regulating peyote possession date back to the 1920’s. THOMAS CONSTANTINE MAROUKIS, PEYOTE 
AND THE YANKTON SIOUX: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SAM NECKLACE 181 (2004). 
141 Dion, 476 U.S. at 734; Native American Church, 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2011). 
142 U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
143 See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 15 (1946) (holding that Congress may 
prohibit the transportation of a woman across state lines for the purpose of polygamy); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944) (“There is no denial of equal protection of the laws in 
excluding children of a particular sect from [public proclaiming of religion in streets] as is barred also 
to all other children.”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute requiring adults be vaccinated against certain diseases); 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 166 (1878) (holding that Congress has the constitutional power 
to prohibit polygamy even if it is part of one’s religion).  
144 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990). 
145 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
146 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
147 Contra Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the 
Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse supra note 7, at 1671–72 & n.2 (claiming that the argument of 
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violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied unemployment benefits to 
an individual who refused to accept Saturday work in violation of her 
Seventh Day Adventist beliefs.
148
  The Court first assessed the 
infringement on Sherbert’s religion: 
The ruling forces her to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one 
hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in 
order to accept work, on the other hand.  Governmental 
imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden 
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed 
against appellant for her Saturday worship.
149
 
Such an infringement on religious exercise could only be sustained if 
the government showed it had a “compelling state interest” in the 
activity.
150
  The state’s concerns that fraudulent religious objections would 
dilute the employment compensation fund or present scheduling problems 
were, in the Court’s view, not compelling.151  
In Yoder, Amish parents challenged Wisconsin’s compulsory 
education rule as incompatible with their religious beliefs.
152
  To balance 
the free exercise claims against the state’s interest, the Court first evaluated 
the quality of the Amish claims that the complained of activity would 
infringe on religious beliefs.
153
  While recognizing the “delicate” nature of 
the inquiry, the Court looked closely at the sources and tenets of the Amish 
religion, observing that “the traditional way of life of the Amish is not 
merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious 
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily 
living.”154  The “Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice” were 
traceable to the community’s “literal interpretation of the Biblical 
injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, be not conformed to this 
world.”155  As the Court observed, “This command is fundamental to the 
Amish faith” and created irreconcilable tensions with the obligation to send 
young people to public high school.
156
  The state law violated the Free 
Exercise Clause because it “affirmatively compel[led the Amish], under 
                                                                                                                          
leading academics that Yoder and Sherbert controlled Smith ignores a number of other important 
precedents). 
148 Verner, 374 U.S. at 403–04 (holding that the disqualification for benefits imposes burdens on 
the free exercise of religion). 
149 Id. at 404. 
150 Id. at 406. 
151 Id. at 407. 
152 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207–09 (1972) 
153 Id. at 215. 
154 Id. at 215–16. 
155 Id. at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 Id. at 216–17. 
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threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with the 
fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”157 
Following Sherbert and Yoder, federal appellate courts subsequently 
cited these passages for the proposition that judges should evaluate the 
“quality” of religious claims as a component of the substantial burden 
analysis.
158
  In the American Indian context, the courts interpreted Yoder to 
mean the plaintiffs must show the government had infringed upon beliefs 
or practices that were central or indispensable to the religion.
159
  These 
were the first limiting principles to apply in Indian religion cases. 
A.  ”Centrality” as Limiting Principle in Indian Religion Cases:  
 1964–1986 
Two state cases, People v. Woody
160
 and Frank v. Alaska,
161
 initially 
introduced the concept of centrality into American Indian religious 
freedoms analysis.
162
  The Indians prevailed in both cases, with the courts 
showing little of the reluctance to analyze Indian religious practices that 
would stymie future claims.
163
  
In Woody, California Supreme Court Justice Tobriner explained: “On 
April 28, 1962, a group of Navajos met in an Indian hogan in the desert 
near Needles, California, to perform a religious ceremony which included 
the use of peyote.”164  Police officers witnessed part of the ceremony and 
arrested Jack Woody and other participants who were later convicted of 
violating the state’s prohibition on peyote possession.165  Citing Sherbert, 
the court first examined whether the state law imposed a burden on 
Woody’s exercise of religion.166  
The Woody court observed that for members of the NAC, peyote was 
believed to embody the Holy Spirit and provide direct contact with God 
                                                                                                                          
157 Id. at 218. 
158 See, e.g., Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980) (explaining 
that the test for Free Exercise Clause claims requires the evaluation of the “quality of the claims alleged 
to be religious” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
159 See id. at 1164 (stating that the plaintiff’s Cherokee religious claims “have fallen short of 
demonstrating that worship at the particular geographic location in question is inseparable from the 
way of life . . . , the cornerstone of their religious observance . . . , or plays the central role in their 
religious ceremonies and practices”). 
160 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964). 
161 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979). 
162 See Woody, 394 P.2d at 818 (holding a religious group’s use of peyote was protected by the 
Constitution because the act was central to their religion); Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072–73 (finding a 
religion’s use of moose meat was constitutionally protected because it was central to the faith). 
163 Woody, 394 P.2d at 817; Frank, 604 P.2d at 1071–73.  
164 Woody, 394 P.2d at 814. 
165 Id. at 814–15. 
166 Id. at 816. 
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through its ingestion in sacraments of the religion of the NAC.
167
  Relying 
on the parties’ testimony, expert anthropologists and NAC documents, the 
court described peyote practices in great detail.  From sundown on 
Saturday to sunrise on Sunday, NAC members gathered to pray, sing, and 
drum, leading eventually to the “central event . . . consist[ing] of the use of 
peyote in quantities sufficient to produce a hallucinatory state.”168  At this 
point in the ritual, the sponsor passes a ceremonial bag from which most 
adults are permitted to take four buttons.
 
 Peyote produces feelings of 
brotherhood and love among members who revere it as a protector, 
teacher, and grandfather.
169
  The ritual ends with a sunrise prayer and 
breakfast and the members depart, suffering “no aftereffects.”170  Even 
without written texts, the Court observed, Indians across the United States 
and Canada “follow surprisingly similar ritual and theology.”171 
Given the evidence, the Woody court concluded that peyote was “more 
than a sacrament.”172  NAC members devoted prayers to peyote itself, 
much like others did to the Holy Ghost.
173
  Articles of incorporation for the 
NAC of California provided: “[W]e as a people place explicit faith and 
hope and belief in the Almighty God . . . . [W]e further pledge ourselves to 
work for unity with the sacramental use of peyote and its religious use.”174  
In the court’s view, forbidding the use of peyote would “remove the 
theological heart of Peyotism.”175 The state law prohibiting possession 
amounted to a substantial burden, indeed a “virtual inhibition,” of the 
practice of Woody’s religion.176 
California, in turn, had failed to establish a compelling interest.  The 
Attorney General argued the prohibition was necessary to protect Indians 
from the physical effects of peyote, the gateway effect to other drugs, and 
the “indoctrination of small children,” but failed to substantiate any of 
these claims.
177
  Harkening back to arguments of a previous generation, the 
state also claimed peyote would “obstruct[] enlightenment and shackle[] 
the Indian to primitive conditions,”178 an argument that the court 
                                                                                                                          
167 Id. at 817. 
168 Id.  Contemporary accounts by practitioners and scholars alike contest the notion that religious 
use of peyote causes hallucinations or visions.  See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 83 (discussing how 
it is not common for Peyote to cause visions and delusions today, and asserting that the “vision thesis 
of earlier scholars has been overstated”).  
169 Woody, 394 P.2d at 817–18. 
170 Id. at 817. 
171 Id. 
172 Id.  
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 815. 
175 Id. at 818. 
176 Id.  
177 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
178 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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rejected.
179
  
In an argument that foreshadowed the institutional concerns raised in 
Smith, California complained that the court’s analysis inquired too far “into 
the bona fides” of religious belief, an inquiry that the Attorney General 
described as “difficult” and “repugnant to the spirit of our law.”180  The 
court clarified that it was not intruding into the “truth or validity of 
religious beliefs,” which would be disallowed by the First Amendment.181  
Rather, it was the job of the court—using the evidence at hand—to 
“distinguish between those who would feign faith in an esoteric religion 
and those who would honestly follow it.”182  Courts had long made such 
judgments in conscientious objector cases, decisions that posed “no undue 
burden upon the trier of fact.”183 
The Woody court’s description of peyote as “central” and “essential” 
arose in its distinction of the case from others where courts had upheld 
burdens on religion.
184
  In Reynolds v. United States,
185
 for example, the 
Court sustained a federal law banning polygamy against challenges by 
Mormons who argued their religion required plural marriage.
186
  The 
Woody court wrote that while polygamy was a “basic tenet in the theology 
of Mormonism,” it was “not essential to the practice of the religion.”187  
Peyote, by contrast, was “the sole means by which [NAC members] are 
able to experience their religion.”188   
Other centrality cases followed.  In Frank, the Alaska Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction of an Athabascan Indian who had been found 
guilty of violating game laws when he transported a moose, taken out of 
state season, for a funeral feast.
189
  After the death of a young man in the 
Athabascan village of Minto, Carlos Frank gathered with twenty-five-to- 
thirty other men from the village, forming a hunting party to take a moose 
for the funeral feast or “potlatch.”190  Frank assisted in transporting the 
moose to Minto and was arrested for “unlawful transportation of game 
illegally taken.”191  Over 200 people attended the potlatch, which was 
believed to serve as the last meal shared by the living and the dead, helping 
to nourish the spirit of the dead for his journey and to ease the grief of his 
                                                                                                                          
179 Id.  
180 Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
181 Id. at 821. 
182 Id.   
183 Id.   
184 Id. at 817, 820. 
185 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
186 Id. at 166. 
187 Woody, 304 P.2d at 820. 
188 Id. 
189 Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068, 1075 (Alaska 1979).    
190 Id. at 1069. 
191 Id. 
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family.
192
  
The court reviewed testimony by elders and an anthropologist, several 
of whom analogized the serving of wild meat at a potlatch to communion 
in Catholic mass.
193
  The court observed: “Native foods comprise almost 
all of the foods served at the funeral potlatch.  In a culture without many 
formal rules this is an absolute requirement.”194  The Frank court found the 
“funeral potlatch is the most important institution in Athabascan life” and 
that food “is the cornerstone of the ritual.”195  Moreover, “[m]oose is the 
centerpiece of the most important ritual in Athabascan life and is the 
equivalent of sacred symbols in other religions.”196  The evidence made 
clear that the serving of moose meat was “deeply rooted” in the 
Athabascan religious tradition and that the state law infringed upon that 
practice by making it illegal.
197
   
The burden then turned to the State to show a compelling interest in 
the hunting laws at issue in Frank.  The State immediately turned down a 
slippery slope, claiming that if an exemption were allowed in this case, 
widespread disobedience would follow in the form of “poaching and creek 
robbing, . . . tragic confrontations between recreational hunters and 
Athabascans,” and a “downward spiral into anarchy.”198  But the court 
wrote that “[j]ustifications founded only on fear and apprehension” could 
not overcome First Amendment rights.
199
  Similarly, the fact “that there 
was but one funeral potlatch in Minto in 1975, and that one moose was 
needed for it,” undermined the state’s conservation argument.200  There 
was no compelling interest in burdening the religious practice.
201
  
Examining Woody and Frank in hindsight, several points are notable.  
The two state courts did not shy away from evaluating the nature of the 
religious claims based on the evidence provided, even when the 
government claimed that such analysis exceeded the judicial role.  Further, 
the courts were willing to look at the specific parties in their larger 
religious and cultural context, assessing what the criminalization of peyote 
would mean for the NAC and how the prohibition of moose hunting would 
affect Athabascan villagers.  With tens of thousands of peyote practitioners 
across the country, the peyote case was not just—or even primarily—about 
                                                                                                                          
192 Id. at 1069, 1072. 
193 Id. at 1072. 
194 Id. (“Native food means moose, bear, caribou, porcupine, fish, duck and berry dishes.”). 
195 Id. at 1071. 
196 Id. at 1073. 
197 Id. at 1073–74. 
198 Id. at 1074 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 361–62 (8th 
Cir. 1975)). 
200 Id. 
201 Id.  
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Jack Woody.  In this regard, Woody may have been analogous to Yoder in 
which the Court protected the “Amish way of life” as a collective, or at 
least aggregated the interest against state interference.
202
  In Frank, the 
court situated Carlos Frank’s actions in the Athabascan religion and 
experiences of the village of Minto following a young person’s death.203  
Frank’s religious obligations to help provide a moose for the funeral arose 
from his membership in the native village of Minto and participation in the 
Athabascan culture.
204
  Viewed through the prism of collective interests, 
the centrality standard worked relatively well to preserve Indian religious 
freedoms in these cases.  The federal courts would have a more difficult 
time with this standard. 
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
205
 the centrality standard 
worked to the tribal religious practitioners’ detriment.206  The Sixth Circuit 
reviewed Cherokee Indian claims that a federally funded dam project 
would violate the Free Exercise Clause by flooding ancient holy towns, 
burial grounds, and medicine gathering sites in the Little Tennessee River 
Valley.
207
  Cherokee medicine men and elders testified that the area was 
“the birthplace of the Cherokee” people and the Cherokees’ “connection 
with the Great Spirit.”208  Medicine men testified that they went to the 
valley several times a year to gather medicine and that flooding the lands 
would “destroy the spiritual strength of the Cherokee people.”209  For all of 
these reasons, the plaintiffs alleged that the action would result in 
“infringement on their right to worship . . . by the destruction of sites 
which they hold in reverence and in denial of access to such sites.”210   
The task for the court was how to decide whether and to what extent 
these claims were actionable under the Free Exercise Clause.  Observing 
that “[o]rthodoxy is not at issue,” the Sixth Circuit explained that the 
Cherokees would not be penalized for their lack of “written creeds” and 
                                                                                                                          
202 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 506 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).  But see Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption 
and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 422 (1987) 
(arguing that “individuals, not institutions, are always the ultimate source of religious conviction,” and 
cases such as Yoder recognize the “aggregated rights” of individuals and not the interests of “the 
Amish”). 
203 Frank, 604 P.2d at 1074. 
204 Id. at 1073; see also id. at 1071–73 (describing and explaining Frank’s role in the Athabascan 
funeral customs). 
205 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
206 Id. at 1164 (“The claim of centrality of the Valley to the practice of the traditional Cherokee 
religion, as required by Yoder, Woody and Frank, is missing from this case.”); see also BRIAN EDWARD 
BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF 
SACRED LAND 9–38 (1999) (discussing the Sequoyah case). 
207 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160. 
208 Id. at 1162. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 1160. 
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“man-made houses of worship.”211  Yet, even accepting the Cherokees’ 
“sincerity,” the court wrote that it still had to determine whether the 
Cherokees had stated a constitutionally cognizable First Amendment 
objection to the otherwise legal conduct of the government.
212
  Citing 
Yoder, the Sixth Circuit evaluated the “centrality or indispensabilty” of 
each religious practice to the religion.
213
  Here, the court noted that some of 
the religiously significant plants were available elsewhere and some 
Cherokees did not know the location of the sacred sites.  In a passage that 
would presage concerns about geographic limits in future sacred sites 
cases, the court said that the plaintiffs “are now claiming that the entire 
Valley is sacred” even though “none of the affidavits state[] this 
explicitly.”214  Moreover, there was conflicting testimony even among 
Cherokees about the area’s significance.215  The Sixth Circuit concluded 
that the religious claims reflected “‘personal preference’ rather than 
convictions ‘shared by an organized group.’”216  This was because under 
Yoder, Woody, and Frank, the Cherokees had not shown the threatened 
practices and places to be “indispensab[le]” to their way of life, the 
“cornerstone” of their religious observance, or “central” to religious 
ceremonies.
217
  
Today, of course, the fact pattern in Sequoyah would likely trigger the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, which 
provides to tribal governments a right of consultation with respect to the 
intentional excavation of American Indian graves on federal lands.
218
  But 
in 1980, the Sixth Circuit struggled to appreciate the tribal nature of the 
claims in Sequoyah.  The Eastern Band of Cherokees and United 
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians were named plaintiffs and had tried 
to emphasize their collective interests, framing the claim in terms of “all 
those present or future Cherokee Indians who practice the traditional 
Cherokee religion.”219  The affidavit of religious practitioners Lloyd 
Sequoyah, Emmaline Driver, Willie Walkingstick, and Lloyd C. Owle also 
made clear that they were not litigating for themselves alone, arguing:  
When this place is destroyed, the Cherokee people cease to 
                                                                                                                          
211 Id. at 1163. 
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 1164. 
214 Id. at 1163. 
215 See id. (stating that the plaintiffs are in disagreement about the exact location of the religious 
sites). 
216 Id. at 1164 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972)).  In this regard, Sequoyah 
may have reflected Yoder’s distinction between “religion” and a “philosophy.” 
217 Id.  
218 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c) (2006) (stating that the intentional excavation of Native American human 
remains is permitted only if the appropriate Indian tribe is consulted). 
219 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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exist as a people. . . . The white man has taken nearly 
everything away from us, our heritage, culture, traditions, 
and our way of life that is our religion. . . . [A]s the water 
backs over the once Cherokee land, our people will feel a 
great pain. The earth will cry . . . as water covers this 
beautiful, fruitful valley, members of our tribe will be in 
silence.
220
 
But the court said “[s]imilar feelings” about places where their 
ancestors lived “are shared by most people to a greater or lesser extent.”221  
In response to the Cherokee claims that they lost access to their sacred sites 
through the treaty and removal process, the court was sympathetic but 
ultimately deferred to the United States’s current ownership.222  The 
dissenting judge would have remanded to give the Cherokees the 
opportunity to brief the centrality standard and, in particular, to develop the 
record on “the role that this particular location plays in the Cherokee 
religion.”223 
In Badoni v. Higginson,
224
 Navajo medicine men and leaders filed a 
claim to prevent further desecration of Navajo gods and sacred areas 
caused by recreation at Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
225
  The 
federal district court held the plaintiffs had no cognizable Free Exercise 
Clause claim in part because the government’s authority as an owner 
outweighed any claims by the Navajo medicine men.
226
  Without the bright 
line of ownership, the Navajos could not differentiate their claims in a way 
that the government could be expected to manage.  This might “lead to 
unauthorized and very troublesome results”:  
A person might sincerely believe that he or a predecessor 
encountered a profound religious experience in the environs of 
what is now the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D. C., and 
that experience might cause him to believe that the Lincoln 
Memorial is therefore a sacred religious shrine to him.  That 
person, however, could hardly expect to call upon the courts to 
enjoin all other visitors from entering the Lincoln Memorial in 
order to protect his constitutional right to religious freedom.
227
 
In the district court’s view, the plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate 
                                                                                                                          
220 BROWN, TEACHING SPIRITS, supra note 82, at 15 (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
221 Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1162–63. 
222 Id. at 1162–64. 
223 Id. at 1165 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
224 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977). 
225 Id. at 642–43. 
226 Id. at 647. 
227 Id. at 645. 
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“deep religious conviction[s], shared by an organized group and intimately 
related to daily living,” as required by Yoder.228  This was because, in the 
court’s view, the few medicine men conducting the religious rites at 
Rainbow Bridge were “not recognized by the Navajo Nation as such”; their 
training had taken place years ago and was not “tribally organized or 
carried out.”229  Additionally, the plaintiffs had only “attended a combined 
total of nine religious ceremonies” at the Monument and had done so “only 
infrequently prior to 1965.”230  For all of these reasons, the court 
concluded: 
[T]here is nothing to indicate that at the present time the 
Rainbow Bridge National Monument and its environs has 
anything approaching deep, religious significance to any 
organized group, or has in recent decades been intimately 
related to the daily living of any group or individual.  Rather, 
the record supplied by the plaintiffs is to the contrary.
231
  
The district court decision in Badoni reveals one of the problems with 
pitting individual religious practitioners against the federal government in 
Indian religion cases: the court may lack sufficient context to assess the 
religious practices in the record.  Without an appreciation of the ways in 
which medicine men served and were recognized by the larger community, 
for example, the Badoni court was left to count up Navajo medicine men 
who had visited Rainbow Bridge as a measure of the depth and 
significance of the religious practice.
232
  Similarly, by counting visits to 
Rainbow Bridge, the court could not seem to understand that the 
ceremonies in question were never held periodically (such as once a month 
or year), but rather as the needs of an individual or family arose.
233
  
Missing was an assessment of how these practices and beliefs stemmed 
from the Navajo creation story, perpetuated Navajo culture and lifeways, 
and were critical to helping individuals and the community maintain the 
state of hozho that defined the right way of living for Navajos.   
Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the Navajos had presented 
religious claims of sufficient quality vis-à-vis Yoder: 
                                                                                                                          
228 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
229 Id. at 645–46. 
230 Id. at 646. 
231 Id. 
232 Interestingly in today’s “ministerial exception cases” that give churches some latitude to 
discriminate in hiring, a much litigated question is who qualifies as a “minister.”  See, e.g., Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (declining “to adopt a 
rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister”).  Today, the Navajo Medicine 
Men’s Association, along with the Diné Hataalii Association, is now recognized by the Navajo Nation 
as a partner in official governmental advocacy for religious freedoms in domestic and international 
tribunals. 
233 Badoni, 455 F. Supp. At 646 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Rainbow Bridge and a nearby spring, prayer spot and cave 
have held positions of central importance in the religion of 
some Navajo people living in that area for at least 100 years.  
These shrines are regarded as the incarnate forms of Navajo 
gods, which provide protection and rain-giving functions.  
For generations Navajo singers have performed ceremonies 
near the Bridge and water from the spring has been used for 
other ceremonies.  Plaintiffs believe that if humans alter the 
earth in the area of the Bridge, plaintiffs’ prayers will not be 
heard by the gods and their ceremonies will be ineffective to 
prevent evil and disease.
234
 
Accepting the Navajo practices at Rainbow Bridge as “central,” the Tenth 
Circuit nonetheless agreed that the government’s interests in water levels at 
Lake Powell outweighed the religious claims.
235
  Here the problem was in 
the court’s lack of institutional capacity to negotiate the contours of a 
negotiation between the Navajo Nation and United States.  And the 
Navajos lost the case. 
B.   The Bright Lines of “Objective Coercion” and “Ownership” in Free 
Exercise Cases 1986–1993 
Not long after Sequoyah and Badoni, the Supreme Court took up two 
cases, Bowen and Lyng, which changed the direction of Indian religion 
cases dramatically.  The lower appellate courts had understood Yoder and 
Sherbert to require a “quality” test and applied it by looking for a claim 
that was “central” to a religion and then balancing such claim against the 
government interests.  In Bowen and Lyng, however, the Court made clear 
that the judicial role was not to probe the quality of the religious claims at 
all—courts were institutionally ill-suited to intrude into the sphere of 
religion in this way.  As I will argue here, in Bowen and Lyng, the Court 
replaced the nuanced “centrality” inquiry with bright lines that made it 
even more difficult, if not impossible, for Indian religious plaintiffs to 
obtain relief.  
In Bowen, Stephen Roy challenged the federal requirement that his 
daughter obtain a Social Security number in order to receive welfare 
benefits, contending that the assigned number would rob their daughter of 
her spirit, in violation of their “Native American religious beliefs.”236  
According to Roy, the daughter had been given her name “Little Bird of 
the Snow” in a ceremony in which her father and sister buried her placenta 
                                                                                                                          
234 Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 177 (10th Cir. 1980). 
235 Id. 
236 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986). 
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and a small white bird appeared to them.
237
  Her name became a sacred 
aspect of her identity, derived through a spiritual event.  In addition, Roy 
had related religious concerns, which he attributed to Abenaki Indian 
beliefs, about the pervasiveness of technology in identifying human beings.  
“[T]he legend of Katahdin” described “great evil” that results from three 
related practices: “the widespread use of computers”; the “people’s casual 
acceptance” of such use; and the “proliferation of weaponry” relying on 
computer technology, which made killing into a “sterile act.”238   
Because of these concerns, Roy refused to provide his daughter’s 
Social Security number in the application process for benefits through the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.  He believed that it 
would harm her spirit and the purity necessary for her to become a “holy 
person.”239  As a result, the family had been denied benefits of between 
thirty-three and sixty-six dollars per month for several years by the time of 
the trial.
240
  Roy argued that this government action violated the Free 
Exercise Clause by forcing them to choose between observing a 
requirement of their faith and receiving a government benefit (not unlike, 
of course, the claims in Sherbert).
241
 
At trial, the government argued that Roy’s beliefs were not “religious” 
in nature on grounds that these beliefs were generically Native American 
(versus Abenaki), philosophical, and irrational.
242
  Yet, the court saw no 
reason why a belief had to be traceable to one tribe and cited to the 
testimony on the religious aspect of the Katahdin tradition.
243
  The court 
also noted that religious beliefs did not have to be rational to be actionable 
under the First Amendment.  Thus, the district court enjoined the 
government both from denying benefits to the Roys and from using their 
daughter’s Social Security number until she turned sixteen, at which time 
the government indicated that it would have even greater concern about 
identifying her.
244
    
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Free Exercise Clause did 
not compel the government to conform its conduct to the religious 
preferences of citizens.
245
  While the Supreme Court formally accepted the 
sincerity of Roy’s claims, everything about the opinion projected 
skepticism.  Whereas the district court had noted Roy’s Abenaki family 
lineage and described the religious beliefs in that context, the Supreme 
                                                                                                                          
237 Roy v. Cohen, 590 F. Supp. 600, 604 (M.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
238 Id. at 604–05 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
239 Id. at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 603. 
242 Id. at 609. 
243 Id.  
244 Id. at 613–14. 
245 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986). 
 2012] LIMITING PRINCIPLES AND EMPOWERING PRACTICES 423 
 
Court emphasized that Roy had only “recently” developed his religious 
objection to Social Security numbers through “recent” conversations with 
an Abenaki chief.
246
  Similarly, when it came time to “determin[e] the 
breadth of Roy’s religious concerns,”247 the Court was skeptical about his 
reliability.  Roy had originally testified that his daughter’s spirit would be 
robbed if she were issued a Social Security number.  But when new 
evidence at trial revealed that the government had already issued her a 
number, Roy seemed to change his tune.  He testified that Little Bird’s 
spirit was not actually robbed yet, but would be robbed by “widespread 
use” of the number.248  
Roy’s changing position heightened the Court’s usual concerns about 
the slippery slope.  As the majority wrote: “It is readily apparent that 
virtually every action that the Government takes, no matter how innocuous 
it might appear, is potentially susceptible to a Free Exercise objection.”249  
For example, “someone might raise a religious objection, based on Norse 
mythology, to filing a tax return on a Wednesday (Woden’s day).”250  The 
Court was unconvinced that the government would have to accommodate 
beliefs of this nature, writing: “Roy may no more prevail on his religious 
objection to the Government’s use of a Social Security number for his 
daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color 
of the Government’s filing cabinets.”251      
Bowen stands for a clear bright line position: religious believers cannot 
compel the government to do anything under the First Amendment.  To 
this end, the Court wrote that Yoder was not a suitable test to apply to “the 
enforcement of facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for 
the administration of welfare programs reaching many millions of 
people.”252  In hindsight, the Court was on a path toward articulating what 
it would say even more emphatically in Smith—that the substantial  
burden–compelling interest test does not apply to neutral statutes of 
general applicability.  Thus, the Court’s skepticism about Roy’s claims, 
which it repeatedly described as “recent” and “unique,” may have been 
                                                                                                                          
246 Id. at 696. 
247 Id.  
248 Id. at 697. 
249 Id. at 707 n.17; see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 448–49 
(1988) (describing Indian objections to government road construction through sacred site as 
indistinguishable from claims about Social Security number in Bowen v. Roy, to the extent that both 
would interfere with government’s management of its own affairs).  
250 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 707 n.17; see also Hansen v. Dept. of Treasury, 528 F.3d 597, 602–03 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (rejecting religious objection to assignment of Social Security number); Ali v. Dixon, 912 
F.2d 86, 89–90 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that a prisoner has no free exercise objection to prison 
officials’ refusal to use in personal interactions the prisoner’s new name, obtained during conversion to 
Islam). 
251 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 700. 
252 Id. at 707. 
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only window dressing.  The case may have come out the same way even if 
the Roys had more effectively articulated limits on the claims and remedies 
they sought.   
That said, it is also true that the Roys’ religious beliefs were not deeply 
articulated in terms of a tribal religion.  The Abenakis are an ancient tribe 
with aboriginal lands in Vermont and New Hampshire, and treaties dating 
back to the 1700s.
253
  Nevertheless, the Abenakis are not federally 
recognized and were not a party or amicus in the Bowen case.  And there is 
little to suggest that Abenakis generally oppose Social Security numbers on 
religious grounds.  While one Abenaki elder testified in the case, the brief 
of the National Congress of American Indians (“NCAI”) pointed out that 
the Social Security Administration had failed to consult with tribal 
leaders.
254
  As Walter Echo-Hawk has argued, “Bowen does not involve 
recognizable tribal religious beliefs.  It involved an offbeat idiosyncratic 
religious belief . . . that was only incidentally described as Native 
American.”255  Despite the lack of agency consultation or a tribal presence 
in the litigation, Bowen has come to stand for the proposition that 
American Indian religious claims may generally be too broad or 
idiosyncratic for the government to accommodate as a matter of right 
under the First Amendment.
256
  This reasoning would prevail in Lyng. 
In Lyng, American Indian religious practitioners sued the United States 
Forest Service alleging that its plans to build a logging road through sacred 
sites would violate the Free Exercise Clause.
257
  The Yurok, Karuk, and 
Tolowa tribes knew the mountainous area as the “High Country,” a sacred 
space inhabited by spiritual ancestors where religious leaders went to 
gather medicine, engage in prayer, and otherwise prepare for tribal 
ceremonies.
258
  These activities, conducted by a small number of religious 
leaders or “doctors,” were necessary precursors to various religious dances 
undertaken by the tribal people in their villages.
259
  These dances along 
with other religious duties comprised some of the tribal “cultural 
covenants”—set forth in the creation stories—designating the various 
responsibilities of human beings and the natural world to each other that 
                                                                                                                          
253 For sources on Abenaki culture and history, see COLIN CALLOWAY, THE WESTERN ABENAKIS 
OF VERMONT 1600–1800: WAR, MIGRATION AND THE SURVIVAL OF AN INDIAN PEOPLE 7 (1990); 
FREDERIC KIDDER, THE ABENAKI INDIANS: THEIR TREATIES OF 1713 AND 1717, AND A VOCABULARY 
3–4 (Portland, Brown Thurston, 1859); FREDERICK MATTHEW WISEMAN, THE VOICE OF THE DAWN: 
AN AUTOHISTORY OF THE ABENAKI NATION 65 (2001).   
254 WISEMAN, supra note 253, at 47–48. 
255 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 525 n.4.  
256 Id. 
257 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 443 (1988). 
258 Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 489. 
259 See id. at 495–96. 
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would keep the world in balance.
260
   
While the High Country was located in the tribes’ aboriginal territory, 
it was not included in their reservations and, by the time of the case, was 
owned by the United States and managed by the Forest Service.
261
  A Draft 
Environmental Statement was released by the Forest Service in 1974 which 
outlined possible land use plans for the “Blue Creek Unit” of the Six 
Rivers National Forest in Northern California.
262
  The proposal ultimately 
called for “harvesting 733 million board feet of timber over the course of 
80 years and required construction of 200 miles of logging roads in the 
areas adjacent to Chimney Rock.”263  Each day, an estimated seventy-six 
logging vehicles, as well as ninety-two other vehicles, would travel 
through the Chimney Rock area.  In support of this activity, the 
government proposed constructing a new road to connect the towns of 
Gasquet and Orleans (“G-O road”).”  This road would cut through the 
High Country.
 264
   
When Indians raised concerns about possible damage to sacred sites, 
the Forest Service commissioned an expert study, which found the entire 
area to be “significant as an integral and indispensable part of Indian 
religious conceptualization and practice.”265  The Theodoratus Report went 
on to explain that specific sites are used for certain rituals, and “successful 
use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of 
the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, 
and an undisturbed natural setting.”266  Because constructing a road along 
any of the available routes “would cause serious and irreparable damage to 
the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief 
systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples,” the 
Theodoratus Report recommended that the G-O road not be completed.
267
    
Despite the findings and recommendations of its own experts, the 
Forest Service selected the logging and road plan described above.  It did 
try to avoid certain sacred sites in selecting the route for the road and 
called for a half-mile buffer around sites identified in the Theodoratus 
Report.
268
  Yet, the Forest Service rejected alternatives that would have 
                                                                                                                          
260 See id. at 494–95 (discussing the “cultural covenants,” and how “[e]ach had a purpose in the 
chain of life”). 
261 Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 498–505 (describing loss of tribal aboriginal territory 
leading up to the Lyng case).  
262 Id. at 505. 
263 Id. 
264 Id. 
265 Dorothea Theodoratus, Cultural Resources of the Chimney Rock Section, Gasquet-Orleans in 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, in READINGS IN AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 
302, 311 (Jo Carrillo ed., 1998) [hereinafter Theodoratus Report]. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
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avoided certain sacred sites, such as Chimney Rock, altogether because 
they required the purchase of private land, had soil stability problems, and 
would still have disturbed other Indian cultural sites.
269
   
The Indian plaintiffs sued, alleging that the completion of the road 
would violate the Free Exercise Clause by degrading the sacred qualities of 
the high country and impeding its use for religious purposes.
270
  More 
specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the visibility of the road, the noise 
associated with it, and the resulting environmental damage would all 
“erode the religious significance of the area” and “impair the success of 
religious and medicinal” activities.271  The Indians were represented by six 
named religious practitioners and the Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Association, a non-profit corporation created to represent the 
tribal interests in grave protection and other religious matters.  The Yurok, 
Karuk, and Tolowa tribes did not appear as parties, possibly because they 
were not federally recognized and did not have well-developed 
governmental infrastructures at the time.
272
  While the Indian communities 
coordinated their efforts and worked closely with their attorneys at 
California Indian Legal Services, they did not have the resources or 
organization that they have today.  For example, in 1993, the Yurok Tribe 
adopted a constitution that sets forth its religious laws and cultural 
covenants, a legal instrument that was unavailable to lawyers at the time of 
the Lyng case.
273
  Moreover, the Yurok Tribe has since developed 
considerable expertise in negotiating with federal agencies regarding land 
use disputes. 
Despite the lack of formal tribal resources, the Yurok, Tolowa, and 
Karuk religious practitioners participated actively in the trial.  Their 
testimony relied on oral tradition and it was very persuasive.
274
  The 
district court looked to Sherbert, Yoder, Sequoyah, and Badoni to evaluate 
whether the Indians had shown a substantial burden on their religion.  
Distinguishing Sequoyah, the district court observed that here, the Indians 
had demonstrated that the area was indispensable and central to the 
practice of religion, and that the government use would seriously interfere 
                                                                                                                          
269 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 443 (1988) (stating that the 
Forest Service decided not to adopt the recommendations). 
270 Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 592 (1983), rev’d sub 
nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
271 Id. 
272 See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 503 n.50 (“[T]he Yuroks, Karuks, and the Tolowa 
would not formalize their governments for several decades.”). 
273 YUROK TRIBE [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 19, 1993 (U.S.), available at 
http://www.yuroktribe/org/government/councilsupport/documents/Constitution.pdf. 
274 See Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 592–95 (finding that Sherbert and Yoder “support the conclusion 
that the proposed Forest Service actions impose an unlawful burden on the exercise of plaintiffs’ 
religion,” while distinguishing the case from Sequoyah and Badoni, where the court did not find in 
favor of the Indian plaintiffs). 
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therewith.
275
  The court stated, “The Forest Service’s own study concluded 
that intrusions on the sanctity of the Blue Creek high country are . . . 
potentially destructive of the very core of Northwest Indian religious 
beliefs and practices.”276  These included preparation for “‘World 
Renewal’ ceremonies, such as the White Deerskin and Jump Dances, 
which constitute the heart of the Northwest Indian religious belief 
system.”277  Citing Yoder and Sherbert, the Court concluded that the Forest 
Service’s actions in the High Country would “impose an unlawful burden” 
on the Indians’ religion.278  Moreover, the government interests in the six-
mile road project were not demonstrably “compelling.”279  Having failed 
the Free Exercise Clause test, the government’s plan to build a road 
through the sacred high country was struck down.
280 
The Ninth Circuit heard the Lyng case twice, initially on direct appeal 
in 1985,
281
 and again on rehearing in 1986.
282
  Both times, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the road construction and 
timber harvesting would impermissibly burden the Tolowa, Yurok, and 
Karuk peoples’ religious freedoms.283  Judge Canby reviewed and upheld 
the district court’s findings that the G-O road would substantially infringe 
the Indians’ religion.284  On the compelling governmental interest prong, he 
went somewhat further than the district court, observing that the 
government “makes little attempt to demonstrate that compelling 
                                                                                                                          
275 See id. at 595 (“Unlike the present case, plaintiffs in Sequoyah did not claim that the area 
threatened with flooding played a central role in the practice of their religion, and in fact failed to 
demonstrate that there had been significant past use of the area for religious purposes.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
276 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
277 Id. at 594. 
278 See id. at 595 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to the court’s 
finding in Sherbert that there was an unlawful burden on the plaintiff’s free exercise of religion even 
though it constituted the denial of a benefit or privilege and was only an indirect result of welfare 
legislation within the State’s general competence to exist). 
279 According to the court, the available timber in the Blue Creek Unit was too small to affect 
timber supplies and the timber industry would not suffer significantly without the project.  Even if the 
government could demonstrate a compelling public interest, the court held that there were “means less 
restrictive of [the Indians’] First Amendment rights” than the government’s proposed management plan 
for Blue Creek Unit.  Id. at 596. 
280 Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 595–96.  The district court also decided claims under the 
Establishment Clause and numerous federal statutes.  Id. at 597–98. 
281 Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d 
sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
282 Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986). 
283 See Peterson, 764 F.2d at 585–86 (“[The Ninth Circuit’s] finding is sufficient to support the 
district court’s conclusion that the proposed operations would interfere with the Indian plaintiffs’ free 
exercise rights. . . . We also reject the government’s argument that the free exercise clause cannot be 
violated unless the governmental activity in question penalizes religious beliefs or practices.”); 
Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692–94 (explaining that the court agrees with the district court’s conclusion that 
“the proposed operations would interfere with the Indian plaintiffs’ free exercise rights”). 
284 Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693. 
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governmental interests . . . require the completion of the paved G-O road or 
the logging of the high country.”285  The evidence did not justify the 
infringement of Indian religious freedoms.
286
 
By the time Lyng reached the Supreme Court, however, the newly 
issued Bowen opinion had changed the analysis altogether.  At oral 
argument, the government urged that “[a] believer’s conclusion that 
government action impacts adversely [on] his belief system is not by itself 
sufficient to trigger constitutional protection, and that was really the 
holding of this Court joined by eight members in Bowen v. Roy.”287  And 
further, “the Government need not make any concessions whatever to the 
interests of the Indians in this case.”288  Here, the government took Bowen 
one step further, arguing in this case that it was not merely the 
government’s management of internal affairs, but rights over its own 
property at stake.  In this regard, a new limiting principle was emerging: 
the principle of ownership.  As the Court put it: “Whatever rights the 
Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest 
the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.”289   
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, it was thus in Lyng that 
ownership became an effective ban on Indian free exercise claims 
involving the public lands.
290
  In my view, the Court announced this near 
absolute rule in response to fears about the scope of the Indians claims on 
federal property.  The line of question occupied much of the discussion at 
oral argument, where the Justices questioned the size of the contested area 
and the extent to which the Indians were trying to exclude others from it.
291
  
The opening question to the Indians’ attorney was “how many square miles 
or square feet there are involved?”292  She answered, “admittedly it’s a 
large area,”  and then tried to direct the Justices’ attention to the location 
“where the conduct is occurring”—namely the six-mile road segment. 293  
In response to questioning, Miles explained that the Indians were not trying 
to exclude Forest Service rangers, campers, hunters, motorcycles, jeeps, 
                                                                                                                          
285 Id. at 695. 
286 Id. 
287 Oral Argument, Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (No. 86-1013) 
(1988), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1987/1987_86_1013#argument [hereinafter 
Oral Argument, Lyng]. 
288 Id. 
289 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. 
290 See Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 1084–85 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyng, and how the decision “cleared up the role of 
ownership”). 
291 See Oral Argument, Lyng, supra note 287 (“Not all religious practices have to be conducted at 
the particular site, and, so, it would not interfere with the Government’s proposal at all unless you 
could show that, and not all land projects are going to seriously interfere with it.”). 
292 Id. 
293 Id. 
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backpackers, Mormons, or the Boy scouts from the contested area.
294
  One 
Justice asked whether “the claim could be made in the future, that any use, 
including that [use] by other non-Indians, of the Forest Service land would 
constitute a sufficient burden that it must be prohibited.”295  Miles 
responded that no applicable precedent would support such a claim, but the 
Justice’s question signaled where the Court was going: it could not discern 
any workable limits on the Indians’ claims. 
Writing for the majority, Justice O’Connor reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision, holding that the Indians had no Free Exercise Clause claim.
296
  
The majority reasoned that Lyng was indistinguishable from Bowen, 
writing, “In both cases, the challenged Government action would interfere 
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment 
according to their own religious beliefs.”297   
The majority was unwilling to use the “centrality” test to distinguish 
Lyng from Bowen.
298
  The dissent had advocated such an approach as a 
means of “balancing” the interests at stake and thereby addressing a “stress 
point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate cultures.”299  But 
the majority disagreed that the Court should act as the “arbiter” in 
determining which public lands are central to which religions and which 
government programs were sufficiently compelling to justify burdening 
those practices.
300
  This would require the Court to “weigh the value of 
every religious belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any 
government program” and, in some cases, hold that “some sincerely held 
religious beliefs and practices are not ‘central’ to certain religions, despite 
protestations to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the 
lawsuit.”301  Such an approach would, in the majority’s view, “cast the 
Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play.”302 
To Justice O’Connor, the facts of Lyng illustrated exactly why, beyond 
the institutional issues, a nuanced approach would be difficult.  As she 
wrote: “government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy 
every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”303  Stating that “[o]ne need not 
look far beyond the present case”304 to see why this was true, the Court 
then proceeded with a set of speculations going far beyond the actual Lyng 
                                                                                                                          
294 Id. 
295 Id. 
296 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 440–41 (1988). 
297 Id. at 449. 
298 Id. at 457–58. 
299 Id. at 473–74 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
300 Id. at 457. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 458. 
303 Id. at 452.  
304 Id. 
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case: 
Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious 
servitude that they are now seeking to impose on the 
Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest.  While 
defending an injunction against logging operations and the 
construction of a road, they apparently do not at present 
object to the area’s being used by recreational visitors, other 
Indians, or forest rangers.  Nothing in the principle for which 
they contend, however, would distinguish this case from 
another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated religious 
objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but their 
own from sacred areas of the public lands.  The Indian 
respondents insist that “[p]rivacy during the power quests is 
required for the practitioners to maintain the purity needed 
for a successful journey.”  Similarly: “The practices 
conducted in the high country entail intense meditation and 
require the practitioner to achieve a profound awareness of 
the natural environment.  Prayer seats are oriented so there is 
an unobstructed view, and the practitioner must be 
surrounded by undisturbed naturalness.”  No disrespect for 
these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs 
could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some 
rather spacious tracts of public property.  Even without 
anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government’s 
property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian 
religion, would in this case be far from trivial: the District 
Court’s order permanently forbade commercial timber 
harvesting, or the construction of a two-lane road, anywhere 
within an area covering a full 27 sections (i.e. more than 
17,000 acres) of public land.
305
 
The upshot was that the government could not function if it might be 
forced to accommodate uses of this inscrutably broad nature.  A bright line 
approach was preferable.  Lyng was like Bowen in that in neither case had 
the government “coerce[d] individuals into acting contrary to their 
religious beliefs” by imposing a penalty or denying a benefit, as in Yoder 
and Sherbert.
306
  Coercion became the new bright line.  The Court held 
“incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more 
difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce 
individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, [cannot] require 
                                                                                                                          
305 Id. at 452–53 (citations omitted). 
306 Id. at 450–51. 
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government to bring forward a compelling justification.”307  The Indian 
plaintiffs’ claim was not actionable under the Free Exercise Clause.308 
The plaintiffs in Lyng were devastated, fearing that their spiritual 
center of the Yurok universe would be destroyed, and not understanding 
why the First Amendment did not protect their religious freedom.
309
  Two 
years later, Congress passed legislation effectively designating the High 
Country as a wilderness area where no further road construction could 
occur.
310
  The six-mile segment was never built (suggesting that the result 
sought by the Indians did not actually cause government to grind to a 
halt).
311
  Some commentators argue that this was the correct result, leaving 
it up to Congress and the Executive Branch to protect religions on a case-
by-case basis.
312
  Others criticize Lyng for narrowing free exercise rights 
and broadening the government’s powers as an owner to the extent of 
immunizing the destruction of Indian religious practices on the federal 
lands.
313
  In any event, it is clear that Lyng advanced some limiting 
principles on religious liberty: in order to show a “substantial burden,” free 
exercise claimants must demonstrate that the government has “coerced 
religious belief” or “denied a benefit” and that the government’s 
management of its land will not typically violate the Free Exercise Clause. 
C.  The Ultimate Limit:  Neutral Statutes of General Applicability  
 In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division v. Smith,
314
 
                                                                                                                          
307 Id. 
308 See supra text accompanying note 231. 
309 See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 526 (“When the Lyng opinion hit the banks of the 
Klamath River, the tribal communities were shocked, devastated, and despondent.”). 
310 Smith River National Recreation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 101-612, 104 Stat. 3209 (1990) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460bbb (2006)). 
311 See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 527. 
312 See Marcia Yablon, Note, Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal Regulatory Responses to 
American Indian Religious Claims on Public Land, 113 YALE L.J. 1623, 1629 (2004) (“In foreclosing 
judicial protection, the Lyng Court shut off one method of protecting sacred sites, but suggested 
another, more feasible method in its place—agency accommodation.”). Cf.  Zoë Robinson, 
Rationalizing Religious Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for 
Religion, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 133, 133, 162–64 (2011) (hypothesizing “that a person’s 
religious freedom is dependent on their political power” or their ability to secure legislative 
accommodation for religious practices).  
313 See, e.g., Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases, supra note 14, at 
1062–67 (outlining the Lyng decision and critiquing its implication that the government is a property 
owner with an almost absolute right to exploit federal lands, even where detrimental to Indians’ sacred 
sites); S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: 
Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 504–06, 
510–11 (1989) (criticizing Lyng’s analysis and narrowing of free exercise rights); see also Peggy 
Healy, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: A Form-Over-Effect 
Standard for the Free Exercise Clause, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 171, 171 (1988) (“The [Lyng] decision, if 
adhered to in future cases, portends a more restrictive interpretation of the free exercise clause, with 
profound implications for all religious groups.”).   
314 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990). 
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the case that would ultimately inspire the enactment of RFRA.  In Smith, 
the Supreme Court rejected the Free Exercise Clause claims of two 
individuals who were deemed ineligible for unemployment benefits after 
being fired from their jobs for having ingested peyote in ceremonies of the 
NAC.
315
  The significance of peyote as a religious sacrament has been 
described above in Woody.   
Some states had been regulating peyote since the 1920s, and the 
federal government put peyote on its list of controlled substances in 1967, 
which made it illegal to possess the plant, with regulatory exceptions for 
“nondrug use of peyote in bona fide ceremonies of the Native American 
Church.”316  States remained free to legislate without religious exemptions 
for Native Americans.  Oregon prohibited the knowing or intentional 
possession of any controlled substance including peyote, and persons who 
violated the prohibition were guilty of a Class B felony.
 317
  
In 1983, Al Smith, a Klamath Indian, and Galen Black, a non-Indian, 
were fired from their jobs for religious use of peyote in ceremonies of the 
NAC.  The state employment division determined that they had been fired 
for “misconduct” and were thus ineligible for benefits.318  Finding that the 
state law made no exception for religious use of peyote, the Oregon 
Supreme Court held that this prohibition violated the Free Exercise Clause 
and that the State of Oregon could not deny Smith and Black benefits for 
this reason.
319
 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause neither prohibited Oregon from applying its drug laws to 
ceremonial ingestion of peyote nor stopped the state from denying 
claimants unemployment compensation for work-related “misconduct” 
based on use of peyote.
320
  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that 
states need not grant religious exemptions to neutral statutes of general 
applicability such as this one.
321
  As in recent cases rejecting religious 
claims for tax exemptions, the Court held there was no religious 
entitlement to an exemption from government programs.
322
   
The Court found the Smith facts akin to Lyng and Bowen, in which a 
religious claimant could not interfere with the government’s management 
of its own affairs.   By contrast, Sherbert and Yoder were unhelpful 
                                                                                                                          
315 Id. at 872. 
316 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2007). 
317 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
318 Id. at 874. 
319 For an engaging treatment of the case, including coverage of the judicial decisions, contextual 
information on the parties and lawyers, and insight into the political dealings behind the litigation, see 
generally GARRETT EPPS, TO AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (2001). 
320 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79. 
321 Id. at 883–84. 
322 Id. at 880 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–61 (1982)). 
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according to the majority because Sherbert was confined to the 
unemployment benefit context
323
 and Yoder was a “hybrid” case based as 
much on the parents’ fundamental interests in raising their children as in 
their free exercise rights.
324
  Additionally, the religious plaintiffs’ conduct 
was not criminally prohibited in either Sherbert or Yoder.   
Concurring, Justice O’Connor would have found a substantial burden 
here on grounds that the state’s interest in enforcing the peyote prohibition 
in Smith was unlike the government’s management of its own affairs in 
Bowen or Lyng.
325
  Justice Scalia disagreed that drug regulation was 
meaningfully different from Social Security Administration or public lands 
management, writing that the government interest was paramount in 
each.
326
  While Justice O’Connor tried unsuccessfully to distinguish these, 
she concurred in the judgment upholding the Oregon laws on grounds that 
the state had a compelling interest in regulating drug possession.
327
 
Justices Scalia and O’Connor agreed that the Court should not protect 
peyote possession because of its “centrality” to the NAC religion.328  State 
courts had recognized peyote as the main sacrament in the NAC and thus 
recognized it as central and indispensable to the religion.  But the Supreme 
Court had already rejected the centrality analysis as institutionally 
inappropriate for the judiciary in Lyng, a point that Justice Scalia reiterated 
in the majority opinion.
329
  With centrality off the table, however, the Smith 
Court had no way to distinguish claims to peyote from any other 
religiously motivated claim to drugs.  With the compelling interest test also 
off the table, the majority also could not distinguish the government’s 
interest in regulating religious use of peyote from any other drug use.  
Citing Lyng, Justice Scalia conceded negative impacts on the Indian 
religion.  In his view, the disfavoring of minority religions was an 
“unavoidable consequence of democratic government,” which could only 
be remedied by the political process.
330
   
                                                                                                                          
323 Id. at 882–84. 
324 Id. at 881–82. 
325 Id. at 885 n.2. 
326 See id. (“[I]t is hard to see any reason . . . why the government should have to tailor its health 
and safety laws to conform to the diversity of religious belief, but should not have to tailor its 
management of public lands, or its administration of welfare programs.” (citations omitted)). 
327 Id. at 907 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
328 See id. at 885 (“The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of 
socially harmful conduct . . . ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a 
religious objector’s spiritual development.’” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988))). 
329 See id. at 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Court today gives no convincing reason to 
depart from settled First Amendment jurisprudence.  There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of 
general applicability or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a 
person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws 
aimed at religion.”). 
330 Id. at 890 (majority opinion). 
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Justice Blackmun’s dissent took the majority to task on precisely these 
grounds, writing that the case could not be about the state’s general interest 
in fighting the war on drugs or even its general interests in protecting 
citizens from the health and safety harms of illegal drugs.  To meet the 
compelling interest test, a state’s interest in burdening religious activity 
had to be more than merely abstract or speculative and, indeed, must be 
supported by evidence.
331
  Here, the state had only once in its history 
prosecuted an individual for peyote possession and had presented no 
evidence that the religious use of peyote harmed anyone.  In most of the 
preceding peyote cases from other jurisdictions, the courts had rejected (or 
the prosecutors had conceded) that religious use of peyote was not 
harmful.
332
     
The dissent cited many factors tending to show how the NAC itself 
regulated and limited the religious practice.  First, “[t]he carefully 
circumscribed ritual context” in which Smith and Black used peyote was 
“far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recreational use of 
unlawful drugs.”333  The NAC itself places “internal restrictions” on and 
engages in “supervision of, its members’ use of [religious] peyote,” which 
in the dissent’s view, “obviate[d] the State’s health and safety concerns” 
and distinguished the NAC from groups that claimed a religious exemption 
to smoke marijuana all day.
334
  The federal Drug Enforcement Agency 
(“DEA”) itself had recognized that the NAC strictly limited peyote use to 
ceremonies under the direction of a church leader, and maintained an 
absolute prohibition on use, sale, or possession for any non-sacramental 
purpose.
335
  The Church’s own doctrine forbids non-religious use of 
peyote.
336
  Far from promoting the lawless and irresponsible use of drugs, 
                                                                                                                          
331 Id. at 911–12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
332 Id. at 912 (“[T]he State failed to prove that the quantities of peyote used in the sacraments of 
the Native American Church are sufficiently harmful to the health and welfare of the participants so as 
to permit a legitimate intrusion under the State’s police power.” (quoting State v. Whittingham, 504 
P.2d 950, 953 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973))); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal. 1964) (“[A]s the 
Attorney General . . . admits, . . . the opinion of scientists and other experts is that peyote . . . works no 
permanent deleterious injury to the Indian.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
333 Smith, 494 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
334 Id. 
335 Id. at 913–15 (citing Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (“[The DEA] finds that . . . the Native American Church’s use of peyote is isolated to specific 
ceremonial occasions, [and so] an accommodation can be made for a religious organization which uses 
peyote in circumscribed ceremonies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id.  at 1464 (holding that 
“for members of the Native American Church, use of peyote outside the ritual is sacrilegious”); 
ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION 148 (3d ed. 1981) (“[P]eyote is seldom abused by 
members of the Native American Church.”); J.S. Slotkin, The Peyote Way, in TEACHINGS FROM THE 
AMERICAN EARTH: INDIAN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY 96, 104 (Dennis Tedlock & Barbara Tedlock 
eds., 1975) (“[T]he Native American Church . . . refuses to permit the presence of curiosity seekers at 
its rites, and vigorously opposes the sale or use of Peyote for non-sacramental purposes.”). 
336 Smith, 494 U.S. at 914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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the NAC’s spiritual code—with its emphasis on brotherly love, self-
reliance, familial responsibility, and abstinence from alcohol—
”exemplifies values that Oregon’s drug laws are presumably intended to 
foster.”337  Justice Blackmun pointed out that “[t]he use of peyote is, to 
some degree, self-limiting”338 because it may cause vomiting and “other 
unpleasant physical manifestations” discouraging casual use.339  For all of 
these reasons, peyote was unlikely to become anyone’s recreational drug of 
choice.
340
  Numerous sources attested to the lack of peyote abuse or 
trafficking either by NAC members or the general population.
341
   
Finally, the dissent responded to the state’s fears that “if it grants an 
exemption for religious peyote use, a flood of other claims to religious 
exemptions will follow.”342  This was, of course, a classic appeal to the 
slippery slope.  As the dissent pointed out, this argument was not 
persuasive here.
 343
  The federal government and almost half of the states 
had a peyote exception and had not been deluged by other claims to 
religious exemptions.
344
  Moreover, granting a religious exemption to 
religious users of peyote would not, as the majority suggested, obligate the 
state to allow religious claims to smoke marijuana “all day” or to use 
heroin.
345
  The drugs had been proven harmful and trafficked illegally, and 
as Justice Blackmun said, there was no religious institution or tenet 
limiting the drug use in those cases.
346
    
Allowing Oregon to “constitutionally prosecute . . . this act of 
worship” was particularly unfortunate, according to Justice Blackmun, in 
light of the government’s recent reversal of its centuries’ old policies and 
practices of persecuting Indian religions.
347
  While Justice Blackmun was a 
dissenting view on the Court, developments following the decision would 
suggest that his views in favor of recognizing American Indian religious 
freedoms would prevail in the political process.  
                                                                                                                          
337 Id. at 914-16. 
338 Id. at 914 n.7. 
339 Id. (citation omitted). 
340 See id. at 916 (“Peyote simply is not a popular drug; its distribution for use in religious rituals 
has nothing to do with the vast and violent traffic in illegal narcotics that plagues this country.”). 
341 See id. (“There is . . . practically no illegal traffic in peyote.” (citing Olsen v. Drug 
Enforcement Admin.,  878 F.2d 1458, 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1989))). 
342 Id. 
343 See id. at 917 (“This Court, however, consistently has rejected similar arguments in past free 
exercise cases, and it should do so here as well.” (citing Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 
829, 835 (1989); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (same); 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (same)). 
344 Smith, 494 U.S. at 917. 
345 Id. at 917–18. 
346 See id. (“[T]he Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church . . . teaches that marijuana is properly smoked 
‘continually all day.’” (citing Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1464)).  
347 Id. at 920. 
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IV. EMPOWERING (ADMINISTRATIVE) PRACTICES  
The Smith and Lyng opinions struck many American Indians as 
heartless and unjust.
348
  They could not understand why their religious 
practices should be exempt from the protections of the First Amendment.  
As the dissenting opinion in Smith indicated, these decisions also seemed 
like a throwback to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when federal 
and state lawmakers were actively persecuting American Indian religions 
as part of a policy in favor of American Indian cultural assimilation.
349
  Yet 
dicta in both Lyng and Smith offered the suggestion of a new way forward: 
legislative and administrative accommodation of Indian religions.  As 
Justice O’Connor wrote in Lyng: 
Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage 
governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any 
citizen.  The Government’s rights to the use of its own land 
 . . . need not and should not discourage it from 
accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by 
the Indian respondents.
350
 
In Smith, Justice Scalia admitted that the legislative process might leave 
minority religious practitioners at “a relative disadvantage,” but that was 
an unavoidable consequence of democratic government that must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself and in 
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality 
of all beliefs.  Still he suggested: “[A] society that believes in the negative 
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of 
that value in its legislation as well.”351 
Few American Indians would have predicted governmental sensitivity 
or solicitude following these decisions.  And yet, in the post-Bowen-Lyng-
Smith era, Congress passed a number of statutes calling for the 
accommodation of American Indian religious freedoms.  Enactments and 
amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, National 
Historic Preservation Act, Bald Eagle and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 
and Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act now make it 
federal policy to preserve and accommodate the traditional religions of 
                                                                                                                          
348 See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 525 (noting American Indians’ reaction to and 
criticism of Lyng decision).  
349 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 920 n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Oregon’s attitude toward 
respondents’ religious peyote use harkens back to the repressive federal policies pursued a century ago: 
In the government’s view, traditional practices were not only morally degrading, but unhealthy. Indians 
are fond of gatherings of every description, a 1913 public health study complained, advocating the 
restriction of dances and ‘sings’ to stem contagious diseases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
350 Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 453–54 (1988). 
351 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
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American Indians.
352
  These statutes delegate to agencies, including the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Forest Service, Park Service, Army Corps of 
Engineers, and Fish and Wildlife Service, the obligation to manage 
resources—such as sacred sites, eagle feathers, burial grounds, and peyote 
plants—which are vital to American Indian religion.353  
Two things are critical about the post-Lyng and post-Smith laws.  First, 
Congress explicitly created an institutionally appropriate framework for the 
accommodation of Indian religious claims, giving federal agencies 
delegated authority to become experts in the religious questions that so 
stymied the courts in earlier cases.  This first point is elaborated in detailed 
discussion below about the agency process in sacred sites, eagle feathers, 
burial grounds and human remains, and peyote matters.   
Second, Congress explicitly referenced the rights of tribes as an aspect 
of its interest in accommodating Indian religious freedoms and placed in 
tribal governments the opportunity and responsibility to engage with the 
United States in religious accommodations.  As I have suggested above, a 
revealing and understudied aspect of Bowen, Lyng, and Smith is that none 
of these cases involved tribes as parties.  Also described above, few of the 
tribes potentially implicated in Bowen or Lyng were federally recognized at 
the time of the cases.  In Smith, neither the NAC nor the Klamath Tribes 
were parties.  In fact, the history of the Smith case suggests that the NAC, 
as an organization, was actually leery of the case.
354
  The Klamath Tribe, 
which had signed treaties with the United States in the 1850s, had been 
“terminated” by the government in 1954, only to be restored in 1986, a few 
years before Smith.  It is probably not coincidental that all three of these 
cases started in the 1980s—just when the federal government was 
beginning to recognize tribal self-determination, but before the tribes had 
gathered significant political, financial, and organizational strength as 
governments.
355
  
Additionally, of course, First Amendment litigation has classically 
been framed in terms of individual rights, making it unclear what role 
tribes have to play in religious freedoms jurisprudence.  Religious legal 
theory work in the post-Smith era has evaluated collective rights and 
                                                                                                                          
352 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
353 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 668b (2006) (stating that “[t]he Secretary of the Interior is authorized to 
enter into cooperative agreements with State fish and wildlife agencies or other appropriate State 
authorities to facilitate enforcement of [The Bald and Gold Eagles Protection Act]”). 
354 See Epps, supra note 61, at 1006 (“[T]he Native American Church was incensed at Al Smith 
because no one regarded him as a member of the Church . . . . [T]he church that we represented at the 
time and still represent is the very hard core . . . the very traditional peyote practitioners and they had 
never heard of Al Smith . . . .” (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
355 See Bowers & Carpenter, supra note 29, at 502–33 (linking Yurok participation in Lyng to the 
emergence of tribal self-determination). 
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interests by conceptualizing individual practitioners in the aggregate,
356
 as 
minority faiths,
357
 associational groups,
358
 enclave communities,
359
 and 
cultural interests.
360
  Some scholars suggest that the modern realities of 
multiculturalism and pluralistic interests in religion and culture are 
chipping away at the classic foundation of individual rights.
361
  From this 
literature, there are many useful themes for comparison with the American 
Indian situation, such as the social exclusion of minority groups,
362
 counter 
                                                                                                                          
356 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1397, 1411 (2003) (“However discrete or insular minority sects might be one by one, cross-
religious alliances are possible, and the political lobbying power of religious interests in the aggregate 
makes up for any sect’s weakness operating alone.”); see also Ira Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and 
Religious Institutions, supra note 199, at 422 & n.119 (1987) (arguing that “individuals, not 
institutions, are always the ultimate source of religious conviction,” and cases such as Yoder recognize 
the “aggregated interests” of individuals and not the interests of “the Amish”). 
357 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
919, 923 (2004) (“[T]he protection and equal status of minority faiths and adherents is a significant 
purpose of religious freedom, even if not the sole or conclusive one.”); see also Stephen M. Feldman, 
Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 222, 224 (2003) (“[H]istory reveals that . . . the First Amendment often has failed to provide 
equal liberty to religious minorities.”); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority Voice: A Look 
at Free Exercise Laws Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 
160 (1996) (“The continuing increase in religious minorities suggests that more than ever courts must 
appreciate religious minority perspectives to ensure that the law evolves concurrently with our 
country’s changing religious landscape.”); Rosalie B. Levinson, The Dark Side of Federalism in the 
Nineties: Restricting Rights of Religious Minorities, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 47, 55 (1998) (“[T]he whole 
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects, such as religious liberty, from the will of 
the majority.”); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for 
Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 501 (1998) (stating that minority religious group 
interests are not always represented in public policy decisions); David E. Steinberg, Religious 
Exemptions as Affirmative Action, 40 EMORY L.J. 77, 78 (1991) (“[J]ust as the Court has allowed the 
use of racial classifications to benefit racial minorities, the Court should also authorize the use of 
religious exemptions to accommodate members of minority religious groups.”). 
358 See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy 
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 522 (2007) (asserting that religious institutions are 
more than voluntary associations). 
359 See Nomi M. Stolzenberg, Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. 
Grumet: A Religious Group’s Quest for Its Own Public School, in LAW AND RELIGION: CASES IN 
CONTEXT 203, 207 (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010) (discussing formation of Satmar Jewish enclave in 
Monroe Township). 
360 See, e.g., András Sajó, Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2401, 2417 (2009) (describing  scholars who discuss “the role of religions in the 
national culture, and propose a rethinking of the constitutional role of religions in constitutional law by 
granting recognition to religion as culture”). 
361 There is a very rich literature on this topic, which I can only begin to hint at here.  See, e.g., 
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting 
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011). 
362 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL 
HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 282–86 (1997) (providing examples of the social 
exclusion of minority religious groups). 
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majoritarian challenges of the political process,
363
 and the enduring power, 
not always benign, of religious institutions.
364
  Cases considering the 
illiberal beliefs of certain religious groups,
365
 jurisdictional claims of 
religious enclave communities,
366
 and desire of religious bodies to enjoy a 
protected sphere of authority
367
 are all highly resonant with the Indian 
cases and may suggest new directions for advocacy. 
One line of analysis suggests some intersection between the uncertain 
role of tribes in religious freedoms jurisprudence and the courts’ reluctance 
to probe the limits of Indian religious claims.  In several cases, courts have 
begun to conceptualize the rights of religious institutions through a theory 
of “church autonomy”368 in which judges defer, to some extent, to religious 
decisions about clergy hiring, theological disputes, and distribution of 
property.
369
  Professor Richard Garnett has suggested a conception of 
institutional religious rights as a matter of constitutional interpretation, in 
which: 
“[S]eparation of church and state” would seem to denote a 
structural arrangement involving institutions, a constitutional 
order in which the institutions of religion . . . are distinct 
from, other than, and meaningfully independent of, the 
institutions of government.  What is “at stake,” then, with 
separation is not so much—or, not only—the perceptions, 
                                                                                                                          
363 See BRUCE LEDEWITZ, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DEMOCRACY: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE 
END OF SECULAR POLITICS 157 (2007) (“Secularists tend to overlook the importance of religion and its 
historical role in American public life.”). 
364 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: 
Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 227–30 (2007) 
(asserting that child sex abuse is often covered up by the church, and clergymen are shielded by the 
“ministerial exception”).   
365 See, e.g., Ofrit Liviatan, Faith in the Law—The Role of Legal Arrangements in Religion-Based 
Conflicts Involving Minorities, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 54–55 (2011) (stating that religious 
minorities’ liberty is infringed by illiberal sentiments).  
366 See Stolzenberg, supra note 356, at 207 (discussing formation of Satmar Jewish enclave in 
Monroe Township). 
367 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct 694, 712 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (stating that religious groups must be free to govern themselves and determine 
who is qualified to serve in positions of religious importance); see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“[R]eligious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their internal affairs, 
so that they may be free to: ‘select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own 
disputes, and run their own institutions.’” (quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the 
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981))). 
368 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch,.132 S. Ct. at 705–06 
(recognizing “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination laws for a religious institution and 
its ministers); see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 
10–12 (2011) (situating the “ministerial exception” in “church autonomy” scholarship).   
369 See generally Lund, supra note 365 (surveying church autonomy cases). 
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feelings, immunities, and even the consciences of 
individuals, but a distinctions [sic] between spheres, the 
independence of institutions, and the “freedom of the 
church.”370  
In this regard, judges’ reluctance to probe the substance of religious claims 
may be linked to institutional church autonomy and church-state separation 
arguments.
371
  Perhaps, then, the courts are treating Indian religious groups 
like other religious groups, from which the courts also try to maintain a 
respectful distance in recognition of the structural relationship between 
church and state.
372
  Tribal courts have, to some extent, taken this 
approach: when asked to decide competing claims to religious resources 
and ceremonies among tribal members, some tribal courts have deferred to 
traditional spiritual authorities in the tribal community.
373
  
Yet, there are pragmatic, conceptual, and doctrinal differences that 
distinguish American Indians from other theories of groups or institutional 
rights, and other instances of deference to church autonomy.
374
  As 
                                                                                                                          
370 Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, supra note 
355, at 523; Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the 
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273 (2008) (arguing that “the independence and autonomy of 
churches, and of religious institutions and associations generally are seen as deriving from the free-
exercise or conscience rights of individual persons” (emphasis added)).   
371 See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1185–89 (1988) (describing three 
different views, evangelical, secular, and separate spheres, that may explain judicial reluctance to 
entertain religious questions).  For a sampling of the “hands-off” literature and its various theoretical 
underpinnings, see generally Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What 
Are We Talking About?, supra note 38 (describing symposium and scholarship devoted to the “hands-
off approach to religious doctrine”); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts 
over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme 
Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85 
(1997).  
372 Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a ‘Religious Question’ Doctrine: Judicial Authority to Examine 
Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 499—501 (2005). 
373 Two disputes about religious freedoms in the court of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes illustrate 
deference to traditional spiritual authorities.  See, e.g., In re Sacred Arrows, 3 Okla. Trib. 332 (1990) 
(observing that the Tribal Court cannot decide who the Arrow Keeper is, a question better left “to the 
Headsmen, Chiefs, and the Cheyenne tribal members themselves . . . in accordance with traditional 
practice and procedure”); see also Redman v. Birdshead, 9 Okla. Trib. 495 (2006) (noting a conflict in 
tribal constitution simultaneously providing for free exercise rights and prohibiting tribal court 
jurisdiction “over traditional matters such as the conduct of ceremonies,” usually decided by spiritual 
leaders in the tribal community).  For a deeper discussion of the challenges, both substantive and 
procedural, of assessing tribal customary law beyond the religion context, see MATTHEW L.M. 
FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 87–88 (2011) (describing the role of customary and 
codified law in tribal justice systems); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and 
Intratribal Common Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 701 (2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Looking to the East: 
The Stories of Modern Indian People and the Development of Tribal Law, 5 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 1 
(2006); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 57 (2007); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War Against Tribal 
Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93 (2007). 
374 This, too, is a literature that I can only reference briefly here.  In previous works, I have 
examined in more detail American Indian group rights vis-à-vis political theory, surveying leading 
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described above, American Indians have experienced a particular and 
pronounced history of federal intervention into tribal religious matters.  
While attempts to disentangle the government from such involvement are 
ongoing, they are also incomplete.  Federal courts can and should defer to 
tribal courts regarding religious matters arising on reservations, and tribal 
courts may, in some cases, be able to defer to religious institutions that will 
be best able to decide internal theological questions.
375
  But when it comes, 
for example, to sacred sites located on federal public lands, the United 
States is not yet in a position to disclaim a role in regulating or reviewing 
religious access, whether through a theory of church or tribal autonomy. 
Until the federal government comprehensively restores ownership of 
sacred sites and burial grounds to tribes, fully repatriates all of the human 
remains and religious artifacts in federal possession, and decriminalizes 
peyote and eagle feather use, it will probably play a role in accommodating 
American Indian religious practices.
376
   
The second distinction is conceptual.  Most of the institutional or 
group rights arguments referenced above still stay relatively close to the 
liberal democratic conception that rights are held by individuals, whether 
as associated individuals or incorporated entities.
377
  By contrast, from an 
indigenous perspective, tribal members relate to one another through a 
fabric of kinship and cultural relations that link them to a particular place 
on the natural landscape. The fundamentally collective nature of tribal 
interests is especially pronounced in matters of religion wherein, as 
previously described, the primary purpose of tribal religion is for the 
                                                                                                                          
works of western liberalism, nationhood, peoplehood, human rights, multiculturalism, minority, and 
indigenous rights.  See, e.g., Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal 
Constitutional Law, supra note 30, at 159–61, 173; Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1022, 1050–61 (2009); Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 348–55; see 
generally Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, supra note 44 (discussing American Indian 
rights and liberalism).  The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples has numerous 
articles recognizing the collective rights of indigenous peoples, including religious liberty and practice.  
See Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 
13, 2007), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/512/07/PDF/N0651207.pdf?OpenElement. 
375 Native Am. Church of N. Am. v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) 
(holding that there is no federal cause of action for a First Amendment case arising on a reservation); 
Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (same).  
376 On occasion, the United States has returned sacred sites to tribes.  For example, federal 
legislation restored Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo.  Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437, 1438 (1970);  see 
generally R.C. GORDON-MCCUTCHAN, THE TAOS INDIANS AND THE BATTLE FOR BLUE LAKE (1991) 
(providing a detailed historical account of the return of Blue Lake to the Taos people).  Today, Lakota 
people are trying to raise enough money to purchase a portion of their sacred Black Hills.  See ICTMN 
Staff, Tribes Reach Deal to Purchase Black Hills Sacred Site, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, (Sept. 4, 
2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/09/04/tribes-reach-deal-to-purchase-black-
hills-sacred-site-132613. 
377 See AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 1–6 (1995) (surveying existing bases 
for group rights in U.S. law and calling for additional legal protection of such groups). 
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survival of the tribe itself and not for individual salvation.  Again and 
again, tribal leaders articulate a relationship between tribal religious 
traditions and contemporary tribal self-determination.
378
  To survive as 
Indian people, they must survive collectively. 
Finally, from a doctrinal perspective perspective, tribes are sovereign 
entities whose existence pre-dates the Constitution.  They are not bound by 
the Bill of Rights
379
 and may even maintain theocratic forms of 
government.
380
 Tribes interact with the United States through a 
“government to government” relationship. Originating in the treaties 
between American Indian and European governments (later the United 
States), this relationship is effectuated today through the federal Indian 
trust responsibility.
381
  The trust responsibility has been interpreted as a 
fiduciary obligation to manage Indian resources with the highest degree of 
care, through legislative and executive actions.
382
  Today, federal and tribal 
governments alike are committed to a policy of tribal “self-determination” 
                                                                                                                          
378 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing 
the relationship between ceremonies at Bear Lodge and Lakota as self-determination); see also GELYA 
FRANKS & CAROLE GOLDBERG, DEFYING THE ODDS: THE TULE RIVER TRIBE’S STRUGGLE FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN THREE CENTURIES 26–27 (2010) (describing Yokuts tribal creation story as a 
“[s]ource of [n]ative [s]overeignty”); Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents Now Targeting City 
Council, ARIZ. DAILY SUN (Jan. 12, 2006), http://azdailysun.com/snowmaking-opponents-now-
targeting-city-council/article_3cff71dc-acbf-59f9-8461-63548e54cfb5.html (“It is another sad day . . . 
[when] in the 21st Century, genocide and religious persecution continue to be perpetrated on Navajo 
people [and] other Native Americans . . . who regard the Peaks as sacred.” (quoting Navajo Nation 
President Joe Shirley Jr.)).  
379 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 381–82 (1895) (holding the right to grand jury under the First 
Amendment inapplicable in capital case before Cherokee Nation court); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 
119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954) (holding the First Amendment inapplicable to actions of tribal council 
against Protestant members of Pueblo); see generally Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of 
American Law to the Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1596 (2004) (noting the U.S. Constitution does 
not regulate the conduct of Indian tribal governments). 
380 See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 463 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey, 
eds., Thomson Reuters 2011) (citing work by Rina Swentzell, a member of the Santa Clara Pueblo and 
noting Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not interfere with tribal rights to organize as theocracies).  
By virtue of their own norms or adoption of the Indian Civil Rights Act, many tribes do have a Free 
Exercise Clause and maintain a pluralistic religious society.  I have examined this point in scholarship 
explaining dozens of tribal constitutions. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious 
Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, supra note 30.  
381 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831). 
382 Compare Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942) (maintaining that in 
establishing a treaty with the Indians, the U.S. government has charged itself with the “moral 
obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” and that its conduct should therefore be judged by 
“the most exacting fiduciary standards”), with United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 504–14 
(2003) (rejecting Navajo Nation’s claim that the Secretary of the Interior breached trust duties when he 
approved tribal coal leases containing below market royalty rates in a set of transactions including 
private communications with coal company).   
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in which tribes exercise autonomy over internal affairs.
383
  The trust 
responsibility is interpreted as a partnership between the federal and tribal 
governments where these political partners join forces to protect the 
separate existence of Indian tribes.
384
  Congress legislates in Indian Affairs 
pursuant to its “plenary authority”385 and increasingly uses this power to 
foster the political, economic, and cultural aspects of tribal self-
determination.
386
   
What is so transformative about the contemporary statutes recognizing 
American Indian religious freedoms is that they begin to address the 
pragmatic, conceptual, and doctrinal situation of American Indians.  
Congress realizes that, after hundreds of years of religious suppression, it 
now has a duty to foster tribal self-determination.  To do so, it must 
accommodate Indian religion on a collective basis to reflect tribal cultural 
practices.  Moreover, Congress has the doctrinal power to legislate in the 
area of tribal religions—whether sacred sites, eagle feathers, burial 
grounds and human remains, or peyote—pursuant to its plenary power and 
trust responsibility.
387
  The upshot is that, in addition to protections 
available under the First Amendment and RFRA, tribal governments, as 
                                                                                                                          
383 See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006) 
(stating Congressional findings on the federal government’s historical and special obligation to 
American Indians, including their right to self-government); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 62–68 (1978) (discussing cases and statutes furthering tribal self-determination). 
384 See CHARLES F.  WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 14 (1987) (describing 
the reservation system as reserving “islands of tribalism largely free from interference by non-Indians 
or future state governments”).  
385 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations 
of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been 
deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”); 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886) (identifying the federal legislative “power” 
over Indian affairs as a basis for upholding criminal statute).  
386 NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 22.02 (2005) 
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW] (discussing the enactment of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act to continue Congress’s legal and moral obligation in 
assisting Indian people as well as allow tribal self-determination). 
387 The purpose of my Article, which is largely conceptual and descriptive, is not to provide a 
normative justification for American Indian legislative exemptions.  Yet, as I acknowledge in the 
discussion below, such challenges do come up, particularly in Equal Protection grounds.  Professor 
Kevin J. Worthen has argued that the preferential treatment of American Indian religious practitioners 
vis-à-vis other religious practitioners is justifiable, in terms of equality and liberty, on the following 
grounds: “(1) [American Indian religions] were created here and exist only here; (2) their beliefs are 
often unique and culture-encompassing; and (3) those beliefs often revolve around sacred sites which 
are located only here . . . [and (4) n]o group in the United States has been dispossessed of as much land, 
or in such a systematic manner as have Native Americans . . . [and the] massive land deprivation has 
been particularly devastating to Native American religion because of the intimate connection Native 
Americans have between land and religion.”  Kevin J. Worthen, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons 
on Religious Exceptions from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 1007.  For a 
discussion of equality and liberty interests in Free Exercise Clause cases, see CHRISTOPHER L. 
EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2007). 
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such, are now empowered to work with the agencies to develop 
accommodations that are carefully crafted to reflect the real religious needs 
of their citizens.  American Indian individuals are, in many (though not all) 
cases, no longer out on their own in trying to assert religious freedoms.   
Of course there are downsides to legislating at the tribal level.  Some 
tribes are, in fact, theocracies and establish a certain tribal religion.
388
  But 
in others, the tribal government is not synonymous with a tribal religion or 
religious institution.
389
  In many tribal communities, there are several 
religions practiced and perhaps even competition among religions.
390
  
Political leaders may not have access to confidential religious information 
and there may even be tension between religious practitioners and elected 
tribal leadership, as in any community.
391
  Tribes without federal 
recognition are typically not even covered by federal Indian statutes, 
including the religion statutes.
392
  For these reasons, advocates often insist 
that traditional tribal religious leaders be invited to consultations with 
federal agencies, in addition to governmental representatives.  Despite 
these and other challenges, however, the presence of tribal governments 
has often improved and enhanced the ability of American Indian religious 
practitioners to articulate the scope and norms of tribal religions, as I 
describe in several examples below. 
In this Part, I describe the evolution and enactment of these statutes, 
along with their administration in regulatory contexts.  I argue that tribal 
governments now have the opportunity to work with the agencies on 
religious freedoms matters and that they are using these opportunities to 
bring tribal religious law and custom to bear on religious accommodations.   
These developments reflect what I call an “empowering practices” 
                                                                                                                          
388 Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, supra note 44, at 845; see also Gloria Valencia-
Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-five Years of Disparate Cultural Visions, 14 KAN J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 49, 52 (2004) (describing the relationship between religion and government at Santa 
Clara Pueblo). 
389 See Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian Tribal Constitutional Law, 
supra note 30, at 159–93 (surveying tribal constitutions, including some that establish religion and 
others that prohibit religious establishment); see also VINE DELORIA, JR., SINGING FOR A SPIRIT: A 
PORTRAIT OF THE DAKOTA SIOUX (1999) (describing traditional Dakota religious leaders and 
Episcopalians in Deloria family). 
390 See, e.g., Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D.N.M. 1954) (claims by 
Protestant Pueblo members that they were denied certain rights unless they adopted Catholicism).  
391 Historically, for example, the Navajo Nation outlawed peyote practice, a position which has 
recently changed, as described below. 
392 See, e.g., Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding 
that consultation requirements of National Historic Preservation Act did not apply in sacred site case 
where tribe lacked federal recognition);  Marc Dadigan, Fish and Wildlife Service Denies an Indian her 
Feathers, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Apr. 7, 2011, 10:15 AM), http://www.hcn.org/greenjustice/blog/fish-
and-wildlife-service-denies-an-indian-her-feathers (recounting the story of a traditional Wintu religious 
practitioner who is not entitled to participate in the eagle permitting program, and thus denied religious 
access to eagle feathers required for her religion because her tribe is not federally recognized). 
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approach to American Indian religious freedoms occurring at the 
intersection of administrative practice, federal Indian law, and tribal 
religious practice.
393
  At its best, the empowering practices approach has 
the potential to develop accommodations that are meaningful to tribes and 
address the problems of content and scope that presented such problems in 
the cases described above.  In this Part, I highlight both the statutory 
provisions, administrative mechanisms (rulemaking, hearing, land 
management plan, advisory committee, etc.), and particular religious 
practices at issue to suggest both successful models of “limiting practices” 
and opportunities for improvement.  In several examples, I discuss briefly 
the ways in which these statutes and regulatory models comply with the 
Establishment Clause, often furthering a secular purpose of public lands 
management, endangered species conservation, or the preservation of tribal 
culture.  For the most part, however, I leave detailed discussion of these 
and other questions about judicial review for a follow-up article. 
A.  AIRFA and RFRA 
As a backdrop to the wave of 1990s statutes, recall that Congress 
passed the AIRFA to set forth a nationwide policy on American Indian 
religious freedoms.  Therefore, acknowledging the need for a national 
policy in favor of Indian religious freedom, Congress stated its respect for 
the “inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the 
traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native 
Hawaiians, including, but not limited to, access to sites, use and possession 
of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and 
traditional rites.”394   
Consistent with the spirit of the First Amendment, AIRFA focused 
primarily on American Indian religion in terms of individual liberties.
395
  
But it also expressly acknowledged the link between Indian religious belief 
and Indian “cultures” and the Indian “way of life.”396  Subsequent legal 
instruments would go even further in connecting Indian religious liberty 
with tribal rights, and indeed, self-determination and self-government.  In 
1994, President Clinton issued an Executive Order calling for all 
departments and agencies of the United States to consult with tribal 
governments on federal lawmaking matters that affect the tribes, in 
                                                                                                                          
393 While this Article does not deeply look at administrative law, this Section draws on my 
previous works addressing the administrative law aspects of the agency process in Indian law.  See 
Carpenter, Interpreting Indian Country¸ supra note 65, at 83–153 (analyzing judicial review of agency 
interpretation in Indian law cases); Carpenter, Property and Peoplehood, supra note 14, at 329–35, 
364–38 (considering agency expertise in sacred sites matters). 
394 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006). 
395 Id. (stating that the policy of the United States will be to protect and preserve individual 
liberties such as “freedom to believe, express, and exercise the tradition religions”). 
396 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(1) (2006). 
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fulfillment of the trust responsibility.
397
  President Clinton’s 1994 
Executive Order has since been replaced by Executive Order 13,175 on 
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments of 2001, 
which emphasizes the obligation of consultation with tribal 
governments.
398
  The order, confirmed by both Presidents Bush and 
Obama,
399
 highlights the federal government’s commitment to tribal 
sovereignty, self-government and self-determination and to the 
“government-to-government” relationship between the United States and 
Indian nations.
400
   
In 1993, Congress passed RFRA based on findings that the Court’s 
decision in Smith “virtually eliminated the requirement that the 
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral 
toward religion.”401  RFRA’s intent is “to provide a claim or defense to 
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government” 
and “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”402  RFRA provides that  “governments 
should not substantially burden religious exercise” even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability, unless it can show the burden 
on religion furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least 
restrictive means.
403
  RFRA does not define the term “substantial burden,” 
but defines the “exercise of religion” as “any exercise of religion, whether 
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”404  RFRA 
has been ruled unconstitutional as applied to state governments
405
 but still 
applies to the federal government.
406
   
In this regard, RFRA has potential in American Indian religion cases, 
which often occur in federal contexts, such as in the management of the 
public lands, the regulation of controlled substances, the regulation of 
endangered species, and otherwise.  On the other hand, while RFRA’s 
plain language contemplates “religious exercise” without reference to any 
                                                                                                                          
397 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 3 C.F.R. 304 (2000).  
398 Id.   
399 President Bush’s 2004 Memorandum and President Obama’s 2009 Memorandum are available 
at http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/AS-IA/Consultation/Templates/index.htm. 
400 Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict Between the “Public Trust” and “Indian Trust” Doctrines: 
Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA L. REV. 271, 288 (2003). 
401 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2, 107 Stat. 1488, 1488 
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)). 
402 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (citations omitted). 
403 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(1)–(3), (5). 
404 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4).  This definition was provided in the RLUIPA, which amended 
RFRA in 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc). 
405 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the RFRA violated 
the separation of powers doctrine). 
406 See Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficenta Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) 
(noting that the RFRA restricts the federal government from substantially burdening the practice of 
religion, despite its inapplicability to the states). 
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specific practice, the legislative history is somewhat ambiguous with 
respect to American Indian religions.
407
  As a result, perhaps, the federal 
courts seem unsure about RFRA’s application to these religious claims. 
B.  Sacred Sites 
Sacred sites cases demonstrate some of the most palpable changes to 
federal law and policy in religious freedoms in the post-Smith era.  The 
term “sacred sites” encompasses a variety of places and features on the 
natural landscape with religious significance for certain tribes.
408
  Sacred 
sites often mark the place of creation or emergence for a tribe; they may be 
locations where deities are believed to reside or where contemporary 
prayers and ceremonies take place.
409
  Most sacred sites are unique places 
and the religious activities that occur there cannot be replicated 
elsewhere.
410
  Some places, such as rock formations or mountains, may be 
perceived as living beings.
411
  Tribal religions often instill in the people the 
obligation to care for certain sacred sites, both through specific ceremonies 
and respectful conduct.
412
  Having lost title to their sacred sites through 
generations of conquest and colonization, tribes now find themselves in the 
challenging position of having to contest the current owners—whether 
public or private—to gain access for religious purposes and to protect their 
sacred sites from desecration.  As Lyng demonstrates, it is difficult for 
Indian religious practitioners to prevail in these cases, which arise 
                                                                                                                          
407 See Epps, supra note 61, at 1016 (discussing how the interfaith coalition advocating for RFRA 
declined to push the peyote access issue); see also Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring 
the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1315 & 
nn.198–99 (1996) (“Congress was assured that RFRA would not create a cause of action on behalf of 
Native Americans seeking to protect sacred sites.  The Senate report stated that RFRA would not 
overrule Lyng and that, under Lyng, strict scrutiny does not apply to government actions involving only 
management of internal government affairs or the use of the government’s own property or 
resources.”); see also Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996) (denying RFRA relief to a Native 
American couple challenging road construction through the gravesite of their infant).  
408 See ANDREW GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL 
TRADITIONS 67–69 (2000) (discussing a variety of sacred sites found in the natural environment of the 
United States); CHARLES E. LITTLE ET AL., SACRED LANDS OF INDIAN AMERICA 8 (Jack Page ed., 
2001) (noting that natural cultural landmarks are considered “holy” sites by a variety of tribes). 
409 See, e.g., Steve Young, Sioux Tribes Seek to Buy Sacred Land in S.D., USATODAY.COM (Aug. 
18, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-08-18/black-hills-sale-
sioux-tribes/57130396/1?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&dlvrit=206567 (describing a 
sacred site to the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakato tribes as being “home to their creation story and essential 
to their culture and beliefs”); Tribe: S Calif Quarry Plan Imperils Sacred Site, NATIVE AM. TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nativetimes.com/life/culture/5867-tribe-s-calif-quarry-plan-imperils-
sacred-site (describing a tribe’s objection to building along the Luiseno reservation because it “would 
be built at the spot that they consider the site of the world’s creation”).  
410 See Young, supra note 409 (noting that there are religious and cultural ceremonies tied to the 
disputed sacred site).   
411 See GULLIFORD, supra note 408, at 70 (linking rock formations with ancestral connotations 
and transubstantiation).   
412 See id. at 68 (explaining that for most native people the word sacred connotes respect).   
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frequently in the federal courts.
413
 
In 1992, Congress extended the protections of the National Historic 
Preservation Act (“NHPA”) to certain American Indian sacred sites.414  As 
amended, the NHPA provides, “Properties of traditional religious and 
cultural importance to an Indian tribe [(“TCP”)] . . . may be determined to 
be eligible for inclusion on the National Register” of Historic Places.415  
Like other federal historic sites, a TCP does not enjoy any automatic 
protection from development or otherwise.  Rather, the protections of the 
NHPA are generally procedural.
416
  Similarly, in the American Indian 
context, the 1992 amendments provide that federal agencies are directed to 
consult “with any Indian tribe . . . that attaches religious and cultural 
significance” to a TCP regarding federal “undertakings” that may affect 
it.
417
   
The NHPA’s TCP provisions are enhanced by several instruments, 
including President Clinton’s 1996 Executive Order 13,007 on Indian 
sacred sites.
418
  Substantively, the Executive Order urges federal agencies 
to “accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by 
Indian religious practitioners and . . . [to] avoid adversely affecting the 
physical integrity of such sacred sites.”419  Procedurally, the agencies must 
give notice to tribal governments when federal management may affect 
sacred sites and consult with tribal leaders regarding such plans.
420
  
Significantly, the Executive Order notes that the responsibility to identify 
sacred sites to the agencies belongs to “an Indian tribe or individual 
determined to be an appropriately authoritative representative of an Indian 
religion.”421  
Federal land management agencies, including the National Park 
Service and U.S. Forest Service, have developed internal guidelines in 
                                                                                                                          
413 Many of the well-known sacred sites cases are cited throughout this paper.  For some recent 
and ongoing cases, see Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, 
Karuk v. Kelley, No. CV-10-2039 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 2444668 (discussing 
tribal challenge to Forest Service management of sacred lands in the Orleans district of Six Rivers 
National Forest that was also the subject of Lyng).  See also Slockish v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., 
682 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1201–02 (D. Or. 2010) (dismissing a portion of claim by hereditary Chief of the 
Klickitat Tribe regarding damage to sacred lands caused by highway on Mt. Hood, Oregon for lack of 
standing).   
414 National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2006); see also Dean B. Suagee, 
Historical Storytelling and the Growth of Tribal Historic Preservation Programs, 17 NAT. RESOURCES 
& ENV’T 86, 86–87 (2002) (describing 1992 amendments to the NHPA and implementing regulations). 
415 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A) (2006). 
416 See Morris Cnty. Trust for Historic Pres. v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271, 278–79 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(“NHPA, like NEPA, is primarily a procedural statute . . . .”). 
417 16 U.SC. § 470a(d)(6)(B).  
418 Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).   
419 Id.  
420 Id. 
421 Id. § 1(b).   
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favor of sacred site protections.
422
 
 
The National Park Service’s 
Management Policies manual provides that the Park Service “will develop 
and implement its programs in a manner that reflects knowledge of and 
respect for the cultures of Native American tribes or groups with 
demonstrated ancestral ties to particular resources in parks.”  Procedurally, 
the policy provides that, through its Superintendents, the Park Service will 
consult with tribes regarding administration of parks including sacred 
sites.
423
  Substantively, the Park Service is to undertake “decisions [that] 
reflect knowledge about and understanding of potentially affected Native 
American cultures and people, gained through research and consultations 
with the potentially affected groups.”424 
The United States Forest Service’s National Resource Guide to 
American Indian and Alaska Native Relations, which was issued in 1997, 
acknowledges federal obligations at sacred sites arising from the 
government-to-government relationship, tribal sovereignty, and the fact 
that the Forest Service lands are often adjacent to tribal lands.
425
  While 
Forest Service lands “are public” and “most Indian title to these lands has 
been extinguished,” the Forest Service nevertheless must “be concerned 
where there are [t]ribal rights reserved by treaty, [s]piritual and cultural 
values and practices.”426  The Forest Service Guide instructs its employees 
to “[w]alk the land with American Indians . . . to gain an understanding 
and appreciation of their culture, religion, beliefs, and practices.”427  The 
substantive goal is to “[i]dentify and acknowledge [Indian] cultural needs 
 . . . [and c]onsider these values  an important part of management of the 
national forests.”428  As described below, a number of recent controversies 
compelled Secretary of Agriculture Thomas Vilsack to request that the 
Forest Service issue a new study and report in 2010.   
These post-Lyng evolutions in administrative law have been tested in a 
number of cases.  For present purposes, it is perhaps most helpful to 
juxtapose the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bear Lodge Multiple Use 
Association v. Babbitt
429
 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Navajo Nation 
                                                                                                                          
422 For BLM Policies, see Bureau of Land Management, “8120–Tribal Consultation Under 
Cultural Resource Authorities” (Dec. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Bureau of Land Management Manual], 
available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/pol
icy/blm_manual.Par.80216.File.dat/8120.pdf; Bureau of Land Management, “H-8120-1–General 
Procedural Guidance for Native American Consultation” (Dec. 3, 2004), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/blm_han
dbook.Par.38741.File.dat/H-8120-1.pdf. 
423 Bureau of Land Management Manual. 
424 Id.  
425 FOREST SERVICE, FOREST SERVICE NATIONAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO AMERICAN INDIAN AND 
ALASKA NATIVE RELATIONS xi (Apr. 1997), available at  http://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/. 
426 Id. at 36. 
427 Id. at 59. 
428 Id.   
429 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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v. Forest Service.
430
  Bear Lodge involved the National Park Service’s 
management of Devils Tower National Monument.
431
  Devils Tower has 
long been a sacred site to a number of Plains tribes and is named 
accordingly in each tribal story (e.g., Mato Tipila or the “Lodge of the 
Bear” in Lakota).  As one Lakota story tells: 
To honor the Great Spirit, the Lakota gathered at Mato Tipila 
for a sun dance.  A mysterious woman appeared and gave the 
Lakota a pipe and taught them how to use it in prayer.  As 
she headed back to the horizon, the woman turned into a 
buffalo calf.  Since then she’s been known as White Buffalo 
Calf Woman.  Mato Tipila is remembered as the place where 
the Lakota received the pipe from the spirit world.
432
 
Consequently, for the Lakota and other tribes, Devils Tower is 
important as a place where human beings interacted with the sacred, 
learned religious traditions, and acquired values important to their identity.  
Lakota people go to Devils Tower for individual prayers and visions, to 
leave offerings, and to conduct the Sun Dance, a collective, multi-day 
ceremony of sacrifice conducted every summer.  They continue to keep the 
pipe as one of their most sacred religious traditions.
433
   
The tribal presence at Devils Tower is evident not only in these 
religious traditions, but also in the political history of the place.  Devils 
Tower was originally reserved to the Great Sioux Nation with the Black 
Hills in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868,
434
 which was soon thereafter 
violated by the United States.
435
  Devils Tower became a National 
Monument in 1906, and is now managed by the Park Service.
436
  By the 
1990s, Devils Tower became an exceedingly popular destination for rock 
climbers, hikers, tourists, and motorcycle enthusiasts—whose various uses 
of the tower made it difficult for Indian religious practitioners to keep 
Mato Tipila, as they put it, “in the light of reverence.”437  The noise, litter, 
presence, and curiosity of these other users all made it difficult to conduct 
religious ceremonies requiring quiet, solicitude, and care for the tower.
438
  
                                                                                                                          
430 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
431 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 815. 
432 IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE (Sacred Land Film Project of Earth Island Institute, 2001) 
(recounting this story). 
433 See CHIEF ARVOL LOOKING HORSE, WHITE BUFFALO TEACHINGS (2001).  
434 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 635 (1868). 
435 Ray H. Mattison, Devil’s Tower History & Culture: The First 50 Years, NAT’L PARK SERV.,  
http://www.nps.gov/deto/historyculture/upload.First_50_Years.pdf (last updated July 23, 2012) (“The 
Treaty of 1868 guaranteed this region to the Indians.  In 1874, in violation of this treaty, General 
George A. Custer led a reconnaissance expedition into the Black Hills.”).  
436 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819. 
437 IN THE LIGHT OF REVERENCE, supra note 432 (statement of Lakota Elder Johnson Holy Rock). 
438 Id. 
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In addition, the climbers were threatening nesting raptors and the 
environmental quality of the Tower itself.
439
  
The Park Service was obligated to manage these conflicting uses at 
Devils Tower by the NHPA, the National Park Service Organic Act and 
the Presidential Proclamation, which established Devils Tower as a 
National Monument.
440
  The Park Superintendent initiated a planning 
process in which nineteen federally recognized tribes were invited to 
consult on a government-to-government basis.  Other invited participants 
included local governments in Wyoming, organizations representing rock 
climbers, local and national environmental organizations, and American 
Indian interests, and a number of locally involved individuals.
441
   The Park 
Service held hearings at numerous venues, including Indian reservations, 
and also convened a “Work Group” of leaders representing the various 
interests.  
Through this process, the Park Service produced a “Draft Climbing 
Management Plan” that listed four objectives: (1) preserving the 
monument’s natural and cultural resources; (2) managing recreational 
climbing; (3) increasing visitor awareness of American Indian beliefs and 
traditional cultural practices at Devils Tower; and (4) providing the 
monument with a guide for managing climbing consistent with other Park 
Service and Devils Tower management policies.
442
  
After considering six alternatives for achieving those  
objectives—representing a spectrum of approaches from allowing more 
rock climbing to banning it altogether—the Park Service settled on a 
middle ground: the prohibition of commercial rock climbing during the 
month of June when the most American Indian religious ceremonies were 
conducted.
443
  The Climbing Management Plan also called for educational 
programs on Indian religious and cultural uses and for mitigation of 
climbing’s effects on the environment through reduced use of pitons and 
closure of routes near raptor nests.
444
  The plan was published in the 
                                                                                                                          
439 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERV., DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, DEVILS TOWER NATIONAL MONUMENT, WYOMING (1994) 
[hereinafter DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN], available at http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/cgi/vi
ewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=govdocs. 
440 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817 n.7, 819 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1; Proclamation No. 458, 34 
Stat. 3236 (Sept. 24, 1906)). 
441 See DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 439 (listing the organizations, 
businesses, and individuals who were contacted in the development of the Climbing Management Plan 
and Environmental Assessment).  
442 Id. 
443 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819 (acknowledging the FMCP’s efforts to ask climbers to 
voluntarily refrain from climbing during the month of June). 
444 See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998) (“To 
protect against any new physical impacts to the tower, the FCMP provides that no new bolts or fixed 
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Federal Register for public notice and comment, under the Administrative 
Procedure Act, yielding hundreds of comments both in support and 
opposition to the plan.
445
  After a lawsuit was filed by a group of rock 
climbers who challenged the plan on Establishment Clause grounds, the 
NPS changed the climbing ban to a voluntary closure, which was 
ultimately upheld in the Tenth Circuit on grounds that the climbers 
suffered no injury and lacked standing to sue.
446
  
In this process, the Park Service specifically recognized tribal interests, 
in addition to those of individual Indian religious practitioners.  As one 
Lakota leader explained, religious use of Bear Lodge is “vital to the health 
of our nation and to our self-determination as a Tribe.”447  Accordingly, the 
National Park Service website lists the federally recognized Indian tribes 
with historic relations to Devils Tower and provides education on the 
cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions of each.
448
  This is indicative of 
the respect that the Park Service has tried to show for the tribal religions 
associated with Devils Tower.  Second, when it was time to engage in 
consultation on the Climbing Management Plan, the Park Service granted 
formal and informal measures of respect to the relevant tribes.  It provided 
notice of consultation meetings to nineteen federally recognized tribes,
449
 
and also invited participation by representatives of the Medicine Wheel 
Coalition who were authorized by their own tribal governments.
450
  As 
Lloyd Burton notes, the Park Service Superintendent held five meetings 
over the year, personally travelled to tribal communities, allowed tribal 
representatives to take time to debrief with their constituents, and 
undertook other measures to “preserve a government-to-government 
relationship with the larger group of tribes” interested in Devils Tower.451 
The Climbing Management Plan was also revealing because the basis 
for the compromise between American Indian and other uses of Devils 
Tower was found in the tribal religions themselves.
452
  While some 
                                                                                                                          
pitons will be permitted on the tower . . . . [However, NPS] will not enforce the voluntary closure, but 
will instead rely on climbers’ self-regulation and a new ‘cross-cultural educational program . . . .’”). 
445 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819. 
446 Id. at 822; see also Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 
2007) (holding Forest Service ban on rock climbing at Washoe sacred site did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because it had “a secular purpose—preservation of a historic cultural area”).    
447 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817. 
448 George L. San  Miguel, How Is Devils Tower a Sacred Site to American Indians, NAT’L PARK 
SERV. (Aug. 1994), http://www.nps.gov/deto/historyculture/sacredsite.htm. 
449 See DRAFT CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 439, at 53 (listing nineteen federally 
recognized tribes). 
450 LLOYD BURTON, WORSHIP AND WILDERNESS, CULTURE, RELIGION AND LAW IN PUBLIC 
LANDS MANAGEMENT 131 (2001). 
451 Id. at 131 & nn. 18, 20. 
452 See Natural Arch & Bridge Soc’y v. Alston, 98 F. App’x. 711, 716 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding 
National Park Service’s plan asking tourists to refrain from walking under a sandstone bridge out of 
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American Indians may have preferred complete closure of Devils Tower 
on grounds that any climbing was sacrilegious, some rock climbers 
advocated for no restrictions whatsoever.
453
  But the members of the Work 
Group were ultimately willing to compromise on closure during June, the 
month of the summer solstice, a time of the year that Lakota leaders 
describe as sacred and when most of the ceremonies take place.
454
      
The incorporation of tribal religious values into determinations about 
the content and scope of the accommodation may have helped the Devils 
Tower Climbing Management Plan succeed where other attempts have 
failed.  Following adoption of the plan, no tribe or individual American 
Indian challenged the Devils Tower Climbing Management Plan in court.  
A group of rock climbers did, however, sue under the Establishment 
Clause, but the federal district court upheld the plan, ruling it did not 
violate the Establishment Clause because it advanced secular purposes, did 
not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and did not entangle the 
government with religion.
455
  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, but 
not on the merits.  It held that because the plan made the climbing 
restrictions “voluntary” and the plaintiff climbers had continued climbing, 
they suffered no injury and therefore lacked standing to sue.
456
  
Attempts to invoke the slippery slope against this religious 
accommodation also failed.  Lakota people generally describe the Black 
Hills as “sacred.”457  Yet this particular accommodation only involved one 
butte located within the Black Hills.  Undaunted by this fact, the Mountain 
States Legal Foundation (“Mountain States”) argued for a writ of certiorari 
on grounds that such accommodations would end development across the 
western United States.  This was because the government owned upwards 
of ninety-percent of the property in some counties and American Indians 
could claim anything to be “sacred.”458  Mountain States argued that if the 
Bear Lodge accommodation served as precedent, it could end “tourism, 
forestry, ranching, mining, and oil and gas exploration and development” 
throughout the public lands, and “many rural western counties would be 
                                                                                                                          
respect for Native American religious beliefs on grounds that plaintiffs had not suffered an actual injury 
and thus lacked standing to bring Establishment Clause challenge). 
453 BURTON, supra note 450, at 129–35 (describing the consultation and negotiation process 
leading to the final climbing management plan). 
454 See CHIEF ARVOL LOOKING HORSE, supra note 433. 
455 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbit, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454−57 (D. Wyo. 1998) 
(applying Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and its articulation of the Establishment Clause 
test). 
456 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821–22 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and its articulation of the standing test). 
457  See Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything that Is: Paha Sapa, Treaties, and Lakota 
Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 317, 317 (1998).   
458 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 
(10th Cir. 1999) (No. 99−1045), 1999 WL 33640033 at *27.  
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devastated” by the loss of revenue streams associated with such 
activities.
459
  But both the district court and Tenth Circuit had confined 
their analysis to the terms of the plan as actually drafted to pertain only to 
Devils Tower itself and rejected the climbers’ lawsuits,460 and the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.
461
 
While early studies showed substantial compliance with the plan, rock 
climbers can, of course, still climb on Devils Tower even during the Sun 
Dance.
462
  The accommodation at Devils Tower is modest, though still 
remarkable in light of the current state of American Indian religious 
freedoms.  Individual religious practitioners, along with tribal 
governments, negotiated an accommodation that reflected in significant 
respects their own religious traditions, developed a very solid record on 
their religious views and practices, and defeated attempts to challenge the 
religious claims through slippery slope arguments.  The Park Service was 
able to incorporate tribal customs and values into an accommodation plan 
that would afford religious freedom while also meeting statutory 
obligations to conserve and protect the Tower’s physical features.  In these 
respects, Bear Lodge represents major progress over a case like Lyng.  
Navajo Nation by contrast, reads almost like a replay of Lyng and 
raises some questions about the effectiveness of the new sacred sites laws.  
This case arose when the Forest Service decided to permit the use of 
sewage effluent in ski area snowmaking on the San Francisco Peaks, which 
are sacred not only to the Navajo, but also the Hopi, Havasupai, Hualapai, 
and a number of other tribes.
463
  The tribes had claimed that spraying one 
of their most holy mountains with the sewage effluent would interfere with 
specific religious practices, such as Navajo healing ceremonies relying on 
plants and medicines collected from the mountain,
464
 and entire religious 
belief systems, including the Hopi ceremonial cycle based on the kachinas’ 
seasonal migrations from the Peaks to the Hopi villages.
465
  The Forest 
Service had gleaned extensive knowledge of these religious interests—and 
those of other tribes—through the NHPA and National Environmental 
                                                                                                                          
459 Id. 
460 Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821 (“Even if other Bear Lodge members have elected not to climb in 
June, that decision is one of several choices available under the plan and is not an injury conferring 
standing.”); Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456−57 (“[T]he voluntary climbing ban[] is a policy that has 
been carefully crafted to balance the competing needs of individuals using Devil’s Tower National 
Monument while, at the same time, obeying the edicts of the Constitution.”). 
461 Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000). 
462 See BURTON, supra note 450, at 143 (describing that since 1995 “80 percent of the recreational 
climbers who would have otherwise climbed the tower agree[d] not to” do so).  
463 See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Forest 
Service has acknowledged that the Peaks are sacred to at least thirteen formally recognized Indian 
tribes, and that this religious significance is of centuries’ duration.”).  
464 Id. at 1063. 
465 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007).  
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Policy Act (“NEPA”) consultation process.  In fact, the Forest Service 
made “more than 500 contacts” and held over forty meetings to determine 
the impact on the tribes.
466
  
While there were a number of religious and cultural concerns, the 
tribes objected most vociferously to the use of “reclaimed water” for the 
ski area snowmaking.
467
  Reclaimed water is sewage from homes, 
hospitals, and elsewhere, that has been treated to a point where it is 
classified “A+” by the state department of environmental quality.468  As a 
practical matter, reclaimed water can be used for landscape irrigation, but 
is non-potable.  The tribes complained that this water would pollute the 
mountain, plants, and springs thereon, thereby violating religious 
requirements of purity for religious resources gathered there.
469
 
To the Hopis, for example, polluting the water was extremely grave 
because the San Francisco Peaks are the mountain home of the kachinas 
who bring water to the corn that is the lifeblood of Hopi sustenance, and 
are involved in specific ceremonies and an entire religious way of life.  In 
addition, the Hopis had “shrines” on the mountains that would be 
desecrated.
470
  For the Navajos, the plants that they gathered from the 
Peaks, which are kept in medicine bundles and used in healing ceremonies, 
would be contaminated.  Their concerns were further exacerbated by 
religious taboos against handling materials that have come in contact with 
the dead, as would the sewage from hospitals and other sources.
471
 
Thus the consultation process revealed the impact on the tribes.  But 
despite finding that several of the proposals would have an “[a]dverse 
effect” on the tribes’ religious practices, the Forest Service decided to 
select an alternative for development that included snowmaking using 
reclaimed water over 205 acres of the mountain, as well as construction of 
a pipeline, water reservoir, ski lodge, and new trails.
472
  In short, the Forest 
Service and tribes had not arrived at a compromise.  The mitigating 
activities announced by the Forest Service, including attempts to protect 
religious shrines and the use of the chairlift during the summer, were 
wholly inadequate to address the concerns about the reclaimed water.
473
  
As justification for this decision to harm the Indian religions, the Forest 
Service cited its statutory mandate to promote “multiple uses” of the public 
lands and its limited responsibilities to Indian tribes under Lyng.
474
  The 
                                                                                                                          
466 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1065−66.  
467 Id. at 1082.  
468 Id. at 1065.     
469 Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1039.  
470 Id. at 1035.  
471 Id. at 1040. 
472 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871, 879 (D. Ariz. 2006).  
473 Id. at 880. 
474 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071−73, 1107 (9th Cir. 2008).   
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tribes sued, arguing that the Forest Service’s plan imposed a substantial 
burden on religion and was not justified by a compelling governmental 
interest under RFRA. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Forest Service, holding that the 
“sole effect of the artificial snow is on the [American Indians’] subjective 
spiritual experience,” which did not constitute a “substantial burden” under 
RFRA.
475
  Under Lyng, which the court held to govern the case, the court 
determined that there was no governmental coercion of Indian belief.  
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit said that it could not distinguish this 
mountain from dozens of other mountains, entire rivers and canyons, and 
upwards of 40,000 prehistoric sites throughout the southwest.
476
  The 
dissent pointed out that the Navajo religion has a very small number of 
sacred sites, exactly one of which was at issue in the case.
477
  But the 
majority, interpreting RFRA through the lens of Lyng, held that the Forest 
Service was free to desecrate, contaminate, and even destroy the Navajo 
sacred site, in part because there was no other workable approach to the 
government’s management of its own land.478 The bright line of Lyng 
would prevail. 
There are at least four lessons to draw by contrasting Bear Lodge and 
Navajo Nation.  First, for all of its relative advantages over the courts, 
using the federal agency process to secure religious practices is still 
difficult—and still, in the final analysis rests on agency discretion.  As 
numerous commentators have observed, the agency process demands that 
traditional American Indians try to translate their religious practices in a 
foreign setting, participating in bureaucratic hearings and disclosing to 
government officials information that would otherwise only be discussed 
in tribal religious contexts—or not at all.479  This process is particularly 
                                                                                                                          
475 Id. at 1063 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
476 Id. at 1066 n.7. 
477 Id. at 1098 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
478 See id. at 1071 n.13 (noting that although Lyng was a Free Exercise Clause case and not an 
RFRA case, this difference is of no material consequence in deciding the case at hand, as the test used 
in Lyng was indicated by Congress to be a workable test that struck a balance between religious liberty 
and government interests). 
479 See generally Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of 
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 25 (1999) 
(discussing the tension between traditional Native American views of productive consultations, such as 
where success is measured by the adoption of the advocated outcome or a discussion leading to an 
unforeseen outcome that is still satisfactory to the majority, and federal agencies’ tendency to measure 
success only in procedural terms).  See, e.g., Christy McCann, Dammed if You Do, Damned if You 
Don’t: FERC’s Tribal Consultation Requirement and the Hydropower Re-Licensing at Post Falls Dam, 
41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 434 (2006) (addressing the two competing views of federal-tribal consultation 
requirements: skeptical, where consultation is regarded as perpetuating the betrayal of Native 
Americans by white men; and optimistic, which views the government as recognizing the importance 
of and making every effort to incorporate Native Americans’ views and interests in federal planning).  
For a survey of best practices, see SHERRI HUTT & JAIME LAVALLEE, NAT’L ASS’N OF TRIBAL 
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fraught in light of this same federal government’s history of persecuting 
these very same tribal religions.
480
  Agency officials, like Park 
Superintendent Deb Liggett in Bear Lodge, can try to mitigate these effects 
through personal efforts to put religious practitioners at ease and meet in 
reservation communities, but even the most heroic efforts will not make 
the consultation process a comfortable, pleasant, or risk-free experience for 
tribal participants.  It also imposes dignitary harms of a kind rarely 
experienced by religious practitioners in the United States—in which 
individuals must undergo an inquisition of sorts to be free to conduct their 
religions.  As American Indian advocate Suzan Harjo recently argued, the 
consultations over the San Francisco Peaks revealed many stress points 
where, for example, the Hopi participants did not feel as if they were 
speaking the same language as the Forest Service—particularly when they 
were repeatedly asked to quantify or measure their religious claims in 
metrics not meaningful to them.
481
  The challenges of the consultation 
process can make it difficult to arrive at a meaningful accommodation, as 
the Navajo Nation case might suggest. 
Second, the Forest Service’s “multiple use” mandate creates special 
challenges in the accommodation of Indian sacred site practices.  The Park 
Service, for example, operates under a statutory mission to “conserve” the 
national parks and monuments for future generations.
482
  The Forest 
Service’s “multiple-use” mandate, by contrast, provides that the forests are 
to be managed “for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and 
wildlife and fish purposes.”483  Needless to say, perhaps, the Park Service’s 
conservation mandate is closer to the spirit of many Indian religious 
practices than is the Forest Service’s multiple-use mandate.  Congress has 
                                                                                                                          
HISTORIC PRES. OFFS., TRIBAL CONSULTATION: BEST PRACTICES IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRIBAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS (2005), available at 
http://www.nps.gov/hps/tribal/download/Tribal_Consultation.pdf. 
480 See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 817 (“In 1890 for example, the United States Calvary shot and 
killed 300 unarmed Sioux men, women and children en route to an Indian religious ceremony called the 
Ghost Dance; these included individuals from the Intervenors’ tribe.”). 
481 See Suzan Shown Harjo, The USDA’s Culture War Against Sacred Places, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, Feb. 15, 2012, available at http://www.indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ict_sbc/usdas-
culture-war-against-sacred-places (addressing communication issues encountered by Forest Service 
officials and Hopi Elders); see also Stewart Macaulay, Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction, 98 
YALE L.J. 1545, 1547 (1989) (explaining that different legal ideas will be encountered as different 
factors are considered—in this context, particularly religion and the amount of experience that 
individuals have in interacting with police, administrative agencies, or courts).  
482 National Park Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).   
483 Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (2006); see also Federico Cheever, 
The United States Forest Service and National Park Service: Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful 
Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 625, 628 (1997) (“The 
Park Service and the Forest Service are different.  The Forest Service authorizes logging, oil and gas 
development, mining and hunting in the national forests.  The Park Service (with a few exceptions) 
permits none of these uses in National Parks.” (citation omitted) (footnotes omitted)).  
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not provided guidance to help the Forest Service prioritize among the 
multiple uses either as a general matter or in specific contexts, nor has 
Congress explicitly suggested how to reconcile Indian religions with 
incompatible uses like snowmaking on the San Francisco Peaks. 
The Forest Service is not unaware of these problems.  Following 
Navajo Nation, U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Secretary 
Thomas J. Vilsack requested that the Forest Service produce a report to 
evaluate compliance with Executive Order 13,007 and to study 
“unintended consequences of land management decisions” affecting sacred 
sites.
484
  The USDA’s Office of Tribal Relations and the Forest Service 
formed a team to conduct over fifty “listening sessions” with tribal leaders 
and traditional practitioners throughout the country.
485
  The USDA also 
conducted an employee survey and surveyed relevant law and policy.  The 
responses suggested that “Forest Service managers would benefit from 
more explicit policy language to protect Sacred Sites” and that the Agency 
has sufficient “discretion” under existing law to provide greater protection 
of sacred sites.
486
  The Draft Report recommended several measures to 
address these issues, including: “improv[ing] relationships through 
communication, training, staffing, and accountability”; reviewing and 
revising directives such as Executive Order 13,007; and “improv[ing] on-
the-ground Sacred Site protection through partnerships, access, and 
protections.”487  The Report was clearly a step in the right direction, and 
may lead to real changes in policy and attitude.  
Third, the contrast between Bear Lodge and Navajo Nation suggests 
the need for more “teeth” in the agency accommodation process.  Here too 
reform may be necessary.  One possibility is to require agencies and 
participants in the consultation process to enter into a memorandum of 
agreement outlining the terms of an agreed-upon accommodation.  Some 
tribal agency accommodations have voluntarily used this model, including 
the U.S. Forest Service’s successful agreement at Medicine Wheel 
National Forest.
488
  But in other instances, including the Forest Service in 
the San Francisco Peaks Consultation, the agencies seem to perceive and 
treat information gleaned from the consultation process as merely advisory.  
This approach conflicts with a growing sentiment, perhaps best reflected in 
                                                                                                                          
484 U.S. DEP’T of AGRIC., DRAFT REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, USDA’S OFFICE OF TRIBAL 
RELATIONS AND FOREST SERVICE POLICY AND PROCEDURES REVIEW: INDIAN SACRED SITES i (July 
2011), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/tribalrelations/documents/sacredsites/20110712_SACRED
_SITES_DRAFT_REPORT_ TO_SECRETARY.pdf.  
485 Id.  
486 Id. at ii.  
487 Id.  
488 See Wyo. Sawmills Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2004) (describing 
the Memorandum of Agreement between Forest Service and American Indian religious practitioners 
providing for closure of road to Medicine Wheel except for traditional religious practitioners’ access).  
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recommendations of the National Congress of American Indians, that the 
Forest Service go beyond mere “communication” and incorporate a 
concept of “seeking agreement” in the consultation process.489  Moreover, 
fostering tribal-agency agreements with respect to religious 
accommodations would advance compliance with the UNDRIP’s mandate 
that “states shall consult and cooperate in good faith” with indigenous 
peoples” and “obtain their free, prior and informed consent before adopting 
and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect 
them.”490 
And finally, it is unclear what effect RFRA has on Lyng or in other 
Indian religion cases.  Given the agencies’ discretion over substantive 
accommodations and the procedural nature of NHPA and NEPA 
requirements, it is clear that the Ninth Circuit’s approach will not actually 
require any protection of Indian religious freedom at sacred sites.  In fact, 
Navajo Nation merely reifies Lyng by limiting RFRA claims on public 
lands to facts where the government “coerces” religious belief.491  More 
promisingly, in Comanche Nation v. United States,
492
 a federal district 
court in Oklahoma recently applied RFRA to protect an Indian sacred site, 
noting that the
 
Tenth Circuit has declined to take the narrow view of 
“substantial burden” adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Navajo Nation.493  
The district court followed Thiry v. Carlson,
494
 in which the Tenth Circuit 
articulated the test for a substantial burden under RFRA as requiring a 
showing that  the government regulation:  
[M]ust significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or 
expression that manifests some central tenet of . . . [an 
individual’s] beliefs; must meaningfully curtail [an 
individual’s] ability to express adherence to his or her faith; 
                                                                                                                          
489 Letter from NCAI to Sec’y Tom Vilsack, U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Chief Thomas Tidwell, 
U.S. Forest Serv. & Dir. Fred Clark, U.S. Forest Serv. 9 (Oct. 17, 2011) (on file with author).  
490 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sep. 13, 2007); see also Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365, 371 (1989) (querying whether Indian tribes ever consented to American 
government); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 45, 47 
(2012) (arguing that “the fundamental question of tribal consent continues to haunt Indian affairs, and 
will continue to do so unless it is rectified”).  
491 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1071, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
although Lyng was a free exercise case and not an RFRA case, this difference is of no material 
consequence in deciding the case at hand, as the test used in Lyng was indicated by Congress to be a 
workable test that struck a balance between religious liberty and government interests). 
492 No. CIV-08-849-D, 2008 WL 4426621 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2008). 
493 See id. at *20 (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the federal government from 
constructing a “training support center” on lands sacred to the Comanche people, on the strength of the 
tribe’s RFRA and NHPA claims, and noting that the Tenth Circuit has declined to adopt the narrow test 
for substantial burden advanced by the Ninth Circuit in Navajo).  
494 78 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d. 1476, 1480 (1995)). 
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or must deny [an individual] reasonable opportunities to 
engage in those activities that are fundamental to [an 
individual’s] religion.495  
This standard would suggest broader judicial review than Lyng’s coercion 
test.
496
 
C.  Eagle Feathers 
In many American Indian religions, eagles are thought to link humans 
with the spirit world.  A member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Oyate, 
Angelique EagleWoman, explains, “the eagle takes our prayers to the 
Great Spirit, Wakan Tanka, for us.”497  In Hopi religion, “[t]he eagle serves 
as the link between the spiritual world and the physical world of the Hopi, 
a connection that embodies the very essence of Hopi spirituality and 
belief.”498  In the Arapaho tradition, an individual who pledges to sponsor 
the Sun Dance may be required to provide an eagle for the ceremony, and 
this offering of “[t]he eagle is  seen as a gift of the Creator.”499  Depending 
on the tribe and religious ceremony, an individual may need to take a live 
eaglet or adult eagle, or possess a single feather, wing, or other eagle part 
to fulfill his or her religious obligations or beliefs.  
Unfortunately for the many Lakota, Hopi, Arapaho, and other Indian 
people whose religion requires use of eagles and eagle parts, it is now a 
federal crime to “take[], possess[], s[ell], purchase[], barter[], offer[] for 
sale, purchase, or barter, transport[], export[], or import” bald and golden 
eagles.
500
  Originally enacted in 1940, the Bald and Golden Eagle 
Protection Act (“Eagle Act”) imposes a sweeping prohibition on such 
activities, and punishes the “taking” of an eagle by a fine of up to $5,000 
and one year in prison.
501
  The Eagle Act has been held to nullify even 
treaty rights to hunt eagles on the reservation in part because of the fear 
that American Indians will hunt eagles “to extinction.”502  Numerous 
American Indians have been prosecuted for violating the Eagle Act and 
related federal statutes such as the Endangered Species Act and Migratory 
                                                                                                                          
495 Id. at 1495 (quoting Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d. 1476, 1480 (1995)).  
496 Id.  In Thiry, the court noted some potential tension with Lyng, but still articulated the broader 
RFRA test under which the Thirys’ challenge to government relocation of their child’s gravesite failed.  
Id. at 1496. 
497 Featherproject, Angelique EagleWoman: The Importance of Eagle Feathers, YOUTUBE (July 
19, 2010),  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PNwP66amEmM&feature=related. 
498 Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets from Wupatki National Monument, 66 
Fed. Reg. 6,516, 6,517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7). 
499 United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942–43 (10th Cir. 2008).  
500 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668b(b) (2006).  
501 Id.  
502 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 & n.5 (1986). 
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Bird Treaty Act.
503
  While the bald eagle has recently been “delisted” as an 
endangered species, the federal government maintains interests in 
protecting both bald and golden eagles, which are each symbols of national 
identity and are essential for American Indian religions.
504
  
Since 1962, the Eagle Act has authorized the Secretary of the Interior 
to administer a permitting process that allows Indians limited opportunities 
to take and possess eagles and eagle parts for religious purposes.
505
  To 
obtain a permit, an individual must apply to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“USFWS”), which is, in turn, required to evaluate certain 
threshold questions of Indian status and religious practice.
506
  The 
regulations provide that USFWS will “investigat[e]” applications to 
determine whether “the applicant is an Indian who is authorized to 
participate in bona fide tribal religious ceremonies.”507  An “Indian” is 
defined as a citizen of a federally recognized tribe, while the term “bona 
fide tribal religious ceremonies” is not defined.508  To substantiate their 
claims, applicants must provide a “certificate of enrollment in an Indian 
tribe” that “must be signed by an tribal official who is authorized to certify 
that an individual is a duly enrolled member of that tribe” and must specify 
the “name of [the] tribal religious ceremony” for which the eagle is 
required.
509
  If the agency determines that the applicant has proven his 
Indian status and bona fide religious purpose, then the permit may be 
granted.  In most cases, it will be a permit to receive and possess an eagle 
feather, wing, or complete carcass sources from the USFWS’s National 
                                                                                                                          
503 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Native American Talks About the Importance of Eagle 
Feathers, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O9SFuM1FpOo (“Reginald 
Dale Akeen pleaded guilty in December 2009 to a felony violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty  
Act. . . . [A]s part of his plea agreement, Akeen agreed to speak on video about the significance of the 
feathers of eagles and other birds to Native Americans and about the fact that he broke the law.”). 
504 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Bald Eagle Recovered!, FWS.GOV, 
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/eagle/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2012) (discussing that although the bald 
eagle was removed from the federal list of threatened and endangered species, there are current legal 
protections that still remain for bald and golden eagles). 
505 See Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006) (“Whenever . . . the 
Secretary of the Interior shall determine that it is compatible with the preservation of the bald eagle or 
the golden eagle to permit the taking, possession, and transportation of specimens thereof for . . . the 
religious purposes of Indian tribes . . . he may authorize the taking of such eagles . . . .”).   
506 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, THE NATIVE AMERICAN POLICY OF THE U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERVICE 5 (1994), http://www.fws.gov/nativeamerican/graphics/Native_Amer_Policy.pdf. 
507 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2011); see also Protection of Bald Eagles and Golden Eagles, 28 Fed. Reg. 
975, 976 (Feb. 1, 1963) (“Whenever the Secretary determines that the taking and possession of bald or 
golden eagles for the religious purposes of Indian tribes is compatible with the preservation of such 
birds, he may issue permits . . . to those individual Indians who are authentic, bona fide practitioners of 
such religion.”).  
508 50 C.F.R. § 22.22. 
509 Id. 
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Eagle Repository in Colorado.
510
  These are parts of eagles that have been 
accidentally killed and donated to meet American Indian religious needs.  
Occasionally, an individual will receive a permit to take a live eagle if 
required for a ceremony. 
The eagle permit process has been successful, to some extent.  As of 
2008, the Eagle Repository reported that it made approximately 1,700 to 
1,800 annual shipments of eagles or eagle parts to applicants.
511
  It has 
granted two tribal permits to the Navajo tribe and one annually recurring 
permit to the Hopi tribe to take live golden eagles.
512
  Challenges to the 
eagle permitting process, including those by non-Indians, have failed, with 
the courts recognizing a compelling governmental interest in both eagle 
conservation and the religious practices of federally-recognized tribes.
 513
 
On the other hand, Indian religious practitioners have lodged a number 
of complaints regarding the eagle permit process, including that: it is not 
well-noticed; it is fraught with delay and supply problems making it 
impossible to receive eagles in time for religious ceremonies (the USFWS 
itself estimates a five-year wait for an immature golden eagle);
514
 it often 
provides eagle carcasses and parts that are dirty, diseased, or insect-
infested such that religious purity is missing; and it invades privacy by 
requiring disclosure of religious and personal identity information to 
federal officials.
515
   
For some of the reasons described above, some American Indians 
continue to take eagles without a permit or purchase them illegally, leading 
to criminal prosecutions for what they perceive to be activities compelled 
by their religion.
516
  In various cases, the federal appellate courts have 
                                                                                                                          
510 See Jay Wexler, Eagle Party, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 181, 182 (2011), available at 
http://www.greenbag.org/archive/green_bag_tables_of_contents.html (“Applying to the [National 
Eagle] Repository is the only way to legally get hold of any part of either [bald or golden] eagle[s] in 
the United States.”).  
511 United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th Cir. 2008). 
512 Id. at 945. 
513 See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing national interest in 
eagles and religious interests of federally recognized tribes as a compelling interest to sustain eagle 
permit program against RFRA challenge by non-Indian); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 
1127–29 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“[T]he government’s general interests in preserving Native 
American culture and religion in-and-of-themselves and in fulfilling trust obligations to Native 
Americans [are] compelling interests.”). 
514 Id. at 953; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ORDERING EAGLE PARTS AND FEATHERS FROM THE 
NATIONAL EAGLE REPOSITORY 3 (2007), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-15b.pdf. 
515 See, e.g., United States v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1124 n.7 (D. Ariz. 2006) 
(noting that “traditional” Hopi “believe it an affront” to have the government exercise authority over 
them); Friday, 525 F.3d at 944–45 (summarizing problems with federal interference, supply, delay, and 
quality). 
516 See, e.g., Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1127 (“Defendant testified he believes his 
permission to take eagles is conferred by his acting in accordance with the tenets of his religious faith, 
i.e., that properly preparing feathers and prayer objects prior to taking the eagles, as he was taught by 
his uncles, should be the only ‘permit’ required to take the eagles.”). 
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upheld the eagle permitting process against First Amendment and RFRA 
challenges.  And yet, a number of these opinions have voiced concern.   
In United States v. Friday,
517
 for example, the Tenth Circuit upheld the 
conviction of a Northern Arapaho man who took an eagle on the 
reservation for an upcoming Sun Dance.
518
  His relative had pledged to 
sponsor the Sun Dance and thus acquired an obligation for the family to 
provide an eagle, an obligation that Winslow Friday believed he was 
fulfilling.
519
  Friday did not know of the eagle permitting process or of the 
repository program in Denver.
520
  From the USFWS’s own testimony, it 
was unclear (or perhaps unlikely) that even if Friday had applied, he would 
have received a pure eagle, as religiously required, or received any eagle in 
time for the Sun Dance.
521
  The USFWS had issued very few permits to 
take live eagles, and even in these cases, only permitted the taking of 
golden eagles.
522
  
While the district court agreed that the government could regulate the 
taking of eagles for religious purposes, it was extremely concerned about 
the way in which the permit process was managed, stating: “It is clear to 
this Court that the Government has no intention of accommodating the 
religious beliefs of Native Americans except on its own terms and in its 
own good time.”523  Yet, the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction on the 
grounds that Friday could not challenge the “futility” of a permitting 
program that he had not even tried to use.
524
  The Tenth Circuit allowed 
that if Friday, or some similarly situated practitioner, applied and was 
unable to obtain a “pure” eagle—if religiously required, or unable to obtain 
an eagle in time for a ceremonial use—he or she might have a RFRA claim 
in the future.
525
 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has begun to address these issues.  
In 2011, it issued a memorandum formally asking for tribal input on two 
questions: (1) whether the DOJ should formalize its internal policy in favor 
of accommodating American Indian religious use of eagle feathers; and (2) 
                                                                                                                          
517 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008). 
518 Id. at 945. 
519 Id. 
520 Id. at 953 
521 Id. at 953–54 (“Native Americans charged with violating the Eagle Act could make an as-
applied challenge to the Act’s permitting system without applying for permits if they demonstrated that 
‘it would have been futile . . . to apply for permits.’” (quoting United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 
1116, 1121 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).  The court then noted that if Mr. Friday was unable to obtain a 
“pure eagle,” he, like the defendants in Hardman, may have had an RFRA claim.  Id. 
522 Id. at 945 (“While it was [the relative]’s responsibility to ensure that the tribe had the eagle it 
needed for the dance, the Fridays believe obligation to be familial, so Winslow was responsible for 
helping however he could.”). 
523 United States v. Friday, No. 05-CR-260-D, 2006 WL 3592952, at *5 (D. Wyo. Oct. 13, 2006). 
524 Friday, 525 F.3d at 951. 
525 Id. at 953–54. 
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whether the DOJ should support tribal governments that seek to become 
more active in wildlife enforcement.
526
  After consultation with tribes 
around the country, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a new 
Memorandum indicating that the DOJ would no longer prosecute enrolled 
members of federally recognized tribes when they possess eagle feathers, 
find molten feathers in the wild, gift eagle feathers, provide them to crafts 
people, or travel with them.
527
  The DOJ will continue to prosecute for 
killing eagles or possessing eagle carcasses without a permit, even by 
enrolled tribal members on the reservation for religious purposes.  Yet, 
prosecutors are encouraged to use discretion and “consider whether 
prosecution of particular cases would be more appropriated be handled by 
tribal prosecutorial authorities in lieu of federal prosecution.”528 
These and other initiatives have shown a willingness to consult both 
with individual religious practitioners and tribes, on a government-to-
government basis, about eagle regulation.
529
  Through the Office of Tribal 
Justice, the DOJ has signaled its willingness to help tribes implement or 
develop legislative codes on eagle regulation.
530
   
Given that many, though certainly not all, religious uses of eagles 
occur in reservation communities, it seems particularly appropriate to defer 
to tribal government jurisdiction.  Winslow Friday, for example, took his 
eagle from a tree on the reservation and used it for a Sun Dance occurring 
on the reservation.
531
  Historically, the Northern Arapaho tribe would have 
had exclusive jurisdiction over his hunting and the Sun Dance itself.  The 
tribal code had potentially relevant provisions governing hunting on the 
reservation.
532
  The case was federal only because of the reach of the Eagle 
                                                                                                                          
526 U.S. DOJ, REQUEST FOR TRIBAL INPUT ON: (1) DOJ CONSIDERATION OF POLICY REGARDING 
EAGLE FEATHERS; AND (2) FEDERAL/TRIBAL TRAINING PROGRAM ON ENFORCEMENT OF WILDLIFE 
AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 2, 5 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/otj/pdf/Eagle%2
0Feathers%20-%20DOJ%20Request%20for%20Tribal%20Input.pdf.  
527 See Off. of the Att’y Gen., Memorandum on Possession or Use of the Feathers or Other Parts 
of Federally Protected Birds for Tribal Cultural or Religious Purposes, Oct. 12, 2012, at 1–3, available 
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ef-policy.pdf. 
528 Id. at 4. 
529 See, e.g., Eagle Summit on March 18, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/tribal/tracks/022010.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012) (detailing 
the Colorado Commission of Indian Affairs invitation to the Tribal Council and other tribal members to 
participate in an Eagle Summit to discuss eagle permits, eagle population management, and the 
possession of eagle feathers).  
530 See E-mail from Montana Wyoming Tribal Leaders Council to Tribal Eagle Feathers 
Workgroup, FW: Eagle Feathers Update and Conference Call—May 20th, 1–3p.m. EDT, MONTANA 
WYOMING TRIBAL LEADERS COUNCIL, http://www.mtwytlc.org/component/content/article/114-
announcements/1683-fw-eagle-feathers-update-and-conference-call-may-20th-1-3pm-edt.html (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2012) (reporting on an annual meeting of tribal leaders during which the Office of 
Tribal Justice Director Tracy Toulou spoke regarding “eagle feathers related issues”). 
531 Friday, 525 F.3d at 945. 
532 See Friday, 525 F.3d at 943 (discussing tribal hunting regulations that forbid the taking of 
eagles). 
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Act to federal and tribal lands.  Notwithstanding the federal law, however, 
there was clearly a tribal law element of the case.  Testimony in the Tenth 
Circuit involved extensive (and potentially conflicting) evidence on tribal 
law and custom regarding the taking of a bald eagle for the Sun Dance, 
evidence that the Tenth Circuit declined to rule on.
533
  Following the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision, the U.S. Attorney’s office—perhaps appreciating this 
history and the tribal nature of the incident—decided to transfer Winslow 
Friday’s case to the Northern Arapaho Tribal Court.534  Friday entered a 
guilty plea, paid a $2,500 fine, and had his hunting privileges on the 
reservation revoked for a year.
535
    
Friday and the current state of eagle feather regulation reveal a strong 
current of tribal interests in a set of cases that had historically been 
adjudicated as individual rights, either under the First Amendment or 
criminal law.  While many problems remain in the permitting process, the 
agencies’ willingness to recognize tribal law regulations and jurisdiction is 
promising.  As Steven Moore, a prominent American Indian law attorney, 
remarked after the Friday case, “In this modern era of tribal sovereignty, 
more and more authority for regulating these kinds of activities needs to be 
turned away from the United States and to tribes.”536   
Finally, in an interesting turn of events, the USFWS recently issued a 
permit to the Northern Arapaho tribe, allowing it to take two bald eagles 
per year for religious purposes.
537
  This is the first permit to kill a bald 
eagle ever issued in the United States and it has been granted to effectuate 
American Indian religious freedoms in fulfillment of RFRA and the federal 
trust responsibility to Indian tribes.
538
  As USFWS recognized, this is a 
“controversial” decision in light of the eagle’s “iconic” status as the 
                                                                                                                          
533 See id. at 942–43.  Though the court acknowledged the extensive evidence on tribal law and 
custom that was presented, it held no weight in the court’s analysis other than being used as 
background information.  Id. 
534 See Northern Arapaho Man Who Shot Eagle for Sun Dance Pleads Guilty, BUFF. POST (Dec. 
23, 2009, 9:41 AM), www.buffalopost.net/?p=5233. 
535 Id. 
536 Id. 
537 David Yeargin, Bald Eagle Take Permit Issued for Religious Purposes, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV. (Mar. 15, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.fws.gov/news/blog/index.cfm/2012/3/15/Bald-Eagle-
Take-Permit-Issued-for-Religious-Purposes.  While the permit would seem to have great promise, one 
potential limitation is that it does not allow the Northern Arapaho to take eagles on the reservation—
raising the question of where, if anywhere, Northern Arapaho people will be allowed to exercise this 
religious accommodation.  See Michael Winter, Wyoming Tribe Gets OK to Kill 2 Bald Eagles for 
Ceremonies, USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2012), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2
012/03/wyo-indian-tribe-gets-ok-to-kill-bald-eagles-for-ceremonies/1#.UGIYdlFTCYQ (stating that 
“the [USFWS] issued the permit Friday, allowing the tribe to kill two bald eagles off the Wind River 
Indian Reservation”).  
538 Id. 
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symbol of American identity.
539
  Yet, it is difficult to know how this permit 
might be implemented given that it forbids the killing of eagles on the 
reservation and Wyoming law forbids taking them off of the reservation. 
Despite their limitations, the Northern Arapaho permit and the DOJ 
Memorandum on Eagle Feathers both reveal a willingness to negotiate 
with tribes over the limits of eagle conservation and religious use.
540
  The 
new permit suggests that USFWS now recognizes that the limited taking of 
eagles by tribal members, at least in the Northern Arapaho context, is 
religiously necessary and will not threaten the entire species.
541
  The 
agency’s statements also suggest that USFWS has come to appreciate the 
relevance of tribal custom as a meaningful factor in guiding regulatory 
decisions.  For instance, USFWS Regional Supervisor Matt Hogan said 
upon issuance of the permit: “We’re really talking about Native Americans 
who have had a longtime, customary traditional relationship with eagles—
in some cases thousands of years. . . . We’re constantly trying to balance 
the conservation of the species with the religious needs of Native 
Americans.”542  To that end, the Northern Arapaho tribe has recently 
amended its tribal code setting forth the tribe’s role in allocating eagle take 
rights for traditional ceremonial purposes.
543
   
                                                                                                                          
539 Id.  The decision was quickly covered in major media outlets, including CNN, MSNBC, The 
Washington Post, and The Huffington Post.  E.g., Steve Hendrix & Dana Hedgpeth, For Va. Eagle, 
Death Is Beginning of Journey, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2012, at A01; Eric Fiegel, Feds Grant Native 
American Tribe Permit to Kill Bald Eagles for Religious Purposes, CNN BELIEF BLOG (Mar. 15, 2012, 
10:33 PM), http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/15/feds-grant-permit-to-kill-bald-eagles/; Ben Neary, 
Northern Arapaho Given Permit to Kill Bald Eagles, 
NBCNEWS.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/46729054/ns/us_news-environment/t/northern-
arapaho-given-permit-kill-bald-eagles/ (last updated Mar. 14, 2012); Northern Arapaho Tribe Receives 
Permit to Kill 2 Bald Eagles for Religious Purposes, HUFFINGTON POST GREEN (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:57 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/13/northern-arapaho-tribe-permit_n_1342933.html. 
540 See Neary, supra note 539 (“Congress recognized [the culturally unique way Native American 
tribes value bald eagles and other wildlife] when they passed the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act 
and required the Service to consider religious uses by tribes a priority for issuing take permits under the 
law.”). 
541 See Ben Neary, Wyoming Tribe Says First Bald Eagle Kill Permit Is a Victory for American 
Indian Sovereignty; Tribe: Bald Eagle Permit a Victory for Tradition, CANADIAN PRESS, Mar. 17, 2012 
(“[O]nly a few tribes have intact ceremonies involving eagles and . . . only a few individuals within 
those tribes have a religious need to kill wild birds.”). 
542 Tristan Ahtone, Wyoming Tribe Wins Right to Hunt Two Bald Eagles, NPR (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/19/148919990/wyoming-tribe-wins-right-to-hunt-two-bald-eagles. 
543 Title 13 of the Northern Arapaho Code is notable for its extensive discussion of the 
relationship between eagles and religious freedoms (including as a matter of federal law), the role of 
the tribe vis-à-vis individual tribal members in eagle take permits, the protection of tribal ceremonies, 
confidentiality of religious matters, ramifications for religious freedoms of tribal property, and treaty 
rights between Arapaho and Shoshones on the reservation.  See NORTHERN ARAPAHO CODE, Tit. 13, 
Religious Freedom (Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www.northernarapaho.com/sites/northernarapaho
.com/files/NA%20Code%20Title%2013%20Freedom%20of%20Religion%2011-2-10.pdf. 
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D.  Burial Sites, Funerary Objects, and Human Remains 
Like people around the world, American Indians conduct funeral rites 
and care for the gravesites of deceased relatives.  Religious norms may 
prescribe specific values and traditions associated with treatment of the 
dead.  For example, some Native Hawaiians express an intergenerational 
relationship between the ancestors and living human beings.  Ancestors 
nourish the earth through the mana or power contained in their bones, 
while the living have obligations to care for gravesites, bring offerings to 
the ancestors, and recite personal lineages going back for generations.
544
  
Since the mid-nineteenth century, however, Native peoples have struggled 
to protect gravesites against encroaching settlers—who acquired their lands 
including cemeteries—and gravediggers—who excavated Native graves 
for their scientific or curiosity value.  
As Sequoyah reveals, American Indian tribes first struggled to protect 
their cemeteries because they lost title to their lands during European and 
American conquest and colonization.
545
  The Cherokee Nation lost almost 
all of its aboriginal territory in the East through dozens of treaties with 
England, France, and later, the United States, culminating in the 1838 
“Trail of Tears,” in which Cherokees were forcibly removed from their 
remaining treaty-guaranteed lands in Georgia.
546
  The Cherokees explicitly 
referenced their ancestors’ graves among the reasons why they did not 
want to leave their homeland.
547
  When the United States nonetheless 
acquired Cherokee lands, it distributed them either to state governments or 
individual citizens.
548
  By 1980, when Sequoyah was decided, the 
Cherokee burial grounds in the Tennessee River Valley had been owned by 
non-Cherokees for over one hundred years, and its new owners had the 
legal authority to destroy the graces if they wished.
549
   
American Indian graves have also been looted by government and 
                                                                                                                          
544 See Edward Halealoha Ayau, Rooted in Native Soil, 7 FED. ARCHAEOLOGY, Fall-Winter 1995, 
available at http://www.nps.gov/archeology/cg/fd_fa_win_1995/soil.htm (remarking that the living 
“are guided in part by a belief that the ancestors may exact retribution for failure to protect them from 
those who would steal their mana”).  
545 See DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN, ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE 
BATTLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITY 21 (2000) (noting that as a result of the Indian Removal Act 
of 1830, many Indians “lost their land, their homes, and their livestock”). 
546 Id. 
547 See, e.g., Resolutions from Aquohee District, 3 CHEROKEE PHX. & INDIANS’ ADVOC., Sept. 11, 
1830, at 2, available at http://www.wcu.edu/library/DigitalCollections/CherokeePhoenix/Vol3/no18/3n
o18_p2-c5A.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (“It has been frequently asserted that we are willing and 
even desirous to go to the west.  We assure our friends it is not so.  We have our homes, we have our 
families, we love to dwell by our father’s graves.”). 
548 See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that the few 
Cherokee expeditions back to former lands were merely educational experiences pertaining to their 
cultural heritage). 
549 Id. 
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individual parties.  During the 1800s, federal agencies were directed to 
collect Indian human remains as scientific specimen.
550
  In 1868, for 
example, the U.S. Surgeon General ordered army personnel to collect 
Indian skulls for craniology studies taking place at the Army Medical 
Museum.
551
  One army surgeon shared that he acquired the head of a 
recently deceased Sioux man by severing it from the body before the man 
could be buried by his family.
552
  This story was replayed many times over.  
For example, in 1900, “Arles Hrdlicka led an expedition to Larson Bay, 
Alaska, and in front of the anguished villagers, dug up and departed with 
the remains of 800 Koniag people.”553  In another instance, the Nebraska 
State Historical Society came to possess the remains of over 400 dead 
Pawnee Indians.
554
   
Well into the twentieth century, government-sponsored and private 
parties looted Indian graves in the name of art, science, and education.
555
  
By the late 1980s, thousands of human skeletons and many more funerary 
artifacts were housed in federally funded museums and other locations.  
The National Museum of Natural History had in its collection 19,250 
human skeletal remains of Native Americans.
556
   
For American Indians, the disinterment of ancestral remains causes 
personal and collective grief, disrupting the cycle of life, obligations to 
ancestors, and religious beliefs.
557
  Moreover, the loss of religious and 
cultural items, such as ceremonial rattles, regalia, and figurines, has made 
it difficult to conduct contemporary religious ceremonies requiring those 
                                                                                                                          
550 This history was studied and documented in detail when Congress considered the legislation 
that would become the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act.  See, e.g., ROBERT E. 
BIEDER, A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS 
(1990), reprinted in S. 1021 & S. 1980: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Indian Affairs of the S., 
101st Cong. 278–363. 
551 Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992) (noting that as a 
result of the directive, “[i]n ensuing decades, over 4000 heads were taken from battlefields, burial 
grounds, POW camps, hospitals, fresh graves, and burial scaffolds across the country”).   
552 THOMAS, supra note 545, at 57. 
553 WINONA LADUKE, RECOVERING THE SACRED: THE POWER OF NAMING AND CLAIMING 77 
(2005).  
554 See id. at 79.  
555 See THOMAS, supra note 545, at 140–42 (detailing the proliferation and efforts of looters and 
public and private museums in seizing and/or documenting Indian culture); Pot Hunters Head to 
Hoosegow, ART MARKET MONITOR (June 12, 2009),  http://artmarketmonitor.com/2009/06/12/pot-
hunters-head-to-hoosegow/ (noting that “pot hunting” for Native American treasures is a pastime in 
many rural communities in the history-rich region). 
556 SMITHSONIAN INST., NAT’L MUSEUM OF NATURAL HIST., REPATRIATION OFF., 
ANTHROPOLOGY DEP’T, http://anthropology.si.edu/repatriation/faq/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 
2012). 
557 See KENN HARPER, GIVE ME MY FATHER’S BODY: THE LIFE OF MINIK, THE NEW YORK 
ESKIMO 27 (2000) (giving an Eskimo’s description of his feelings upon seeing the remains of his 
people in five barrels upon arrival to New York City).   
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items.
558
  After 300 Lakota people participating in the religious Ghost 
Dance were killed by the U.S. Army at Wounded Knee in 1890, for 
example, army and private individuals took personal effects both from 
bodies still on the field and from the mass grave.
559
  When the items were 
publicly exhibited one hundred years later, it caused “great anguish and 
suffering to the victims’ descendants and the entire Sioux nations.”560 
Early legal advocacy to protect gravesites and recover cultural 
patrimony met many hurdles.
561
  State cemetery protection laws rarely 
extended to Indian burial sites
562
 and federal law, such as the 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act, treated Indian artifacts on public 
lands as nationally owned property.
563
  In the 1980s, American Indian 
advocates, led by Walter Echo-Hawk, Suzan Harjo, and others, initiated a 
campaign to address these religious, cultural, and dignitary harms through 
federal legislation.
564
  In 1990, Congress passed the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).565  Like other post-
Smith religious freedoms statutes, NAGPRA addresses individual and 
tribal claims,
566
 which seems appropriate given the nature of the harms and 
issues described above.  By its very terms, it also requires agencies to work 
with tribes to effectuate tribal religious norms, for example, repatriating 
“sacred objects . . . which are needed by traditional Native American 
religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions 
                                                                                                                          
558 Notice of Intent to Repatriate Cultural Items in the Possession of the Denver Art Museum, 
Denver, CO, 66 Fed. Reg. 32,373, 32,374 (June 14, 2001), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2001-06-14/pdf/01-14992.pdf (“These three cultural items also are 
needed by the Zuni Bow Priest, a traditional religious leader, for ceremonial installation at the 
appropriate Ahayu:da shrine in accordance with the practice of Zuni traditional religion.”). 
559 LADUKE, supra note 553, at 101. 
560 Id. at 105.  
561 E.g., Onondaga Nation v. Thacher, 189 U.S. 306, 306–08 (1903) (recounting the Onondaga 
Nation’s attempt to recover wampum belts from state custody and the court’s denials thereof); Kim 
Dayton, “Trespassers, Beware!”: Lyda Burton Conley and the Battle for Huron Place Cemetery, 8 
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1–2 (1996) (recounting the story of Lyda Burton Conley who used both the law 
and her shotgun to protect her mother’s grave from development). 
562 See, e.g., Wana Bear v. Cmty. Constr., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) 
(holding that California cemetery protection law doesn’t apply to protect Miwok Indian burial ground 
from excavation for development); Newman v. State, 174 So. 2d 479, 480, 483–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965) (quashing conviction for removing a Seminole Indian skull because the action was not proven to 
have been done “wantonly and maliciously” as required by a Florida law). 
563 Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470cc–ee (2006). 
564 James Riding In et al., Protecting Native American Human Remains, Burial Grounds, and 
Sacred Places: Panel Discussion, 19 WICAZO SA REV. 169, 173 (2004).  
565 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-601, 104 Stat. 3048 
(1990). 
566 E.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2006). 
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by their present day adherents.”567 
NAGPRA has three major features.  First, in the case of discoveries of 
human remains and cultural items made on federal lands after 1990, 
NAGPRA gives ownership to lineal descendants, to the tribe, or to Native 
Hawaiian organization; it also provides a right of tribal consultation for 
any intentional excavations of such items.
568
  Second, NAGPRA prohibits 
trafficking in American Indian human remains and cultural items, which is 
punishable by fines and imprisonment.
569
  Third, NAGPRA requires 
federal agencies and federally funded museums to inventory and repatriate 
certain items to tribes after consultation.
570
   
Many museums, art dealers, archaeologists, and others initially 
opposed NAGRPA.  They feared, among other things, that human 
skeletons and other objects with scientific, educational, and aesthetic value 
to the public would be returned wholesale to tribes, leaving museums, labs, 
and other institutions empty of their most precious resources.
571
  While 
thousands of repatriations have taken place, these fears have gone 
unrealized.
572
  First, NAGPRA places significant procedural and 
substantive hurdles in front of successful repatriations.  It takes museums 
and tribes time, money, and expertise to complete the inventory, notice, 
consultation, and claims processes. 
573
  Second, NAGPRA has, in some 
instances, facilitated cooperation among museums and tribes, or among 
scientists and tribes.
574
  Such interactions are typically characterized by a 
substantial investment in time and the development of mutual respect 
among the parties.  As one curator put it, working with tribes works best 
                                                                                                                          
567 Id. § 3001(3)(C); see also GREG JOHNSON, SACRED CLAIMS: REPATRIATION AND LIVING 
TRADITION 90–92, 97–99, 102 (2007) (reflecting on Native Hawaiian advocacy before NAGPRA 
review committee on issue of “sacred objects”). 
568 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (2006). 
569 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2006). 
570 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§  3003–05 (2006). 
571 E.g., ELIZABETH WEISS, REBURYING THE PAST; THE EFFECTS OF REPATRIATION AND 
REBURIAL ON SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY, 67–81 (2008) (arguing that NAGPRA has diminished the number 
of skeletal remains available for study, reduced funds for scientific research, and infringed on scientific 
freedom). 
572 MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 16–18 (2003). 
573 E.g., T.J. Ferguson et al., Repatriation at the Pueblo of Zuni, Diverse Solutions to Complex 
Problems, in REPATRIATION READER: WHO OWNS AMERICAN INDIAN REMAINS? 239, 262–63 (Devon 
A. Mihesuah ed., 2000). 
574 See, e.g., Miranda J. Brady, A Dialogic Response to the Problematized Past, in CONTESTING 
KNOWLEDGE: MUSEUMS AND INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES 133, 133–37 (Susan Sleeper-Smith ed., 
2009) (reflecting on the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of the American Indian adopting a 
more collaborative model); Brian D. Jones & Kevin A. McBride, Indigenous Archaeology in Southern 
New England: Case Studies from the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation, in CROSS-CULTURAL 
COLLABORATION: NATIVE PEOPLES AND ARCHAEOLOGY IN THE NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 265, 
265–66, 278–80 (Jordan E. Kerber ed., 2006) (providing an example of a tribe funding to hire 
archaeologists and historians to conduct scientific and academic research, as well as assisting in the 
repatriation process). 
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when museums treat “consultation as a process not a destination.”575   
Some museums have, for example, adopted “special handling” 
procedures to respect tribal norms on the appropriate treatment of human 
remains or sacred objects in their collections (for example, covering them 
with a blanket, allowing tribal members to bless them with sage, or 
avoiding handling by a member of one gender or the other).
576
  Museum 
officials have gained from tribal leaders valuable information about the 
objects in their possession.
577
  Museums can try to “give back” to the 
Indian communities that are willing to share valuable knowledge with 
them, by loaning sacred objects for religious use or study.
578
  After years of 
consultation leading to a successful repatriation, museum officials have 
even been invited to reburial ceremonies occurring in tribal 
communities.
579
   
Assessing and implementing Native religious norms into 
administrative accommodations is a challenging process, contested among 
tribes and among religious practitioners or groups in the Native 
community.
580
  Two mechanisms have been particularly useful: the 
NAGPRA Review Committee and the agency rulemaking process.  The 
Review Committee is established under NAGPRA “to monitor and review 
the implementation of the inventory and identification process and 
repatriation activities.”581  The Review Committee makes annual reports to 
Congress on compliance and also hears disputes on factual matters to 
resolve repatriation issues between Indian tribes, Alaska Native villages 
and corporations, and Native Hawaiian organizations with museums and 
Federal agencies.
582
  Constituted as an “advisory committee” under the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, the NAGPRA Review Committee is 
governed by administrative law, as well as religious freedoms and federal 
Indian law.  Review Committee members are appointed by the Secretary of 
the Interior from nominations by Indian tribes, Native Hawaiian 
organizations, traditional Native American religious leaders, national 
museum organizations, and scientific organizations.
583
  The NAGPRA 
                                                                                                                          
575 Bridget M. Ambler, Curator of Material Culture, Remarks at the Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., 
(Oct. 11, 2011).  
576 Id. 
577 Id. 
578 Id. 
579 Ken Gewertz, The Long Voyage Home: Peabody Returns Native American Remains to Pecos 
Pueblo, HARV. U. GAZETTE (May 20, 1999), available at 
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/1999/05.20/indian.remains.html.  
580 See, e.g., Na Lei Alii Kawananakoa v. Hui Malama I Na Kupuna O Hawai’I Nei, 158 F. App’x 
53 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2005) (involving a suit between Native Hawaiian organizations regarding 
disposition of cultural items). 
581 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3006(a) (2006).   
582 Id. § 3006(c). 
583 Id. § 3006(b)(1). 
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Review Committee’s composition is meant to lend both substantive 
expertise and political balance in policy determinations, such as the 
eternally complicated question of determining when it is appropriate to 
allow scientific study on items covered by NAGPRA.
584
  
Following one recent and now infamous case, a rule by the Department 
of the Interior resolved a major issue of broad contention.  In Bonnichsen 
v. United States,
585
 anthropologists and archaeologists challenged the 
applicability of NAGPRA to an 8,000 year-old skeleton found in the 
aboriginal territory of several tribes in the Columbia River Plateau near 
Kennewick, Washington.
586
  When the skeleton was initially discovered by 
two teenagers, it was turned over to the Army Corps of Engineers.  The 
court stated: “The experts compared the physical characteristics of the 
remains—e.g., measurements of the skull, teeth, and bones—with 
corresponding measurements from other skeletons.  They concluded that 
Kennewick Man’s remains were unlike those of any known present-day 
population, American Indian or otherwise.”587  This examination evoked 
earlier “science” that had classified Indians’ according to craniometry and 
other disciplines that required used the study and measurement of dead 
Indian bodies to substantiate claims about Indian racial inferiority.
588
  It 
also contradicted their religious obligations to rebury the individual they 
called the “Ancient One.”589  The tribes argued that according to their 
religious beliefs:  
When a body goes into the ground, it is meant to stay there 
until the end of time.  When remains are disturbed and 
remain above the ground, their spirits are at unrest. . . . To 
put these spirits at ease, the remains must be returned to the 
ground as soon as possible.
590
  
The Department of Interior had decided that the tribes had a right to 
rebury the Ancient One’s remains, a ruling that the scientists challenged.591  
The Ninth Circuit vacated the Interior’s decision, holding that the scientists 
had a right to study the skeleton under an Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act because the remains did not fall under NAGPRA’s 
                                                                                                                          
584 See Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 455 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1224 
(D. Nev. 2006) (holding that BLM’s decision not to repatriate remains to tribe, and instead to allow 
scientific study on grounds that the remains were culturally unidentifiable, was arbitrary and 
capricious).  
585 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2004). 
586 Id. at 870. 
587 Id. at 871. 
588 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 249.  
589 Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 870 n.8 (quoting Bonnichsen v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 
1121 (D. Or. 2002)).   
590 Id. (quoting Bonnichsen, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1121).   
591 Id. at 868.   
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purview.
592
  This was because NAGPRA defined “Native American” as 
“of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the 
United States.”593  Given the evidence about the skull and other 
measurements, the court was unconvinced that the skeleton was 
indigenous.
594
  Moreover, the court noted with some incredulity the 
government’s argument that even “remains as old as 100,000 or 150,000 
years, close to the dawn of homo sapiens . . . would be ‘Native American’ 
under the government’s interpretation of NAGPRA.”595  The 
archaeological evidence showed no human settlements in the relevant 
region dating back 9,000 years, and the court was not compelled by the 
tribes’ oral traditions that showed a connection to “the Ancient One.”596  
Stating that “the government’s . . . interpretation . . . has no principle of 
limitation beyond geography” and that Congress did not intend NAGPRA 
to apply to remains of “such great antiquity,”597 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the government’s determination that the remains were Native American 
and covered by NAGPRA must fail.
598
  The court ordered that the skeleton 
(which had already been reburied) be made available to the scientists.
599
 
In the aftermath of Bonnichsen, the Department of the Interior issued 
regulations dealing with the disposition of “culturally unidentifiable human 
remains,” an issue that had previously been left open under NAGPRA.600  
These regulations provide that if an agency or museum is unable to provide 
a “right of possession,” culturally unidentifiable remains are to be 
repatriated first to the tribe from which the remains were removed or to the 
Indian tribe or tribes “that are recognized as aboriginal to the area from 
which the remains were removed.”601  This was exactly the standard 
proposed by the Columbia River Tribes in Bonnichsen.
602
  Its adoption by 
the Department of the Interior suggests that what may look to the courts 
like a limitless tribal religious norm—in this case, an obligation to take 
care of ancestral remains within the aboriginal territory—can ultimately 
serve to inform administrative policy after consultation with tribes.  
                                                                                                                          
592 Id. at 880.   
593 Id. at 875 (citing Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C.  
§ 3001(9) (2006)). 
594 Id. at 880.   
595 Id. at 876 n.17. 
596 Id. at 880–82. 
597 Id. at 876 n.17. 
598 Id. at 882. 
599 Id. 
600 43 C.F.R. § 10.11(c)(1) (2011). 
601 Id. § 10.11(c)(1). 
602 Bonnichsen, 367 F.3d at 870. 
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E.  Peyote 
  This review of legislative and administrative accommodations of 
Indian religion ends where it began: with religious use of peyote.  As the 
earlier discussions of Woody and Smith make clear, peyote is the sacrament 
of the NAC, deeply revered for its spiritual and healing powers.  Smith was 
controversial because it provided that states could outlaw peyote 
possession even for religious use.
603
  True, as Professor Marci Hamilton 
often points out, many states legislated in favor of peyote exemptions 
following Smith.
604
  But this hardly ensured widespread religious liberty 
for NAC members.  To the contrary, these laws created a “patchwork” 
effect in which twenty-eight states had an exemption for religious use and 
the rest made peyote possession a felony.
605
  As Walter Echo-Hawk 
argued, “NAC members became subject in twenty-two states to arrest, 
incarceration, and discrimination solely because of their form of 
worship.”606  Not only were peyote practitioners forbidden from practicing 
in those states, but they could not transport peyote across those states.
607
  
Given that peyote grows only in Texas (and Mexico), it became very 
difficult to obtain the sacrament.
 608
  Moreover, the state rules varied, with 
some, like Texas, imposing a “25 percent Indian blood-quantum-
requirement” and others using different measures of eligibility.609  As a 
result of outright prohibitions, legal uncertainty, and continuing societal 
ignorance about peyote, NAC members were left to “pray in fear” after 
Smith.
610
 
After the broad-based coalition of religious and secular organizations 
declined to push for peyote-specific protections in RFRA, well-known 
peyote leaders such as Reuben Snake partnered with legal services 
organizations and the Native American Religious Freedom Project to push 
                                                                                                                          
603 See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671 (1988) (finding that the First Amendment does not 
extend protection to conduct, including the use of peyote, that the States have validly proscribed), 
superseded by statute, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006)) (“[T]he use, 
possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes . . . is 
lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the United States or any State.”). 
604 Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, 
and the Doctrinal Discourse, supra note 7, at 1693; see also Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the 
Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 820 n.73 (1999) (listing examples of 
federal and state statutes that provide exemptions for peyote use in religious ceremonies). 
605 See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 208 (discussing the AIRFA Amendments of 1994, which 
eliminated disparities between states in the treatment of religious peyote use by Indians). 
606
 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 317. 
607 See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 205–06 (discussing how, after Smith, the states could 
prosecute the possession of peyote, even if intended for religious use). 
608 Id. at 5. 
609 See id. at 200–01 (discussing lawsuits in Texas and in New York that challenged the Indian-
blood requirements for the use of peyote in religious ceremonies). 
610
 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, at 317, 532 n.164 (quoting Robert Billie White Horse, President 
of the Native American Church of Navajoland). 
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for more responsive federal legislation.
611
  This effort required a 
nationwide grassroots effort, reaching peyote organizations and Indian 
tribes across the United States.  Elected leaders, even those from tribes that 
had not always supported peyote, testified in support of the bill.  In 1994, 
Congress passed amendments to the AIRFA, providing “the use, 
possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for bona fide . . . 
traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not be prohibited by the 
United States or any State.”612  Under the AIRFA amendments, “Indian” is 
defined as a member of a federally recognized tribe.
613
  This statutory 
approach had the welcome effect of overruling Smith and it was also 
consistent with accommodating Indian religious in the context of tribal 
self-determination.   
Still, challenges remain.  The AIRFA Amendments create potential 
inconsistency with an earlier regulatory exception, stating that “[t]he listing 
of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does not apply to the 
nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native 
American Church, and members of the Native American Church so using 
peyote are exempt from registration.”614  The regulations had sometimes 
been interpreted to include and protect NAC members who were either 
non-Indian or of Indian heritage but not eligible for citizenship in their 
tribes.   
Access to peyote by non-Indians raises a number of issues.  NAC 
members and leaders are, for example, deeply concerned about instances in 
which non-Indians have claimed to create a new “Native American 
Church” and sought exemptions for the “religious use” of peyote.615  The 
“Oklevueha Native American Church”—an organization run by a non-
Indian peyote activist named James Mooney who was arrested in 2006 for 
possession of 12,000 peyote buttons—has been particularly aggressive.616  
Mooney has argued that state and federal laws violate equal protection and 
RFRA by limiting peyote exemptions to members of federally recognized 
tribes, claims that have thus far been unsuccessful.
617
  In one case, the DOJ 
                                                                                                                          
611 HUSTON SMITH & REUBEN SNAKE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: THE TRIUMPH OF THE NATIVE 
AMERICAN CHURCH 139–40 (1996); see also id. at 125–39  (describing the history of Indian religious 
use of peyote and how it has been affected by European jurisprudence from the early European 
colonization of America through the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith). 
612 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2006). 
613 Id. §§ 1996a(c)(1)–(2). 
614 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2012). 
615 See State v. Mooney, 98 P.3d 420, 422 (Utah 2004) (overturning conviction of non-Indian who 
possessed peyote and claimed membership in “Oklevueha Earthwalks Native American Church”). 
616 MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 223. 
617 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 8–11, Oklevueha 
Native Am. Church v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-00892 (D. Utah Sept. 13, 2010) (alleging that the 
government violated the RFRA and the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to allow members of the 
NAC to use peyote in religious ceremonies). 
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agreed to drop the charges if Mooney “agreed to never acquire, use, or 
distribute Peyote.”618 
Many American Indians find Mooney’s litigation strategy worrisome 
and his conduct offensive.  First, if successful, Mooney could eviscerate 
the federal statutory protection for peyote use that American Indians fought 
so hard to obtain after Smith.  Second, Mooney’s use of peyote in his own 
brand of ceremony violates their beliefs about the sanctity of the plant.  For 
NAC members, peyote is a deity that must be carefully harvested and 
transported, never wasted, and only taken in a religious ceremony.
619
  
Because of the very small geographic area where peyote can grow, as well 
as overharvesting problems, peyote supplies are already quite low.  Non-
Indian use jeopardizes the plant, creates extra demand, and raises the 
price.
620
  Additionally, when federal agents seize peyote from individuals 
not protected by law, they destroy the plant—leading to the desecration 
and loss of thousands of peyote buttons that would have otherwise been 
used in a NAC meeting.
621
  Finally, Mooney and others similarly situated 
threaten to raise the kind of concerns articulated in Smith, that certain 
individuals are merely using religious arguments as a shield for illicit drug 
use.  
Mooney’s challenges reveal much about the current state of American 
Indian religious freedoms.
622
  It would be very difficult for the NAC to 
prevail, under the First Amendment or RFRA alone, on an argument that 
American Indians should have an exclusive exemption for peyote use.  A 
“church autonomy” argument might protect the NAC in its internal 
affairs—for example, in affirming the Church’s right to select certain 
individuals as roadmen or divide property according to church rules.  But 
some NAC leaders and members desire to limit non-Indian access to 
peyote as a general matter.  On this point, the Utah court held that tribal 
affiliation is immaterial to the legality of the ingestion of peyote by an 
                                                                                                                          
618 MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 224. 
619 See, e.g., Non-Natives Using Peyote, NATIVE AM. CALLING (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.nativeamericacalling.com/nac_past2010.shtml (national radio call-in show featuring 
differing perspectives on non-Indian peyote use, as in Oklevueha). 
620 See MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 225–28 (describing the ecological and economic factors 
that have led to a decline in peyote harvest, and a concurrent increase in the price of peyote over the 
past fifty years). 
621 See Non-Natives Using Peyote, supra note 619.  
622 While Mooney is generally perceived at one end of a continuum of legitimacy in religious use 
of peyote, there are more nuanced and complicated questions raised, for example, by the religious use 
of peyote by American Indians lacking enrollment status or by non-Indian relatives of tribal members.  
For discussion of these issues in the eagle feather context, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Culture Talk or 
Culture War, 45 TULSA L. REV. 89, 96–97 (2009). 
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individual.
623
  But other courts have held that that NAC membership is a 
political classification that withstands free exercise and equal protection 
challenges by non-Indians.
624
  Moreover, the DOJ and DEA have been 
quite sympathetic to the NAC in its quest to preserve the statutory 
exemption for members of federally recognized tribes.  The DOJ has 
worked to prosecute Mooney and others, and the DEA, after consultation 
with tribal and NAC leaders, has proposed amending the regulations to 
conform with AIRFA, such that the exemption for peyote possession will 
be available only for members of federally recognized tribes.
625
  As scholar 
Thomas Maroukis argues, “This represents a moving away from a First 
Amendment defense of Peyote use to the argument that the exemption 
comes from the unique trust relationship between American Indian nations 
and the federal government.”626    
V. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps in an ideal world, there would be no role for federal courts, 
legislators, or agencies in American Indian religion.
627
  Tribal people 
would be truly free to live out their own spiritual visions and dreams as 
communities sharing the landscapes that give rise to a different and 
beautiful way of life.
628
  But this is not the reality that we inhabit, at least 
not today.  Through generations of conquest and colonization, the federal 
government has inserted itself into every aspect of American Indian tribal 
life, and has only begun to disentangle itself from the previous suppression 
of American Indian religion.  Increasingly, the government has shown its 
support for the American Indian perspective that religious freedom is tied 
                                                                                                                          
623  See Utah v. Mooney, 98 P.3d 420, 428 (Utah 2004) (holding that bona fide religious use of 
peyote by members of the NAC cannot serve as a basis for the prosecution of members, irrespective of 
tribal membership). 
624 See Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that NAC membership is a political classification).  
625
 MAROUKIS, supra note 101, at 222–23.   
626 Id. at 224.  Cf. Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
434 (2006) (“[I]f any schedule I substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount no matter 
how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote?  
Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the health 
risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a schedule I substance.”).  
627 Those who call for external oversight of religious institutions, see, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, 
The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. L. REV. 951, 
969–70 (criticizing Supreme Court cases that fail to protect the civil rights of ministers against 
discrimination by religious institutions) and of tribal governments, see, e.g., Robert Clinton, Federal 
Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REV. 657, 657 (2002) 
(considering whether additional federal judicial review would strengthen the case for indigenous self-
governance), might start from a different premise. 
628 See James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness, 1 
INDIGENOUS L.J. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that indigenous peoples must “dream and articulate impossible 
visions” in furtherance of a post-colonial reality). 
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to tribal self-determination, and that religious and cultural experiences give 
tribal members the values that shape their collective and separate existence 
as nations within the nation.  Yet, so long as the United States continues to 
own sacred sites and regulate religious rituals, there will still be a long way 
to go in ensuring that American Indians enjoy religious liberties at the 
individual and tribal level. 
Given this reality, what are the lessons to draw about limiting 
principles and empowering practices in American Indian religious 
freedoms?  First, I am not entirely persuaded that courts are institutionally 
incapable of assessing the basic beliefs and practices of tribal religions in 
free exercise cases.  Like religious freedoms scholar Richard Garnett and 
others, I see this inquiry as requiring the evaluation of testimony and 
documents, no more or no less difficult than the analysis of other complex 
or specialized matters like the science behind toxic torts or financial 
transactions giving rise to mortgage-backed securities.  Admittedly, 
American Indian religions reflect a different world view than other world 
religions.  Yet, the state courts in Woody and Frank, and even the federal 
appellate court in Lyng, showed sensitivity and sensibility as they analyzed 
Indian practices without intruding into a forbidden religions sphere.  The 
rhetoric about limitless Indian religious claims in Bowen, Lyng, and Smith 
may be more about acceding to the power of conquest than about true 
institutional incompetence.
629
  In any event, the Supreme Court’s inability 
or unwillingness to evaluate American Indian religious claims on their own 
terms was a major factor explaining the Bowen-Lyng-Smith trilogy—a 
factor that has been largely overlooked in previous scholarship examining 
Smith generically as a religion case. 
I am persuaded, however, that Congress and the Executive Branch, 
when motivated to address Indian issues, are better situated than the courts 
to negotiate with tribal governments over the contours of religious 
accommodation.  The legislative and administrative framework created in 
the post-Smith era empowers tribes and agencies, taking religious norms as 
a baseline, to work together and find solutions to seemingly intractable 
problems.  The Departments of Justice and the Interior, and agencies such 
as the Park Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, have increasingly shown 
their willingness to work closely on matters of eagle feathers, peyote, 
sacred sites, and burial grounds to fashion accommodations that allow for 
some restoration of religious freedoms to American Indians while 
balancing the needs of competing stakeholders.  I have suggested several 
                                                                                                                          
629 See ECHO-HAWK, supra note 10, 274–75 (arguing that the Indian cases are not only about “an 
insensitive court system that experienced inordinate difficulty understanding and protecting a set of 
religions vastly different from those more familiar to American judges” but also about the fact that “the 
courts were captive to larger, more powerful forces that resulted in the near eradication of tribal 
religion—that is, settler-state policies animated by religious discrimination against tribal religions”).  
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reforms in this Article, including the requirement for agencies to enter into 
consensual agreements with tribes; the expansion of tribal government 
jurisdiction over eagle feather and peyote matters; and the formation of 
expert, representative, interdisciplinary national advisory committees to 
provide insight on complex religious matters.  Together, these reforms 
would improve the legal framework in the spirit of self-determination, 
religious freedoms, and human rights. 
 Beyond the American Indian context, it seems that for many 
individuals and groups, RFRA and RLUIPA are working relatively well to 
effectuate religious freedoms.  The statutory version of the substantial 
burden/compelling interest test has successfully protected even minority 
religions in recent RFRA cases.
630
  Of course, as religious rights scholar Ira 
Lupu has argued, one problem with the legislative accommodation model 
is that “[r]eligious liberty cannot be captured in a simple test or phrase or 
statutory formula.”631  American Indian tribes have worked relatively well 
with agencies to develop richly nuanced accommodations of tribal-specific 
religions in ways that broad brush legislation might not.  An interesting 
follow-up project to this one would be to assess the extent to which other 
religious groups have worked successfully with agencies to fashion 
particularized accommodations of religion, and whether the American 
Indian context is typical or exceptional in this regard.  Relatedly, the 
American Indian context also illustrates Alan Brownstein’s point about the 
costs of the accommodation model on religious minorities.
632
  At best, 
these groups must now expend significant political capital and resources 
negotiating for the fundamental liberties that members of majority faiths 
enjoy without conflict.  The American public may want to evaluate 
whether this is a justifiable cost to impose on minority religious 
practitioners.   
The costs are particularly high for American Indians.  Tribal leaders 
have spent significant time and resources lobbying Congress and the 
agencies on sacred sites and eagle feathers at the same time that reservation 
residents are facing crushing poverty, violent crime, jurisdictional battles, 
land claims, and other matters requiring tribal leaders’ attention.  
Moreover, in the administrative process, tribal interests often still lose out 
to parties with more financial resources and political clout.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Navajo Nation casts serious doubt on the extent to 
                                                                                                                          
630 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005) (discussing Wicca, Asatru, and 
Satanism); Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 418–19 (discussing the “UDV” religion). 
631 Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 565, 577 (1999). 
632 See Alan Brownstein, The Religion Clauses as Mutually Reinforcing Mandates: Why the 
Arguments for Rigorously Enforcing the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause Are Stronger 
When Both Clauses Are Taken Seriously, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1701, 1725 & n.74 (2011) (arguing that 
religious minorities must expend significant political capital to protect their rights). 
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which the courts will serve as a backstop to ensure that American Indians, 
and possibly other Americans, are protected in their enjoyment of 
fundamental freedoms.  As constitutional scholar Jesse Choper has argued, 
the accommodation model is generally problematic when courts abdicate 
to the political process a traditionally perceived purpose of legislative 
actions: to protect minority rights from majoritarian tyranny.
633
  To this 
end, the Tenth Circuit’s broader approach to RFRA, as applied in the 
district court’s Comanche Nation case, seems much more promising, if not 
completely tested, at this point. 
Whether under RFRA or RLUIPA—or perhaps new amendments to 
the Indian religion statutes—Indian religious practitioners still need some 
guarantee of judicial review if they are to enjoy meaningful religious 
freedoms.  This will require additional work by advocates and scholars.  
RFRA and RLUPA are silent on American Indian issues, while the Indian-
specific religion statutes have few substantive enforcement mechanisms.  
Even as Congress has legislated in favor of “tribal” interests in religion and 
courts have begun to assess the autonomy interests of religious 
“organizations,” it remains somewhat unclear where exactly American 
Indian organizations, tribal governments, the NAC—and perhaps even 
certain non-Indian religious institutions and groups—fit under the Free 
Exercise Clause or RFRA.
634
  By the same token, Congress has not exactly 
clarified the extent to which it expects agencies to be bound by the new 
Indian religion policies.
635
  Further work at the intersection of Indian law 
and religious freedoms law could elucidate these questions. 
Finally, the American Indian example suggests that all three branches 
of government can treat issues of institutionalism and equality with nuance 
toward a broader conception of religious freedom.  Certainly, American 
Indians may be unique entities in religious freedoms jurisprudence and 
beyond.  But they also crystallize the question of what religious freedom 
means in our country.  If religious freedom is about individual rights 
construed in terms of formal equality and a limited judicial role, American 
Indians will find themselves excluded from the promise of the First 
Amendment and RFRA.  But if religious freedom is about something 
                                                                                                                          
633 See Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of Constitutional Protections of Religious Liberty, 
70 NEB. L. REV. 651, 685–88 (1991), cited in DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR. & MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 752 
(2011). 
634 See, e.g., Brett G. Sharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1220 
(2004) (arguing that religious “autonomy” literature has three concerns, the autonomy of the church, 
the state, and the individual). 
635 For briefs in Te-moak Tribe of Western Shoshone v. United States, currently on appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit regarding the BLM’s obligations to tribes at sacred sites, see Turtle Talk, Briefs in Te-
Moak Tribe et al. v. Interior (June 13, 2010, 2:06 PM), 
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2012/06/13/briefs-in-te-moak-tribe-et-al-v-interior/. 
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more—perhaps pluralism and a courageous commitment to make space for 
the religious beliefs that inspire both individuals and groups within our 
nation—then its promise will encompass the first Americans as well as 
those who followed.
636
 
 
  
                                                                                                                          
636 See BURTON, supra note 450, at 291 (linking accommodation of tribal religious practices to the 
broader tradition of religious pluralism in the United States); see also THOMAS BANCHOFF, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW RELIGIOUS PLURALISM (2007) (examining views on religious pluralism, 
including tolerance and accommodation). 
